Essays on Exchange-Traded Fund Mispricing and Liquidity by Broman, Markus Sebastian
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON EXCHANGE-TRADED FUND MISPRICING AND 
LIQUIDITY 
 
 
 
 
 
MARKUS SEBASTIAN BROMAN 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
YORK UNIVERSITY 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
 
JUNE, 2015 
 
 
© Markus Broman, 2015 
  
ii 
ABSTRACT 
In the first essay I investigate whether the high liquidity of ETFs attracts a clientele of 
short-term investors. I find that liquidity is an important determinant of fund flows, particularly 
at weekly and monthly horizons. I also investigate whether more liquid ETFs facilitates shorter-
term trading. I document a liquidity clientele amongst institutional investors: i) their buys and 
sells are positively related to ETF liquidity, ii) liquidity is significantly more important for short- 
than for long-term investors, and iii) liquidity is inversely related to average holding periods. 
These findings are consistent with the idea that liquidity benefits short-term traders the most. 
In the second essay I show that changes in ETF misvaluation – as proxied by the return 
difference between an Exchange-Traded Fund and its underlying portfolio Net Asset Value – 
comove excessively across ETFs. Excess comovements are positive and highly significant across 
ETFs in matching investment styles, and negative and significant across distant styles. Further 
tests based on return reversals suggest that ETF premiums relative to NAV reflect misvaluation 
primarily in the ETF, rather than the NAV price, particularly for ETFs in more liquid styles (e.g. 
small-cap). Finally, the degree of return comovements is stronger for funds with high 
commonality in demand shocks and more attractive liquidity characteristics. These findings are 
consistent with the idea that liquidity can sometimes be detrimental to pricing efficiency, because 
liquidity attracts short-horizon noise traders with correlated demand for investment styles. 
The third essay investigates whether asset prices are exposed to local-trading induced 
misvaluation. My sample contains 2727 pairs of European ETFs from 15 different country pairs. 
Each ETF-pair has identical fundamentals, but is traded by investors from different countries. I 
document a strong country-specific factor in twin return differentials. This result holds from 
daily to monthly horizons, it is unrelated to exchange rates and it cannot be explained by 
liquidity differences. Consistent with local misvaluation in the stock market, I find a significantly 
positive relationship between twin return differentials and local stock returns, particularly at 
higher frequencies. Additional tests provide evidence against the alternative explanation that 
misvaluation is driven by similarities in information diffusion between twins. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
As of August 2014, the global Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) market has garnered $2.7 trillion of 
assets, similar in size to the global hedge fund industry, despite the fact that hedge funds predate 
ETFs by 41 years. Figure 1-1 illustrates the growth in assets of the ETF and the hedge fund 
industry, side-by-side from 1993 to 2014. The ETF industry reached $600 billion as late as in 
2006, roughly six years later than the hedge fund industry. Although the U.S. leads in assets with 
$430 billion in 2006 and $2 trillion in 2014, European ETF assets have also grown rapidly from 
$92 billion in 2006 to $500 billion in 2014
1
. In terms of trading volume, ETFs already account 
for 42 percent of all equity dollar volume on NYSE ARCA
2
. 
The advantages of ETFs are well known. They offer investors tax-efficient exposure to a 
diversified basket of securities at real-time prices, and at a lower fee than their retail index fund 
counterparts. In addition, In Chapter two, I show that many ETFs are more liquid relative to their 
                                                 
1
 Source: The data on the ETF vs. hedge-fund comparison is from ETFGI Research Note: “ETF/ETP industry 
forecast to surpass hedge funds in Q2”, April 2015. Data on U.S. ETF assets is from the Investment company fact 
book 2005. The data on European  AUM is from Financial times, “Chart that tells a story — ETF growth”,  May 1, 
2015. 
2
 “Measuring ETF Liquidity: Looking beyond Trading Volume” SPDR University, SPDR.com 
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underlying portfolio of securities. For instance, between 2006 and 2012 the SPDR S&P 500 ETF 
(ticker: SPY) the proportional quoted spread of SPY was only 18 percent of those for its 
underlying basket, and its Amihud’s price impact was only 17 percent of those for its basket. 
This is far from an isolated incident. For our sample of U.S. equity ETFs (consisting of 165 ETFs 
with $540 billion in assets, or 85 percent of U.S. equity ETF assets), relative liquidity in spreads 
is on average 89 percent of the underlying portfolio spreads. Moreover, the ETF structure 
provides an extra (or “hidden”) layer of liquidity that allows select institutional investors (known 
as Authorized Participants, or APs) to create or redeem ETF shares for their retail or institutional 
clients via the primary market whenever it is more cost efficient, i.e. when the liquidity of ETF in 
the secondary market is below that for its underlying securities. This option-like feature of ETFs 
implies that the lower bound for their liquidity is determined by the maximum of the liquidity of 
the ETF in the secondary market, and the liquidity of the underlying securities in the primary 
market.  
In the second chapter, I examine whether improved liquidity of ETFs relative to its 
underlying basket (if any) leads to greater net demand for ETFs, and encourages shorter-term 
trading. Our conjecture is that liquidity facilitates short-term trading, in which case liquidity 
should be an important determinant of ETF net demand over shorter horizons. Liquidity should 
be important not only for buying, but also selling (Cella, Ellul and Giannetti (2013), for example, 
discuss the importance of liquidity particularly for institutional selling, especially during 
episodes of market distress, such as the financial crisis of 2008.). I measure ETF demand either 
by net fund flows (over weekly, monthly or quarterly horizons), or institutional demand (net, buy 
or sell) constructed from quarterly institutional holdings from SEC 13-F filings.  
Although liquidity is beneficial to all investors, short-term investors should value liquidity 
the most (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). Recent survey evidence by Greenwich Associates 
(2013) shows that institutional investors frequently use ETFs for short-term trading strategies: as 
a short-term hedging vehicle, for transition management, for tactical asset allocations, and cash 
equitization. Amongst institutional investors, I therefore study further whether there is a liquidity 
clientele effect, whereby more liquid ETFs (relative to their underlying basket) experience 
increased ownership by shorter-term investors relative to longer-term, and reduced holding 
periods.  
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Short-term trading and the existence of liquidity clienteles is a critical assumption in the 
third chapter, where I argue that ETFs attract a clientele of short-term investors with correlated 
non-fundamental demand for investment styles. More generally, there is also an ongoing debate 
on whether short-term trading is beneficial to, or detrimental for, market efficiency. The 
empirical evidence is mixed, possibly because short-term trading can theoretically be beneficial 
when it is related to arbitrage activities (Shleifer and Summers, 1990, for example); detrimental 
when it reflects common non-fundamental demand such as style switching (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003), sentiment (Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990), or correlated 
liquidity needs (Greenwood and Thesmar, 2011) that generate excess comovements among asset 
returns; or detrimental when it reflects exogenous trading needs such as income shocks (Lynch 
and Tan, 2007) or liquidity shocks (Huang, 2003) that increase the frequency of trading and 
impose a liquidity risk factor on asset prices. 
In the third chapter I investigate how style investing and the high liquidity of ETFs can 
facilitate excess comovements in ETF returns. In frictionless markets with rational investors, the 
price of a security will equal its fundamental value, and any comovement in returns must be due 
to comovement in fundamentals. However, in economies with frictions or with irrational 
investors, and in which there are limits to arbitrage, comovement in returns may be partially 
delinked from fundamentals giving rise to what is known as excess comovement. Several 
theoretical models build on the price impact of correlated investor demand to explain the 
existence of excess comovement (Barberis and Shelifer, 2003; Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 
2005; and Greenwood and Thesmar, 2011). 
The theoretical channel for excess comovement in ETF returns relies the model by 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003), where investors allocate funds at the style level (e.g. small or 
value) as opposed to at the individual asset level, moving into styles that have performed well in 
the past, and out of styles that have performed poorly. If some of these style investors are also 
noise traders with correlated sentiment (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2006), then coordinated shifts in 
investor preferences across investment styles (e.g. from value to growth) will induce a common 
factor in the returns of assets in the same style.  
Investor demand should go first to the securities where the purest play exists and where 
liquidity is highest. Exchange-Traded Funds provide investors with easy access to popular 
investment styles (large, small, value, growth, sector) at a cost that is on average lower relative to 
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their underlying basket of securities (as shown in Chapter 2). Moreover, it is easy to move 
money in and out of two different styles with ETFs and to enter into long-short strategies (e.g. 
Value-Growth) due to the relatively low short-selling costs of ETFs. My conjecture is that, due 
to the ease of investing in investment styles with ETFs and because of their high liquidity, ETFs 
attract a clientele of short-term investors with correlated non-fundamental demand for 
investment styles. In this case, liquidity can sometimes be detrimental to pricing efficiency, 
because the high liquidity of ETFs is attractive to short-term investors, which increases the 
exposure of ETFs to common non-fundamental demand shocks. 
To arrive at a testable hypothesis, I make a comparison between the return of the ETF and 
the return of its underlying portfolio Net Asset Value (NAV). Since both are claims on the same 
underlying cash-flows, the ETF-NAV return difference can be used as a proxy for the change in 
ETF misvaluation. This relative, or twin-based, comparison allows me to identify excess 
comovements by studying common factors in the change in misvaluation. This approach is in 
sharp contrast to existing studies that investigate anomalous return comovements around 
“exogenous” events, or by relying on a CAPM type model to filter out the fundamental 
component of returns. Moreover, by properly controlling for fundamental drivers of return 
comovements, I can examine what affects the degree of excess comovements in order to provide 
a better understanding of the ETF characteristics, particularly liquidity, that drive a wedge in the 
clientele between ETFs and their underlying securities. 
Common factors in ETF misvaluation (ETF-NAV returns) can also arise for reasons other 
than correlated demand shocks. Specifically, if fundamental news about abstract risk-factors is 
incorporated first into ETF prices (the high liquidity of ETFs is attractive to long-term investors 
as well), while their underlying securities react more slowly, then similarities in information 
diffusion across ETFs can generate excess comovements in ETF returns (Barberis, Shleifer and 
Wurgler, 2005). In order to disentangle the two hypotheses, I use a direct approach by examining 
the source of misvaluation (ETF vs. NAV). The non-fundamentals based view predicts that ETFs 
are hit by temporary demand shocks that subsequently revert, in which case current ETF 
premiums (ETF-NAV price deviations) should predict future ETF returns negatively, while 
future NAV returns remain unaffected. In contrast, the information diffusion view predicts that 
ETFs impound fundamental information first, while their underlying securities (NAV) catch up 
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with a lag, in which case current ETF premiums (ETF-NAV price deviations) predict future 
NAV returns positively, while future ETF returns are not affected. 
In the fourth chapter I analyze whether excess comovements can arise in an international 
setting, specifically, whether the trading by a local (country-specific) clientele in Exchange-
Traded Funds can induce a country-specific factor in ETF misvaluation. My focus is on ETFs 
tracking European equity indices and with a European stock market listing. A unique advantage 
of the European ETF market (in terms of research design) is the fragmentation of listings across 
various exchanges. Although there are more than 650 plain vanilla European equity ETFs traded 
in Europe, many are essentially duplicates of one another as they are either cross-listed from a 
different European exchange, or they track an identical benchmark index. For instance, the most 
popular benchmark index, Euro Stoxx 50, is tracked by 78 different ETFs. ETF providers list 
new (or cross-list existing) funds primarily to meet local clientele demand. Out of the 416 ETFs 
and six countries analyzed in this chapter (U.K., Switzerland, France, Germany, Italy and 
Netherlands), I construct 2727 (local-foreign) pairs of ETFs from 15 different county pairs. Each 
ETF in a pair has identical fundamentals (i.e. passively tracks an identical benchmark index), but 
is traded and owned by investors from different countries.  
Locally excessive return comovements can arise theoretically in the preferred habitat view 
of excess comovement formalized by Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005), where a) some 
investors limit their trading to a particular subset of securities, such as local stocks or ETFs; or b) 
some securities are primarily owned by a specific subset of investors, such as local investor. The 
correlated trading of these investors can then generate a common factor in the returns of 
securities in the habitat.  A similar home bias in “foreign investments” has previously been 
documented by Ke, Ng and Wang (2010), who find that non-US-based mutual funds prefer to 
invest in locally traded securities of U.S. companies. 
The motivation for local clienteles in ETFs is closely related to the literature on home and 
local bias. Home bias, or the tendency for investor to invest in equity securities at home, is 
pervasive around the world (e.g. Chan, Covrig an Ng, 2005), while local bias reflects the 
tendency for investors to invest in nearby domestic securities (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). 
Local ETF habitats can arise theoretically in the framework of Chan, Covrig an Ng (2005). They 
show theoretically that home bias can arise if local investors have lower deadweight costs when 
investing in the domestic market (or higher costs when investing abroad) relative to the world 
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investor. Locally traded ETFs provide investors with easy access to foreign stock market indices 
without having to incur costs associated with the trading, settlement or transfer of ETF shares 
across national markets, operational costs that arise from the requirement to have depository 
accounts in each country and follow post-trading rules in each jurisdiction. Other costs include 
withholding taxes, which apply to dividend income that foreign investors (non-residents) pay to 
the government where the stocks are domiciled, and possibly also to the government where the 
ETF is located. International trading restrictions and lack of information (Merton, 1987) or 
constraints on investors’ attention (Peng and Xiong, 2006) can also contribute to the formation of 
local habitats. 
I also investigate an alternative explanation of excess comovements that arises from 
differences in the speed of information diffusion between securities traded in difference countries 
(Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005). Specifically, if local investors are better or faster at 
processing information about abstract local fundamental factors, then it can give rise to excess 
comovements among local securities relative to their foreign peers. To rule out this alternative 
explanation, I compare the strength of excess comovements among sub-samples of ETFs where 
local investors are unlikely to have an informational advantage over foreign investors. As a more 
direct test, I also examine the source of mean-reversion in ETF misvaluation. Local-trading 
induced misvaluation suggests that current ETF premiums predicts future returns of locally 
traded ETFs negatively, while the information diffusion story predicts that current ETF 
premiums predicts future returns of foreign ETFs positively, as foreign ETF prices catch up to 
reflect the fundamental news already incorporated into foreign ETF prices.  
The fifth chapter provides a summary of key results and conclusions. 
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Figure 1- 1: Global assets invested in ETFs/ETPs and hedge funds, at the end of Q1 2015 
 
Source: ETFGI research note 27 April 2015, http://etfgi.com/news/industry/newsid/162 
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CHAPTER TWO: SHORT-TERM TRADING AND LIQUIDITY CLIENTELES: 
EVIDENCE FROM EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 “Unlike traditional index funds, ETFs trade on an exchange, and can be bought and sold at any 
time. That creates a temptation to trade…” 
~ John Bogle, Founder of the Vanguard Group
3
 
As of August 2014, the global Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) market has garnered $2.7 trillion of 
assets,
4
 similar in size to the global hedge fund industry,
5
 despite the fact that hedge funds 
predate ETFs by 41 years. Their trading volume accounts for 42 percent of all equity dollar 
volume on the NYSE Arca by about the same time.
6
 ETFs offer investors tax-efficient exposure 
to a diversified basket of securities at real-time prices, and at a lower fee than their retail index 
fund counterparts. In addition, many ETFs are more liquid than their underlying basket of 
securities; that is, they have positive relative liquidity. One dramatic example in terms of the 
                                                 
3
 Newlands, Chris. “Bogle launches renewed attacks on ETFs” Financial Times, March 15, 2015. 
4
 Including both ETFs and ETPs, from just $426 billion in 2005. Source: ETFGI database. 
5
 The amount of global hedge fund assets under management was $2.82 trillion in the third quarter of 2014. Source: 
Hedge Fund Research Global Hedge Fund Report Third Quarter 2014. It is widely expected that ETFs will eclipse 
hedge funds by the third quarter of 2015. 
6
 “Measuring ETF Liquidity: Looking beyond Trading Volume” SPDR University, SPDR.com. 
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proportional bid-ask spread is the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (ticker: SPY). Between 2006 and 2012, 
SPY was trading at spreads of approximately 18 percent of those for its underlying basket. Other 
examples include iShares Russell 2000 (ticker: IWM), the SPDR S&P Midcap 400 ETF (ticker: 
MDY), the iShares Russell 2000 Growth (ticker: IWO) and Value (ticker: IWN), all of which 
were trading at spreads of 11 to 42 percent of those for their respective underlying baskets. In 
terms of trading volume, the ETF structure provides an extra (or “hidden”) layer of liquidity, 
allowing institutional investors to create or redeem ETF shares via the primary market whenever 
it is more cost efficient, or when there is a demand and supply imbalance. 
In this paper, I examine whether improved liquidity of ETFs relative to its underlying 
basket (if any) leads to greater demand for ETFs, and encourages shorter-term trading. I measure 
liquidity in four ways. The first three relate to secondary market liquidity: quoted spreads, price 
impact, and turnover. The fourth relates to the creation and redemption process in the primary 
market. The decisions that I am considering are that of institutional investors, who have the 
ability to choose between investing in an ETF and its underlying basket. For most retail 
investors, the transaction costs involved in trading the underlying basket are likely prohibitive. 
Therefore, relative liquidity may be less important for retail investors. Our conjecture is that 
liquidity facilitates short-term trading, in which case liquidity should be an important 
determinant of ETF demand over shorter horizons. I measure ETF demand either by net fund 
flows (over weekly, monthly or quarterly horizons), or institutional demand (net, buy or sell) 
constructed from quarterly institutional holdings from SEC 13F filings. Amongst institutional 
investors, I study further whether there is a liquidity clientele effect, whereby more liquid ETFs 
(relative to their underlying basket) experience increased ownership by shorter-term investors 
relative to longer-term, and reduced holding periods.  
There is an ongoing debate on whether short-term trading is beneficial to, or detrimental 
for, market efficiency. The empirical evidence is mixed,
7
 possibly because short-term trading can 
theoretically be beneficial when it is related to arbitrage activities (Shleifer and Summers, 1990, 
for example); detrimental when it reflects common non-fundamental demand such as style 
switching (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003), sentiment (Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 
1990), or correlated liquidity needs (Greenwood and Thesmar, 2011) that generate excess 
                                                 
7
 Several papers have linked short-term trading to more anomalous pricing of stock returns, while others have linked 
short-term institutional trading to greater pricing efficiency (see Cremers and Pareek (2014) for an extensive list of 
references). 
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comovements among asset returns; or detrimental when it reflects exogenous trading needs such 
as income shocks (Lynch and Tan, 2007) or liquidity shocks (Huang, 2003) that increase the 
frequency of trading and impose a liquidity risk factor on asset prices.  
Although liquidity is beneficial to all investors, short-term investors should value liquidity 
the most (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). Recent survey evidence by Greenwich Associates 
(2013) shows that institutional investors frequently use ETFs for short-term trading strategies: as 
a short-term hedging vehicle, for transition management, for tactical asset allocations, and cash 
equitization. The incidence of short-term trading in ETFs is also evident from a comparison of 
holding durations of ETFs relative to their underlying securities. To illustrate, using quarterly 
holdings data from SEC 13F filings, I find that the mean holding period for our sample of ETFs 
is 2.8 quarters, which is on average two quarters lower than the dollar-weighted holding duration 
of its underlying basket. (Because I do not have access to daily or intraday holdings data, I am 
not looking at arbitrage transactions or high frequency trading of ETFs.) 
In order to provide a clean comparison of liquidity across ETFs and underlying securities, I 
focus on a select sample of 165 ETFs that are traded in the U.S. and that track only U.S. equity 
indices. In other words, both the ETFs and their underlying securities are traded in the same time 
zone, and in the same currency. The total assets under management of our sample as of the end 
of 2012 is $540 billion - roughly 85 percent of all U.S. equity ETFs. Within this universe, 
investors can choose from a wide range of funds tracking size, valuation and sector-based 
indices.  
If liquidity facilitates short-term trading, then fund flows at higher frequencies should be 
more responsive to liquidity than at lower frequencies. I quantify ETF, underlying basket, and 
relative liquidity (ETF minus underlying portfolio liquidity) using the four measures mentioned 
previously. To preview our results, I show that in general, ETF (underlying basket) liquidity 
predicts future fund flows positively (negatively), or alternatively, that relative liquidity predicts 
net flows positively. These results hold for weekly and monthly flows, while for quarterly flows 
liquidity is no longer a significant determinant. In contrast, trading costs that are more relevant 
for longer-term investors – namely expense ratios – are more than 10 times stronger for quarterly 
net flows as opposed to weekly. The relationship between liquidity and future fund flows also 
remains highly significant when I use unexpected liquidity shocks instead of liquidity levels.  
  
11 
 
Net ETF flows capture aggregate demand, both by retail and institutional investors. To 
investigate the hypothesis that relative liquidity matters primarily for institutional investors, I 
begin by constructing a measure of net institutional demand, and separate measures for 
institutional buying and selling. Net institutional demand is the change in ETF shares held by 13-
F investors over a quarter relative to shares outstanding at the beginning of the quarter, while 
institutional buying (selling) is the aggregate number of shares bought (sold) by 13-F investors 
during a quarter. Similarly to quarterly net flows, I do not find a significant relationship between 
liquidity and net institutional demand. Although it is not surpising to find that liquidity matters 
less over longer horizons, a calendar quarter is still a relatively short holding period and I should 
not expect the significance to disappear altogether. Indeed, our results demonstrate that ETF 
liquidity is a strong predictor of institutional buying, and an even stronger predictor institutuional 
selling (Cella, Ellul and Giannetti (2013), for example, discuss the importance of liquidity 
particularly for institutional selling, especially during episodes of market distress, such as the 
financial crisis of 2008), which is consistent with the idea that short-term trading strategies 
require liquidity both for buys and sells. 
In terms of more direct evidence of a liquidity clientele effect amongst institutional 
investors, I show that liquidity is more important for investors with short-term trading needs. 
First, institutional ownership is significantly higher among ETFs with higher relative liquidity. 
Indeed, institutional investors account for more than 80 percent of the trading in ETFs (Aggarwal 
and Schofield, 2012), while in our sample their total ownership is on average roughly 40 percent, 
which suggests that institutions are more active traders in ETFs. Second, I compare the fraction 
of short-term ownership in ETFs, using the definition of transient investors by Brian Bushee 
(1998), with the fraction of short-term ownership in the underlying securities, and find that ETFs 
have on average 13.1 percent more short-term investors. Third, I look at institutional ownership 
by short- and long-term investors and show that relative liquidity is two to six times as important 
for short- than for long-term institutional ownership (significant at the one percent level). 
Further, in order to show the incidence of short-term trading in ETFs, I use Cremers and 
Pareek’s (2014) measure of institutional investors’ average quarterly holding duration (which I 
call ETF duration). This measure is unrelated to arbitrage activities because it is calculated from 
quarterly portfolio holdings. It therefore ignores arbitrage trades in response to ETF mispricing, 
as the latter is short-lived. I also investigate the determinants of ETF duration and find that ETF 
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liquidity is amongst the most important explanatory factor. These results confirm that ETFs are 
used for short-term trading, which is facilitated by the high liquidity of ETFs. Therefore, an 
important implication of our findings is that as the ETF market continues to grow at a rapid pace, 
it will likely facilitate a higher volume of short-term trading, thereby affecting market efficiency 
and volatility. 
The reverse causality story – i.e., greater use of ETFs by short-term investors leads to 
higher ETF liquidity – is theoretically also a possibility. If true, it could explain the result that 
liquidity predicts more short-term trading. The empirical evidence suggests, however, that 
greater ownership by short-term investors can sometimes lead to lower (rather than higher) 
liquidity. For example, Cella, Ellul and Giannetti (2013) show that during episodes of market 
turmoil, liquidity dry-ups are exacerbated for stocks held primarily by short-term investors. In 
this case the empirical finding that liquidity encourages shorter-term trading is inconsistent with 
reverse causality. 
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, defines the key variables and 
presents the summary statistics. The empirical analysis in section 3 focuses on the relationship 
between liquidity and ETF demand, measured either by net fund flows (over weekly, monthly or 
quarterly horizons) or by quarterly institutional demand (net, buys or sells) using 13-F data. 
Section 4 provides more direct evidence on liquidity clienteles by investigating the importance of 
liquidity for institutional ownership, and for short- vs. long-term investors, and whether average 
institutional holding periods are directly related to ETF liquidity. Section 5 concludes.  
2.2 DATA 
Our data selection starts with all U.S. traded ETFs. I keep funds that i) invest only in U.S. equity, 
ii) are physically replicated and passively managed, and iii) have at least 3 years of data 
available.
8
 I exclude actively managed ETFs because investors presumably choose them for their 
portfolio strategy and manager performance, not necessarily for reasons of liquidity and short-
term trading. Further, the segment of active funds is still very small, representing about one 
percent of total ETF assets. In recent years, a number of “smart beta” funds have emerged. I also 
exclude these funds because they are semi-active strategies. These three exclusion criteria 
                                                 
8
 We exclude the first 6 months of a fund's history given that liquidity measures based on shares outstanding are 
prone to extreme outliers as newly created ETFs experience dramatic creation/redemption activity early in its 
lifecycle.  
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decrease the sample of ETFs from 363 to 224 to 165. In terms of assets under management 
(AUM), the total AUM of U.S. equity funds was $632 billion in September 2012 according 
Blackrock (2012), while the AUM of our 165 funds was $540 billion, or roughly 85 percent of  
the AUM of all U.S. equity ETFs. Given the dramatic expansion in the scope and size of the ETF 
market in the last few years, earlier data on ETF creations is likely to suffer from non-
stationarity. Only around 2006-2007 has the growth in AUM started to stabilize and creations 
have become more stationary. This is why I decided to focus on a more recent sample period, 
from January 2006 to December 2012.
9
 
Our sample of ETFs, NAV prices, underlying indices and number of shares outstanding
10
 
are obtained from Bloomberg. As reported by Petajisto (2011), Bloomberg coverage of ETFs is 
anywhere from 60 to 97 percent of all ETFs by number, and 90 to 99 percent by assets. ETF 
price, volume and return data are obtained from CRSP. 
Next, I use Morningstar Direct to access several fund characteristics and ETF holdings, 
which are used for computing measures of an ETF’s underlying basket’s liquidity. The holdings 
data in Morningstar is either monthly or quarterly (the latter in the case of Vanguard ETFs, for 
example). In order to identify a benchmark index's investment style, I use the ubiquitous 
Morningstar style classification system that characterizes funds along two dimensions: small-, 
mid- and large-cap as well as value, growth and blend. I do this for three reasons. First, the 
Morningstar classification coincides with dichotomy often used by practitioners. Second, 
Morningstar is a leading fund information provider and its classification system is publicly 
available. Third, many ETFs are named after their Morningstar style analogs e.g. SPDR S&P 600 
Small-Cap Value or iShares Russell 3000 Growth fund. The style classifications are updated 
monthly. Finally, I also use yearly net expense ratios from Morningstar. 
At the end of 2012, our raw sample consists of 165 U.S. equity ETFs; 80 core (or non-
sector) and 85 sector ETFs. Among the core styles, there is roughly an equal distribution of 
value-growth-blend funds within each size-category, except the small-value (with 3 ETFs) and 
large-blend (21 ETFs) categories (see Table 2-1). The most popular sector styles are financial, 
technology and real-estate with 13, 12 and 11 ETFs respectively. At the start of our sample 
period in January 2006, the total AUM of the sample is $211.27 billion, the mean (median) 
                                                 
9
 Prior to 2000, there were very few ETFs, most of them were single foreign country index funds.  
10
 The number of shares outstanding in Bloomberg is updated daily whereas CRSP generally updates shares 
outstanding once a month. Therefore, many share creations/redemptions are not captured by CRSP. 
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AUM is $2.2 billion ($0.46 billion). The total AUM grows to $544 billion at the end of our 
sample period in December 2012, and the mean (median) is $3.17 billion ($0.59 billion). As the 
means and medians indicate, the AUM is highly skewed in the cross-section of funds. 
I obtain institutional ownership data for our sample of ETFs from the CDA/Spectrum 
database provided by Thomson Reuters. This data comes from quarterly 13-F filings with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). After 1978, all institutional investment 
managers (including foreign investors) with discretionary assets in excess of $100 million in 
Section 13(f) securities (mainly publicly traded equity) are required to report their holdings to the 
SEC on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. SEC regulation stipulates that all holdings of common 
stock (including ETFs) greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed.  
Following Frazzini and Lamont (2008), the holdings data is adjusted for stock splits, and I 
discard observations where the report date is subsequent to the file date, or when the number of 
shares in a fund’s portfolio exceeds the total amount of shares outstanding. The data has also 
been cleaned for inconsistencies and missing data has been filled in using prior and future 
holdings observations as outlined in Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz (2009). 
Finally, I also use disaggregated institutional ownership by type of institution from 
Thomson Reuters. The type codes from this data set have two critical problems. First, as noted 
on the WRDS website, the type code variable is not reliable after 1998 due to an internal 
mapping error. I address this issue by using the classification codes provided by Brian Bushee. 
Second, the manager number (MGRNO) is not always unique to a manager/institution. Instead, I 
use the permanent keys provided by Bushee
11
.  
2.2.1 Defining liquidity 
Liquidity is a multi-faceted concept and capturing it with a single measure is likely inadequate. I 
therefore focus on four dimensions of liquidity: Amihud’s price impact, quoted spreads, 
turnover, and share creation/redemption activity. First, Amihud’s price impact is an important 
measure particularly for institutional investors whose trades are typically large and which are 
known to affect stock prices (see e.g. Edelen and Warner, 2001). I define the monthly price 
impact (AMIHUD) for an ETF or a constituent stock as: 
                                                 
11
 We thank Brian Bushee for making his data available to us at: http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.  
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             𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐻𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ log [
|𝑅𝑖,𝑑|
𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑
]
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
                                                                                                    (1) 
 where 𝑅𝑖,𝑑 =  closing mid-quote return (in %) for ETF or stock i on trading day d;  
  𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑 =  dollar volume (in $ millions) for ETF or stock i on trading day d; 
  𝑁𝑡 = number of trading days in calendar month t. 
I take the natural logarithm of the daily price impact before calculating the monthly average in 
order to reduce the impact of outliers in the data. This is particularly important when Eq. (1) is 
calculated for stocks (Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk, 2012). For consistency, I also take the natural 
logarithm of our other liquidity measures. Amihud’s price impact has been widely used in the 
literature. Hasbrouck (2009) reports that, “among the daily proxies, the Amihud illiquidity 
measure is most strongly correlated with the TAQ-based price impact coefficient” (p. 1459). 
Several other papers also endorse Amihud’s measure as a good proxy for price impact (e.g. 
Lesmond, 2005; Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009; Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka; 2010).  
Second, the proportional quoted spread (QSPR) is a direct measure of liquidity for normal-
sized transactions and it features in many theoretical models on liquidity and asset pricing (see 
e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986). The monthly average QSPR for an ETF or a constituent 
stock is defined as follows:  
              𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ log [
𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑑 − 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑑
(𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑑 + 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑑)/2
]
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
                                                                                     (2) 
 where  𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑑 and 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑑 = ask and bid price at the close on trading day d for ETF or stock i  
   𝑁𝑡  = number of trading days in calendar month t. 
Third, I look at turnover. The definition for turnover (TO) for an ETF or a constituent stock is: 
               𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ log [
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑
]  
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
                                                                                                                (3) 
 where 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑 = share volume of ETF or stock i on day d;         
  𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑 = number of shares outstanding; 
  𝑁𝑡 = number of trading days in calendar month t. 
Our argument for using turnover as a measure of liquidity is based on the notion that turnover 
measures the intensity of trading activity, and is therefore related to holding periods. As Amihud 
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and Mendelson (1986) point out, turnover is inversely related to illiquidity costs.
12
 Before 
computing the monthly average measures, I discard daily price impact and turnover observations 
beyond the 99.5
th
 percentile of the distribution to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. 
Unlike traditional equities, one concern with ETFs is that their turnover and price impact 
measures contain information about trading volume only from the secondary market. In contrast, 
shares that are created (or redeemed) in response to buy-and-hold demand may bypass the 
secondary market and go directly to (from) the investor’s portfolio. In the case of turnover, it 
moves in the opposite direction relative to the activity in the primary market. Specifically, a 
share creation that bypasses the secondary market will result in a decline in turnover as the 
number of shares outstanding increases, and vice-versa for redemptions. Trading volume in the 
secondary market is affected only when the creation/redemption arises from arbitrage trades.
13
 
Even in this case, there may be a discrepancy because arbitrage trades may have been initiated 
any time within the 3-day settlement period, while new shares show up in the data only at 
settlement. Given that I average the liquidity measures over a monthly horizon, I do not expect 
the aforementioned time-series phenomena to affect our results. Nevertheless, I may gain some 
additional insights by considering a liquidity measure that is specifically designed to capture 
activities in the primary market, which leads us to our fourth measure of liquidity: share 
creation/redemption activity (henceforth share creation), defined as:  
             𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = log [1 +
1
𝑁𝑡
∑
|𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑 − 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑−1|
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑−1
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
]                                                                    (4) 
 where: 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑 = shares outstanding for ETF i on day d;  
  Nt  = number of trading days in calendar month t. 
A high share creation activity is attractive to investors, particularly institutional investors, 
because it proxies for primary market liquidity, and captures the additional layer of liquidity that 
ETFs possess. For example, new ETF shares can be created to meet excess demand and to 
minimize price impact in the secondary market, if the underlying securities have sufficient 
liquidity. This option-like feature of ETFs implies that the lower bound for their liquidity is 
                                                 
12
 Other explanations for turnover have also been proposed, such as investor disagreement, investor attention and the 
speed of adjustment to market-wide information (see e.g. Cremers and Pareek, 2014).  
13
 For example, in a creation, there is no impact on trading volume if an investor already has the underlying 
securities in an existing portfolio, and is keeping the newly created ETFs. 
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determined by the maximum of the liquidity of the ETF in the secondary market, and the 
liquidity of the underlying securities in the primary market.  
Following Lo and Wang (2000), Yan (2008), Idzorek et al. (2012), I estimate the liquidity 
of the underlying portfolio by dollar-weighting each security’s liquidity (i.e. the weight of the 
security in the ETF’s basket). In our case, I use the three secondary market measures presented 
above: Amihud’s price impact (1), quoted spreads (2), and turnover (3). 
The liquidity of an ETF’s underlying portfolio plays two roles in determining demand. 
First a more liquid underlying portfolio will facilitate the creation and redemption process of the 
ETF, thereby improving the ETF’s primary market liquidity. Second, an institutional investor 
can gain exposure to a stock index by either purchasing the ETF or the constituents directly. In 
making this decision, the investor may compare the liquidity of the two options. Therefore, I also 
consider an ETF’s relative liquidity, in price impact, quoted spreads and turnover, defined as:  
   𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐻𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡) =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑑
|𝑅𝑘,𝑑
𝑈𝑁𝐷|
𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑘,𝑑
𝑈𝑁𝐷 /
|𝑅𝑖,𝑑
𝐸𝑇𝐹|
𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑
𝐸𝑇𝐹
𝐾
𝑘=1
]
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
                                             
           𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡) =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑑𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑘,𝑑
𝑈𝑁𝐷/𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑑
𝐸𝑇𝐹
𝐾
𝑘=1
]
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
                                                      (5) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡) =
1
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where 𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑑  = dollar-weight, or the weight that each security has in the underlying basket held  
 by the ETF, of stock k in ETF i on day d. 
I construct the relative liquidity measures in a consistent manner across all three measures. First, 
I take the daily log-difference between ETF and underlying portfolio liquidity. Second I take the 
monthly average of this measure. Since I am using log-differences, the relative liquidity 
measures can be interpreted as the percentage difference in liquidity between the ETF and its 
underlying portfolio. As for share creation activity (CREATE), I can already view it as a measure 
of relative, rather than just ETF liquidity since the underlying stocks have no regular share 
creation activities.  
In the empirical tests I present results either for all liquidity measures, in which case I draw 
inferences that apply broadly across several measures, or I use a composite measure given that 
previous research has highlighted that variations in liquidity are governed by a significant 
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common component.
14
 The composite measure is constructed using the first principal component 
for i) the ETF [Eq. (1) to (4)], ii) the underlying portfolio [Eq. (1) to (3)], and iii) relative 
liquidity measures [Eq. (4) and (5)].  
2.2.2 Descirptive statistics 
To illustrate the dynamics of relative liquidity, I graph the different measures for a balanced 
panel of ETFs that have existed since 2006.
15
 Figure 2-1 shows that relative spreads are roughly 
zero for the average fund, but varies considerable over time. If I look across funds grouped by 
underlying index size (pooling core and sector styles together based on Morningstar’s 3-by-3 
size and valuation style), I can see that small-cap ETFs, followed by mid- and by large-cap, offer 
the highest relative liquidity in spreads. After the financial crisis in 2008, the underlying basket 
spreads of small-cap ETFs have been around 50 to 100 percent higher than that for the ETF 
itself. As for Amihud’s price impact, Figure 2-1 shows an increasing trend over time in the large- 
and small-cap size categories. The average small-cap fund has consistently provided positive 
relative liquidity via price impact, while for the average large-cap funds relative liquidity is 
negative. As shown in Figure 2-1, both relative turnover and share creation activity have 
generally declined over time for the average fund, except toward the end of 2008, at the peak of 
the financial crisis. This observation is likely a reflection of the balanced panel of funds 
maturing: younger funds typically have higher relative turnover and share creation activity 
relative to older funds (at the median).  
[Figure 2-1] 
Table 2-1 reports summary statistics for several additional variables of interest. Blend or core 
funds are on average at least twice as large as value or growth funds, while differences in 
medians are less pronounced. In terms of expense ratios, the notable difference is between funds 
with exposure to sector and non-sector funds, with the former’s median ratio being more than 
twice as high. I will discuss the last two columns in Table 2-1 in a later section. 
 [Table 2-1] 
                                                 
14
 See e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000); Amihud, (2002); Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) 
15
 New ETFs typically have low relative liquidity in spreads and price impact, but high relative liquidity in turnover 
and share creation activity. For this reason, we illustrate relative liquidity using a balanced panel in Figure 1. In the 
panel regression analysis, we will employ the full sample. 
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The correlations between the different relative liquidity measures are positive, but far from 
perfect: the range is from 0.19 to 0.77 (see Table 2-2). Relative price impact and spreads are the 
most highly correlated (0.77), while relative spreads and share creation activity are the least 
correlated (0.19). ETF liquidity and relative ETF liquidity measures are highly correlated (from 
0.65 to 0.95), because most of the variations in relative liquidity (ETF minus underlying 
portfolio liquidity) are driven by ETF liquidity. In robustness tests, I also use shocks to liquidity. 
The correlations here are from -0.02 to 0.65. 
 [Table 2-2] 
2.3 ETF DEMAND AND LIQUIDITY 
In this section, I focus on the importance of liquidity for ETF demand, measured either by net 
ETF flows (sections 3.1-3.5) or quarterly institutional buys and sells (sections 3.6 and 3.7). Our 
conjecture is that liquidity is more important for shorter-term demand (weekly and monthly net 
flows as opposed to quarterly), and for both buys and sells because short-term trading strategies 
require liquidity in both instances.  
2.3.1 Share creations and ETF flows 
ETF data on share creations are available daily, because they are traded like a stock. Therefore, 
net ETF flows can be estimated at the daily interval using the change in the number of shares 
outstanding and the NAV per share on the day of the (net) share creation. That said, I will focus 
primarily on monthly flows, derived from daily flows, although in some tests I also use weekly 
or quarterly flows. The reason for aggregating daily flows is that net share creations are lumpy: 
due to a minimum creation/redemption size, they tend to happen less frequently and in large 
batches. Also, daily flows are prone to extreme outliers, as evidenced by the difference in the 
means and the medians: in our sample, the average (median) ETF has net share creations on 30.9 
percent (22.7 percent) of the trading days, and conditional on such days, the magnitudes are 
$69.6 million ($12.4 million) or 2.8 percent (1.0 percent) of AUM (see Table 2-3).  
I define the net fund flow over the horizon t (= week, month or quarter) as: 
           𝐼𝐹𝐿𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ (𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑 − 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑−1)𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑑
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
=
∑ (𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑑 − 𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑑−1(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑑))
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
                 (6) 
 where 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑 = number of shares outstanding for ETF i on day d; 
  
20 
 
  𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑑 =  Net Asset Value per share;  
  𝑟𝑖,𝑑 =   NAV return over day d; 
  𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 =   Assets Under Management at the end of period t-1. 
The second expression of inflows in Eq. (6) corresponds to what is typically used in the mutual 
fund literature with one exception. The dollar flow in the numerator is measured at the daily 
level and is aggregated over the horizon t to obtain per-period dollar flows. This definition is 
more accurate because ETF flows are measured using actual prices (NAVi,d) observed on the day 
when flows occurs. In contrast, the monthly flow typically used in the mutual fund literature (i.e. 
𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡)), assumes that flows occur at the end of each period (see for example, 
Sirri and Tufano, 1998). The reason is that mutual fund data are available only at the monthly 
interval, unlike ETF data which can be obtained daily. In order to mitigate the impact of outliers 
and potential data errors, I winsorize net fund flows at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics: Liquidity, share creations and ETF flows 
If liquidity facilitates short-term trading, then fund flows at higher frequencies should be more 
responsive to liquidity than at lower frequencies. In addition, the magnitude of share 
creations/redemptions (i.e. ignoring the sign) should be positively related to liquidity because it 
is beneficial both for buying (creations) and selling (redemptions). 
First, I provide summary statistics on the frequency of share creations/redemptions, as well 
as the dollar and proportional magnitudes. The relationship between daily share creations and the 
secondary market liquidity measures Eq. (5) can be seen when I condition on the AUM of the 
funds. To simplify the presentation, I group ETFs into a high and low liquidity category where 
the cut-off is based on the median liquidity rank at a given point in time.
16
 The results in Table 2-
3 show that within each AUM tercile, funds with above median relative liquidity have more 
share creation activity relative to funds below the median. To illustrate, in the middle AUM-
tercile, funds with high relative liquidity have, on average, more frequent share creations (on 
34.6 percent versus 20.2 percent of days), larger dollar magnitudes ($20.0 million versus $9.3 
million) as well as greater relative magnitudes (4.1 percent versus 2.4 percent of AUM, or 
                                                 
16
 Specifically, each ETF is ranked based on the equally-weighted liquidity rank across the three measures of 
relative liquidity in Eq. (5) in the prior month. Share creation activity is excluded here because it is mechanically 
related to the magnitude of share creations. 
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equivalently of shares outstanding) compared to funds with low relative liquidity. These 
differences are significant at the 5 percent level both at the mean and the median.  
[Table 2-3] 
Second, I look at the relationship between net fund flows and relative liquidity measured 
over different horizons (see Table 2-4). The results suggest that weekly fund flows are on average 
0.48 percent across all funds (the median is zero due to infrequent share creation), but 0.55 
percent for funds with high relative liquidity and 0.40 percent for funds with low relative 
liquidity. The difference is significant at the 5 percent level. Similarly, at the monthly horizon, 
the median difference between funds with high relative liquidity (0.67 percent) vs. low relative 
liquidity (0.00 percent) is significant at the 1 percent level. The difference in means is also 
positive, but insignificant. However, at the quarterly horizon there are no significant differences 
in fund flows between the two liquidity categories, consistent with the notion that liquidity 
matter more at higher frequencies where short-term trading is more prevalent. Another distinct 
feature is that funds with higher liquidity have much more volatile flows.  
I also provide a breakdown of net fund flows by relative liquidity (high vs. low) 
conditioning on fund size (high, medium and low AUM). At the weekly and monthly horizons, 
net fund flows are significantly higher for more liquid funds relative to less liquid funds, but only 
among medium and low AUM funds. Amongst the largest funds, liquidity no longer matters. 
[Table 2-4] 
2.3.3 Determinants of net fund flows  
I model net fund flows as follows: 
              𝐼𝐹𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝑏2𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (7) 
 where 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 = ETF & underlying portfolio or relative liquidity during period t-1 
  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  = vector of fund characteristics 
  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1  = vector of control variables, mainly macro variables 
  𝐹𝐸  = fixed effects: year, month, sector, style and/or fund 
i) 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 
I include measures of ETF, underlying portfolio or relative liquidity to investigate whether this 
critical determinant of short-term demand is important for net ETF flows. 
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ii) 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 
First, I consider ETF mispricing. ETFs can be mispriced at any point in time, trading at a 
premium to its fundamental value, or at a discount. The level of mispricing is defined as the log 
deviation of the ETF price from its NAV: 
               𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑑 = ln(𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖,𝑑) − ln(𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑑)                                                                                                   (8) 
 where  𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖,𝑑 = ETFi’s bid-ask midpoint on day d; 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑑 = Net Asset Value of ETFi 
In calculating the premium, I use the bid-ask midpoint as suggested by Engle and Sarkar (2006). 
I expect ETF flows to be positively associated with premiums because arbitrageurs can take 
advantage of positive (negative) premiums by creating new (redeeming old) ETF shares. 
Specifically, as the ETF price rises above its NAV (i.e., PREM > 0), APs can execute an 
arbitrage trade and profit from the creation of new ETF shares, through an exchange of the 
underlying basket with the ETF manager, and vice versa when PREM < 0. The extent to which 
premiums forecast flows over longer horizons is, however, unclear. Much of the arbitrage 
activity, APs and investors such as hedge funds engaging in long-short ETF strategies, occurs 
daily or intra-daily. In unreported results, I find that daily premiums only persist for a few days, 
but average premiums over weekly or monthly horizons contain a strong persistent component. 
Hence, I use the average daily premium over the period t (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡) to capture excess demand 
for an ETF that has yet to be arbitraged away.  
Second, Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) show that salient, attention-grabbing information 
such as front-end loads and commissions, are important for mutual fund investors’ purchase 
decisions, while less transparent operating fees are not important. However, Grinblatt et al. 
(2013) provide direct evidence that high-IQ investors prefer mutual funds with lower fees 
relative to low-IQ investors using a comprehensive dataset of Finnish males. For ETFs, the direct 
costs include commissions and expense ratios. Commissions for ETFs have gone down 
dramatically; several trading platforms now offer ETF trading free of commissions.
17
 With this 
in mind, I only control for a fund’s annual net expense ratio in the fund flow regressions.  
Third, tracking error, measured by the standard deviation of the daily change in 
premiums, 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑑 , (measured over the same horizon as for ETF flows) may also be an 
                                                 
17
A list of commission-free ETFs can be found at http://etfdb.com/type/commission-free/all/. Free commissions 
often come with restrictions, such as limits on how quickly a transaction can be turned over.  
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important determinant of ETF flows when investors are concerned about the magnitude of 
mispricing, whether positive or negative. Traditionally, tracking error is based on the return 
differences between the NAV and the underlying index, which reflects the ETF manager’s 
replication strategy and performance, rather than between the ETF price and its NAV (Eq. (8)). 
Our definition is slightly different, and it reflects the ability of the APs in executing arbitrage 
trades to eliminate mispricing (i.e., limits to arbitrage). 
Fourth, I consider past returns as a predictor of fund flows. Existing theoretical studies on 
mutual fund flows typically focus on the pursuit of superior talent (see Gruber, 1996; Berk and 
Green, 2004; Zheng, 1999), in which case investors rationally select managers based on their 
past performance. In the context of passively managed ETFs, the search for alpha cannot explain 
return chasing behaviour. Alternatively, return chasing can reflect positive feedback trading in 
investment styles, which arises in the theoretical style chasing model of Barberis and Shleifer 
(2003) or in herding models where investors learn from each other’s signals (see e.g. Banerjee, 
1992), or follow correlated signals (see Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1992; Hirshleifer, 
Subrahmanyam, and Titman, 1994). In light of the recent evidence that ETF investors engage in 
positive feedback style chasing  (Broman and Shum, 2015b), I control for up to four lags of ETF 
returns as well as four lags of own and distant style returns based on Morningstar’s 3-by-3 size 
and valuation index.  
Fifth, ETF inflows may be affected by a number of other fund-specific characteristics, such 
as age (AGE, AGE
2
), cumulative inflows and size (AUM).  
iii) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 
I also include a number of control variables to capture aggregate market conditions: the VIX 
index, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) level of market liquidity and the term spread between the 
10-year and 3-month U.S. government yields. For additional details on the variable definitions, 
see Appendix 1. 
iv) 𝐹𝐸 
I estimate regression (7) using pooled OLS with fixed effects for style (Morningstar 3-by-3 
categories), sector (0, 1), time (year, month separately) and in some cases, also fund effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by calendar time to account for cross-sectional dependence in the 
residual demand shocks.  
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2.3.4 Baseline results: ETF flows 
I first present results for the baseline model (Eq. (7) without the liquidity variables). The results 
in Table 2-5 show that ETF flows (passive funds), unlike mutual fund flows, are not persistent: 
the first lag is negative and significant while the remaining lags are positive but generally 
insignificant. Similar results are also obtained for quarterly net flows (unreported to conserve 
space), and for another measure of ETF demand, namely quarterly net institutional demand 
calculated from 13F holdings (more details in section 3.6). The lack of persistence in ETF flows 
is likely a reflection of how ETFs are used and created. For instance, it may reflect the outcome 
of arbitrage trades, or short-term style chasing strategies (Broman and Shum, 2015b).  
Specification (2) in Table 2-5 also shows that the other fund-specific characteristics enter 
with the expected signs. Bigger and older funds, and funds with higher expense ratios grow more 
slowly. Flows also increase during periods of high market volatility (VIX) and when the term-
spread is high. These findings indicate that passive investing using ETFs grows during uncertain 
times. This may reflect in part a shift away from active vehicles, and/or the desire to switch to 
ETFs because they are perceived to be more liquid during uncertain times, which would be 
particularly attractive for short-term traders. Specifications (3) and (4) provide sub-sample 
results for non-sector and sector funds respectively. The main difference between the two is that 
the mean-reversion in flows is mainly evident for sector funds, and macro variables are generally 
less significant for sector funds.  
[Table 2-5] 
2.3.5 Results: Liquidity and ETF flows 
In Table 2-6 I look at the impact of liquidity on fund flows. Because of the high correlations 
between the liquidity measures (see Table 2-2), I perform separate regressions for each measure. 
For consistency, I sign all of the variables such that larger values indicate higher liquidity. Our 
first set of results in Table 2-6 suggest that ETF liquidity is positively and significantly related to 
fund flows (all measures), while underlying portfolio liquidity enters negatively, but significantly 
only for price impact. The weaker results for underlying portfolio liquidity may reflect a lack of 
variations in this measure, because some funds share similar underlying portfolios (e.g., a broad 
U.S. index), and especially since I have controlled for several related macro variables, such as 
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Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s market-wide liquidity level, term-spread and the VIX, as well as 
year and month dummies.  
[Table 2-6] 
Given the opposite signs of the ETF and underlying portfolio liquidity variables, the implication 
is that investors prefer highly liquid ETFs that invest in securities with lower liquidity. Hence, 
relative liquidity, as a separate variable, ought to be able to explain this result. Indeed, this is 
what I find. Fund flows are higher for funds with higher relative liquidity in spreads, price 
impact, turnover and share creation activity (all significant at 5 percent level or better). To 
illustrate the economic magnitude of these effects, I compare the impact of relative liquidity 
between funds at the 25
th
 and the 75
th
 percentiles of the distribution. The increase in monthly 
flows within the interquartile range is 0.51 percent, 2.14 percent, 1.43 percent and 0.98 percent 
respectively for REL(QSPR), REL(AMIHUD), REL(TO) and CREATE, respectively. These 
numbers are economically meaningful when compared to the mean (median) monthly flow of 
about 2.15 (0.00) percent. The explanatory power of the other fund-specific variables is not 
materially affected by the inclusion of the liquidity variables. In unreported tests I also confirm 
that similar results are obtained in sub-samples of funds based on age and AUM. 
The results so far have shown that funds with higher liquidity have higher future flows. 
This is largely a cross-sectional phenomenon given the high degree of persistence in our liquidity 
measures. I also investigate the importance of the time-series dimension of liquidity on flows by 
replacing the liquidity measures with shocks to liquidity (from an AR(1) model). This 
specification, reported in Panel B, is also less prone to concerns about reverse causality – 
whereby persistent demand creates liquidity – given that neither flows, nor liquidity shocks are 
persistent. I also add ETF fixed effects in order to focus on time-series variations in liquidity. 
The results show that shocks to relative liquidity (via price impact, turnover and share creation 
activity) predict ETF flows positively and significantly (at the 1 percent level or better). In 
contrast to the previous results, quoted spreads are no longer significant. The implication is that 
while both time-series and cross-sectional variations in liquidity matter for predicting ETF flows, 
the cross-section seems to be more important.  
Next, I investigate the importance of liquidity on net fund flows measured over different 
horizons and for sub-samples of core versus sector funds (Table 2-7). To keep the table compact, 
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I combine the different liquidity measures into one by using the first principal component 
(separately for ETF and underlying portfolio). If liquidity is more important for short-term 
trading, then the impact of liquidity on flows should be stronger at shorter-horizons. Indeed that 
is what I find. ETF liquidity enters with a positive and significant coefficient at the weekly and 
monthly horizons, while it is insignificant at the quarterly horizon. The results are similar 
regardless of whether liquidity levels (Panel A) or liquidity shocks (Panel B) are used. Although 
the results are highly significant both for core and sector ETFs, the magnitude of the coefficients 
of ETF liquidity are between three to five times higher for sector funds, which may reflect the 
popularity of short-term sector rotation strategies among ETF users. Furthermore, sector ETFs 
have significantly shorter holding periods relative to core ETFs (see Table 2-1, to be discussed in 
greater detail in section 4). 
Another indication that quarterly flows are less likely to reflect short-term trades is the 
negative and highly significant coefficient on net expense ratios, which are more relevant for 
longer-term investors. Since I have already controlled for ETF fixed effects, this result implies 
that an increase in expense ratios is negatively associated with future net fund flows. I also 
estimate regressions with style fixed effects instead of ETF fixed effects in order to better 
identify the impact of expense ratios. These tests, which are unreported for conciseness, show 
that while expense ratios enter with a negative and significant coefficient across all horizons, the 
magnitude of the effect is roughly 10 times higher in quarterly as opposed to weekly net flows. 
In this specification ETF (underlying portfolio) liquidity enters with a positive (negative) and 
(generally) significant coefficient, consistent with relative liquidity driving the results.  
 [Table 2-7] 
Overall, the results in this section provide further evidence that liquidity is an important 
determinant of flows at higher frequencies, both among core and sector funds, as well as across 
time and in the cross-section of funds. 
2.3.6 Institutional demand  
Net ETF flows capture aggregate demand, both by retail and institutional investors. In contrast, 
our conjecture is that relative liquidity matters primarily for institutional investors, who have the 
ability to choose between investing in an ETF and its underlying basket. For most retail 
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investors, the transaction costs involved in trading the underlying securities are likely 
prohibitive. Therefore, relative liquidity may be less important relative to institutional investors.  
In order to specifically investigate the demand by institutional investors, I construct a 
measure of net institutional demand (NID) based on the total number of ETF shares bought or 
sold by all 13F investors during quarter q scaled by the number of shares outstanding at q-1: 
               𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑞 =
∑ (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞−1)
𝑁𝑗
𝑗=1
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑞−1
                                                                                      (9) 
 where 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 = number of shares owned by 13F investor j at the end of quarter q 
  𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑞−1 =  total number of shares outstanding of ETF i at the end of quarter q-1 
NID is positive when institutional investors buy more shares than they sell from retail investors 
(or other non 13F investors), and/or when institutional investors create new ETF shares in excess 
of what they redeem. Thus, NID captures demand both in the primary and secondary markets.
18
  
I also calculate institutional demand separately for buys (IB) and sells (IS): 
               𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑞 =
∑ (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞−1)𝐼[𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞−1 > 0]
𝑁𝑗
𝑗=1
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑞−1
                    (10) 
                𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑞 =
∑ −(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞−1)𝐼[𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑞−1 < 0]
𝑁𝑗
𝑗=1
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑞−1
                 (11) 
 where 𝐼[. ] = an indicator variable for buys (8) or sells (9) by institution j 
The prediction is that liquidity is an important predictor of both institutional buying (IB) and 
selling (IS) since short-term trading requires liquidity in both instances, particularly because 
institutional investors have an incentive to exit during episodes of market turmoil when overall 
liquidity is already depressed (Cella, Ellul and Giannetti, 2013). It is possible some of the 
liquidity proxies may also be correlated with arbitrage activity (e.g. higher turnover or share 
creation activity), which would predict both more institutional buying and selling (but no impact 
on net demand) because mispricing is symmetric and on average zero, but varies in the short-run. 
This is, however, not a concern here because mispricing is very short-lived: a regression of the 
daily ETF premium (8) on its lags shows that only the first few daily lags are statistically 
                                                 
18
 Note that NID is not equal to the change in institutional ownership, which can be zero as long as institutional 
investors own the same proportion of shares at the beginning and at the end of the quarter. For stocks the 
distinction between the two is unimportant, but for ETFs it is critical because the number of shares outstanding 
changes frequently, and specifically from quarter to quarter. 
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significant. If liquidity continues to predict IB and IS over a quarterly horizon, it must be for 
reasons other than arbitrage activity. 
A potential concern is that while institutional buying is unrestricted in the sense that any 
ETF can be bought, institutional selling is restricted to shares that are currently owned (as 13F 
only includes long positions). If liquidity determines institutional buying, then I may find a 
mechanical link between institutional selling (IS) and liquidity, because the only ETFs in the 
portfolio to sell are the liquid ones. However, I do not believe this to be an issue because the 
average (median) institutional ETF investors owns 9 (4) different ETFs at any given point in 
time during the 2006-2012 sample period. 
2.3.7 Results: Institutional demand and liquidity 
The net demand by institutional investors is on average 1.99 percent of shares outstanding per 
quarter. Previously, I showed that liquidity is not an important determinant for quarterly net 
flows both in univariate tests (Table 2-1) and in regression analysis (Table 2-5). Similarly, for 
net institutional demand, there is no significant difference between funds with above median 
relative liquidity (2.09 percent of shares outstanding per quarter) vs. below (1.91 percent). 
Although it is not surpising to find that liquidity matters less over longer horizons, a calendar 
quarter is still a relatively short holding period, and I should not expect the significance to 
disappear altogether. However, short-term trading strategies require liquidity both for buys and 
for sells. Consistent with this idea, I find a significant difference in quarterly institutional buys 
and sells for ETFs with high vs. low relative liquidity (12.38 vs. 7.73 percent for buys and 10.44 
vs. 5.83 percent for sells). The fact that liquidity is so important for institutional selling may 
explain why net institutional demand are not significantly related to ETF liquidity. 
In order to study further the relationship between institutional demand (net, buys or sells) 
and liquidity, I estimate regressions similar to the fund flow regressions in Eq. (7). The results in 
Table 2-8 confirm the univariate results that liquidity does not matter for net institutional trades, 
but if I analyze institutional buys and sells separately, I find a positive and highly significant 
relationship. To illustrate the economic magnitude, an increase in ETF liquidity from the 25
th
 to 
the 75
th
 percentile is associated with a 2.7 percent increase in institutional buying (mean IB = 
10.02 percent) and a 4.47 percent increase in institutional selling (mean IS = 8.21 percent). 
 [Table 2-8] 
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2.4 LIQUIDITY CLIENTELES AND SHORT-TERM TRADING 
In this section, I provide further evidence on the existence of liquidity clienteles by first 
examining the importance of liquidity for short-term vs. long-term institutional ownership and 
second, by making a direct attempt to link liquidity to short-term institutional trading in ETFs 
using a measure that is unrelated to arbitrage activity.  
2.4.1 Institional ownership – baseline model 
To arrive at a measure of total institutional ownership, I sum up the shares held by all 13-F 
investors for an ETF, and then scale this number by the median number of shares outstanding in 
the two weeks prior to the quarter-end. The median shares outstanding is used to mitigate the 
impact of outliers and timing errors in the reporting of shares held. This is a potential concern 
particularly because shares are on average created once every three days (see Table 2-3). 
Aggarwal and Schofield (2012) suggest that institutions account for more than 80 percent 
of trading activity in ETFs. In contrast, our results show that the mean (median) institutional 
ownership is 41.93 (37.28) percent of shares outstanding (see Table 2-4, Panel B). Given that 
trading is costly, institutions should demand more liquidity than retail investors. The testable 
implication is that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity. 
As expected, IO is significantly higher for ETFs with high relative liquidity as opposed to low 
relative liquidity (50.81 vs. 33.22 percent at the mean, and the difference significant at 1 percent 
level). I also confirm this conjecture in the context of the following regression:  
               𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑞 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑞−1 + 𝑏2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑞−1 + 𝑏3𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑞−1 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (12) 
 where 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑞−1 = ETF & underlying portfolio or relative liquidity during quarter q-1 
  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑞−1  = fund characteristics: expense ratios, age, AUM, tracking error and returns 
  𝐹𝐸  = style, sector and calendar time  
Following Ferreira and Matos (2008), I include calendar time dummies to account for any 
residual correlation across ETFs in a given quarter (cross-sectional dependence) and cluster 
standard errors at the fund-level to account for residual correlations across quarters for a given 
fund (time-series dependence). An alternative solution is to use the Fama-MacBeth procedure to 
control for cross-sectional dependence in the residuals. All of our subsequent results remain 
robust to using this alternative methodology (unreported for conciseness). I also include style and 
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sector fixed to account for any time-invariant preferences that institutions may have in the 
aggregate (see e.g. Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett, Sias and Stark, 2003).  
[Table 2-9] 
The results in Table 2-9 confirm that institutional ownership is higher among ETFs with higher 
liquidity, and ETFs with higher relative liquidity (significant at 1 percent for all measures), 
although underlying portfolio liquidity does not have a consistent sign (positive and significant 
for price impact; negative and significant for turnover). The ambiguity in the relationship 
between underlying portfolio liquidity and institutional ownership may, at least partly, reflect a 
lack of identification as I have already controlled for style, sector and calendar time fixed-effects. 
The only other consistent result is that IO is significantly higher for sector funds (by 8 to 18 
percent) even after controlling for liquidity characteristics, possibly due to the popularity of 
sector rotation strategies among intuitional investors. 
2.4.2 Determinants of short- vs. long-term institutional ownership 
Although liquidity is beneficial to all investors, short-term investors should value liquidity the 
most (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). In this section I therefore investigate the importance of 
liquidity for institutional ownership of ETFs by different types of institutions that are likely to 
differ in their ex-ante needs for liquidity. Our primary focus is on Bushee (1998)’s classification 
of institutional investors, which is based on factor and clustering analysis to classify institutional 
investors into three groups: transient (high portfolio turnover, diversified portfolios), quasi-
indexer (low portfolio turnover, diversified portfolios) and dedicated (low portfolio turnover, 
concentrated investments). I view transient investors as short-term, and quasi-indexers as long-
term. I drop the dedicated category from the analysis because their ownership of ETFs is on 
average less than one percent during our sample period. 
A potential drawback with Bushee’s classification is that it is applied at the portfolio level, 
which may falsely identify some institutions as long-term, when for our purposes they are short-
term investors in ETFs. For instance, an institutional investor could have a significant passive 
allocation in core strategies (e.g. 75 percent buy-and-hold in a diversified portfolio of stocks) and 
a smaller allocation in securities used for short-term trading strategies (e.g. 25 percent of assets 
invested in highly liquid ETFs with a style or sector focus). For this reason, I also consider an 
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alternative classification based on three types of 13F institutions: i) commercial banks (BNK), ii) 
investment companies (INV) and iii) independent investment advisors (IIA). A commercial 
bank’s trust department manages assets on behalf wealthy individual clients (trust accounts) and 
corporate pension plan clients. Investment companies are mainly mutual fund management 
companies; while investment advisors generally refer to investment banks, asset management 
companies, brokers and private wealth management companies. Section 13-F also contains 
several other types: insurance companies, public or private pension funds and endowments, and 
miscellaneous. I drop these additional types because they collectively own less than 6.5 percent 
of ETF assets compared with roughly 40 percent for BNK, INV and IIA combined. As discussed 
in the data section, I am unable to differentiate between INV and IIA, which is why I combine 
them together (INVA).  
I conjecture that investment companies and advisors (INVA) are more likely to have 
shorter investment horizons relative to commercial banks (BNK) for three reasons. First, when I 
double sort on 13-F type (INVA and BNK) and investment horizon, I find that during our sample 
period, roughly 34.4 percent of INVA’s can be classified as transient (based on of the fraction of 
13-F securities held), whereas only 4.3 percent of BNK’s can be classified as transient. Second, 
because INVA’s include active investors such as mutual funds and hedge funds, active short-
term trading strategies are more likely to be used by this group of investors as opposed to bank-
trusts, which are more likely to be passive. Third, investment companies and advisors are also 
likely to require some liquidity within their holdings due to the open-end structure and 
performance sensitivity of many of their products. I therefore classify investment companies and 
independent investment managers as shorter-term and more active in their investment strategies, 
while commercial banks are classified as longer-term and more passive.  
For our sample of ETFs, short-term (transient investors) own 16.56 percent of ETF shares 
on average. Is 16.56 percent high or low? To put things into perspective, I make a comparison 
between the proportion of transient investors in ETFs and the proportion of transient investors in 
the ETF’s underlying basket of securities. In calculating the latter, I first compute the ownership 
by transient investors in each underlying security k held by ETF i in quarter q. I then calculate a 
dollar-weighted average for ETF i’s entire portfolio (𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴,𝑖,𝑞
𝑈𝑁𝐷 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑞𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴,𝑞
𝑘𝑁
𝑘=1 ), scale this by 
the total institutional ownership (𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑞
𝑈𝑁𝐷 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑞𝐼𝑂𝑞
𝑘𝑁
𝑘=1 ) and compare the ratios: 𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑅) =
𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴,𝑖,𝑞
𝐸𝑇𝐹 /𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑞
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴,𝑖,𝑞
𝑈𝑁𝐷 /𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑞
𝑈𝑁𝐷 . The full-sample mean proportion of transient investors is 
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considerable higher in ETFs relative to their underlying portfolios (38.0 percent versus 24.84 
percent). Figure 2-2 depicts the evolution of the 25
th
, median and 75
th
 percentile of the cross-
sectional distribution of 𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑅) . The figure shows an upward trend with the median 
increasing from zero to above 10 percent. 
[Figure 2-2] 
Next, I analyze the importance of liquidity (and other fund characteristics) on institutional 
ownership by short-term (transient or INVA) vs. long-term (quasi-indexer or BNK) investors. I 
estimate regression (12) separately for each investor type, for the difference between short- and 
long-term institutional ownership and also for sub-samples of ETFs with a core and sector style 
classification. To conserve space, I combine the various liquidity measures together using the 
first principal component. 
 [Table 2-10] 
The results in Table 2-10 reveal that while both short- and long-term investors are attracted to 
highly liquid ETFs, short-term investors care significantly more about liquidity. To illustrate the 
economic magnitudes, I compare difference in IO between funds at the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of 
relative liquidity. The interquantile increase is 10.67 percent for short-term investors and 6.05 
percent for long-term investors when I use the transient and quasi-indexer classifications; and by 
10.13 and 3.03 percent when short- and long-term are based on INVA and BNK’s. These 
differences are further amplified by a factor of two if I also take into consideration the fact that 
the average ownership by short-term investors is less than half of that for long-term investors. 
The differences between the impacts for short- vs. long-term investors are also statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, and the differences are stronger for ETFs with a core style as 
opposed to sector ETFs. Similar effects are observed for ETF liquidity, while underlying 
portfolio liquidity is insignificant. The latter result is not surprising given that the signs on the 
individual measures of underlying portfolio liquidity are ambiguous (similar to Table 2-9); 
combining the various measures together using principal component analysis is therefore not 
expected to yield significant results.  
The only other fund characteristic that affects short- vs. long-term investors differently is 
size (AUM), which enters with a negative and significant coefficient for short-term investors. 
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This may also reflect liquidity concerns. That is, short-term institutional ownership is larger in 
small funds because retail investors prefer bigger funds (unsophisticated investors may use size 
as a simple proxy for liquidity), while long-term investors are invariant. 
2.4.3 Short-term trading and liquidity 
Finally, I make a direct attempt to measure the importance of liquidity for institutional short-term 
trading in ETFs. Cremers and Pareek (2014) propose a measure of short-term trading that is 
based on institutional investors’ average holding duration calculated from quarterly 13-F 
holdings as follows. For each ETF in a given institutional investor’s portfolio, the duration 
measure is calculated by looking back in time to determine how long that particular ETF has 
been held continuously in that investor’s portfolio, adjusted for intermediate buys and sells. 
Specifically:  
               𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇−1 =
(𝑊 − 1)𝐻𝑖,𝑗
𝐻𝑖,𝑗 + 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
+ ∑ (
(𝑇 − 𝑡 − 1)𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐻𝑖,𝑗 + 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
)
𝑇−1
𝑡=𝑇−𝑊+1
                                                (13) 
  
 where  𝐵𝑖,𝑗  =  total percentage of shares of ETF i bought by institution j between t=T-W  
    and t=T-1; t, T are in quarters 
  𝐻𝑖,𝑗  =  percentage of total shares outstanding of ETF i held by institution j at time 
    t=T-W. 
  𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  =  percentage of total shares outstanding of ETF i bought or sold by institution 
    j between time t-1 and t, where 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 > 0 for buys and 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 < 0 for sells. 
  𝑊  =  maximum holding duration  
The first term in (13) measures the duration of current holdings, while the second term in (13) is 
an adjustment term for any intermediate buying and selling due to, for instance, tax selling or 
window dressing. I choose a maximum holding duration (W) of 12 quarters because any 
behavioural or informational effects beyond that horizon should be marginal. If ETF i is not held 
by institution j at time T-1, I set the duration measure to zero. To arrive at a measure of duration 
for ETF i, I calculate a weighted average of (13) across all institutions currently holding ETF i 
with the weights given by the ETF ownership of each institution. Before including institution j in 
the calculation, I require that j has existed for at least two years.  
Descriptive statistics for ETF duration is provided in Table 2-1. The mean and median ETF 
duration are very close to each other in the overall sample (2.84 and 2.77 quarters). ETF duration 
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is slightly lower for value and growth funds relative to blend funds, and lower for sector funds 
relative to core funds. Do these numbers imply that ETFs are used for short-term trading? To 
answer this question, I make a comparison between ETF and underlying portfolio duration. For 
each ETF i, the underlying portfolio duration is calculated as the dollar-weighted average 
duration of each stock in the portfolio. Table 2-1 shows that ETF duration is on average 2.01 
quarters less than the corresponding underlying portfolio duration, which confirms that there is 
more short-term trading in ETFs. 
A unique feature of ETF duration is that it ignores all intra-quarterly trading. As a result, 
ETF duration measures short-term trading unrelated to arbitrage trades. The reason is that 
mispricing is very short-lived: a regression of the daily ETF premium (8) on its lags shows that 
only the first few daily lags are statistically significant. If liquidity continues to be an important 
determinant of short-term trading it must be because liquidity is attractive for short-term trading 
in response to non-fundamental demand.  
One potential drawback with ETF duration is that it is mechanically related to the average 
age of the fund’s investor base. Specifically, the institution specific holding duration (13) starts 
at zero for an investor’s first investment in the ETF, whether by existing or new ETF investors, 
and can only reach the maximum holding duration 12 quarters later. This is a particular concern 
for us because ETFs are a relatively recent investment vehicle for many institutional investors, 
and because many new ETFs enter throughout the sample period. To address this concern, I 
control for the time (in quarters) since ETF i was first purchased by investor j, averaged across 
all investors with the weights given by the ownership of ETF i by investor j. I also control for 
fund age in all regressions where ETF duration is the dependent variable. In addition, I require 
that ETF i has existed for at least two years before including it in the sample.  
Next, I investigate the relationship between ETF duration and liquidity, controlling for 
fund characteristics, returns and fixed effects. The explanatory variables are the same as those in 
the institutional ownership regression (12), except that I now also add fund age and the age of its 
investor base.  
[Table 2-11] 
Table 2-11 presents the results. Specification (1) – with only style fixed effects – shows that ETF 
liquidity is negatively related to ETF duration (t = 9.77), while underlying portfolio liquidity is 
  
35 
 
positively related (t = 2.62). This implies that highly liquid ETFs that invest in securities with 
lower liquidity have more short-term trading, which I confirm in specification (2) where I only 
include relative liquidity. The economic impact of an increase in relative liquidity from the 25
th
 
percentile to the 75
th
 percentile is associated with a decrease in ETF duration by 0.64 quarters, 
which is meaningful when compared to the average ETF duration of 2.84 quarters.  
Controlling for time fixed effects (specification (3) and (4)) does not alter the significance 
of ETF liquidity (3) or relative liquidity (4) from before. However, underlying portfolio liquidity 
is now insignificant, which is not surprising because time fixed effects soak up much of the 
variation in underlying portfolio liquidity. Even after I control for time and ETF fixed effects 
(specifications (5) and (6)), ETF liquidity and relative ETF liquidity remain significant (t = 3.47 
and 4.65 respectively). The only other fund characteristics that remain significant across all 
specifications are size and the age of the funds investor base: bigger funds and fund with an old 
investor base are on average held for longer durations. 
Overall, the results in this section show that funds with higher liquidity have more short-
term trading (i.e. lower average institutional holding periods) for reasons unrelated to arbitrage 
trades.  
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Exchange-Traded Funds provide investors with easy access to popular investment styles (e.g. 
large, small, value, growth and sector) at a cost that is on average lower relative to their 
underlying basket of securities. Apart from being exchange-traded with real-time prices, a unique 
feature of ETFs is their open-end structure via the share creation/redemption process, which adds 
a second layer of liquidity on top of secondary market trading volume.  
I started with a quote from Vanguard’s founder, John Bogle, that because ETFs are listed 
on an exchange, they lure investors to trade them too often. In this paper, I argue that ETFs that 
are relatively liquid (in four different dimensions) indeed attract a clientele of short-term 
investors, and more explicitly, short-term trading in ETFs. First, I document that liquidity is an 
important determinant of weekly or monthly net fund flows after controlling for a host of fund 
and macroeconomics characteristics, while quarterly flows are much more responsive to trading 
costs over longer horizons (namely expense ratios). Second, I show that measures of institutional 
buying and selling are both significantly higher in more liquid ETFs consistent with the idea that 
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short-term trading requires liquidity both for buys and sells. Third, I document that the 
proportion of short-term investors in ETFs is more than 10 percent higher relative to their 
underlying baskets and that liquidity is significantly more important for short-term institutional 
investors relative to long-term (by two to six times). Third, by using a direct measure of short-
term trading based on average quarterly institutional holding periods, I show that there is more 
short-term trading in ETFs relative to their underlying portfolios. Moreover, ETF holding periods 
are significantly lower for more liquid ETFs for reasons unrelated to arbitrage activity.  
One important implication of our findings is that as the ETF market continues to grow, it 
will likely facilitate a higher volume of short-term trading, thereby having an impact on market 
efficiency and volatility, as well as causing higher correlations in the underlying basket of 
securities.
19
 
  
                                                 
19
 For recent discussion and evidence of ETFs causing higher correlations in the underlying basket, see Da and Shive 
(2013), and Katherine Fogertey and Robert D. Boroujerdi (2015)’s Goldman Sachs study, “ETFs: the Rise of the 
Machines”.  
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Figure 2- 1: Time-series variability of relative liquidity (Balanced Panel) 
The figures below illustrate the cross-sectional mean relative liquidity for ETFs with the Morningstar style 
classification small-, mid- and large-cap.  
Panel A: Relative liquidity via spreads (LEFT) and price impact (RIGHT) 
 
Panel B: Relative liquidity via turnover (LEFT) and share creation activity (RIGHT) 
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Figure 2- 2: Time-series Variability of Relative Institutional Ownership  
The figures below illustrate the cross-sectional median, 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the relative institutional ownership 
of transient (short-term) investors, calculated as: 𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝐼𝑂)𝑇𝑅𝐴,𝑞 = (𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴,𝑞
𝐸𝑇𝐹 /𝐼𝑂𝑞
𝐸𝑇𝐹) − (𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴,𝑞
𝑈𝑁𝐷 /𝐼𝑂𝑞
𝑈𝑁𝐷).  
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Table 2- 1: Descriptive statistics 
Means and medians are reported for the following variables: Assets Under Management (AUM), net expense ratios, ETF 
duration and relative ETF duration. All variables are measures over the entire sample period, from January 2006 to 
December 2012. ETF duration refers to the average quarterly institutional holding duration for the ETF, while 
REL(duration) refers to the difference between ETF duration and the dollar-weighted duration of an ETF’s underlying 
portfolio of stocks. Descriptive statistics are reported by Morningstar’s 3-by-3 style classification for funds with a core style, 
and by Morningstar sector for sector funds. 
Style 
# 
(2012) 
AUM ($billion) Exp. Ratio (%) ETF Duration REL (Duration) 
Mean MED Mean MED Mean MED Mean MED 
 Large – Value 12 2.21 0.37 0.26 0.20 3.07 3.00 -2.42 -2.62 
 Large – Blend 21 7.54 0.81 0.20 0.20 3.27 3.14 -2.02 -2.14 
 Large – Growth 12 3.31 0.34 0.25 0.20 3.01 2.92 -1.79 -1.81 
 Mid – Value 5 1.11 0.63 0.25 0.25 3.58 3.60 -1.02 -0.85 
 Mid – Blend 6 2.60 1.16 0.22 0.20 3.67 3.70 -0.54 -0.59 
 Mid – Growth 5 0.97 0.46 0.26 0.25 3.24 3.23 -0.72 -0.59 
 Small – Value 3 1.19 0.62 0.25 0.25 3.18 3.36 -1.20 -1.19 
 Small – Blend 10 2.54 0.70 0.26 0.20 3.01 3.07 -1.17 -1.11 
 Small – Growth 6 1.41 0.73 0.25 0.25 2.99 3.04 -0.86 -0.82 
          
 Communication  2 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.48 3.39 3.32 -1.37 -1.59 
 Cons. Cyclical  7 0.48 0.27 0.37 0.35 2.07 1.96 -2.46 -2.74 
 Cons. Defens. 4 0.84 0.36 0.37 0.28 2.63 2.86 -2.77 -2.73 
 Energy 9 1.23 0.55 0.40 0.47 2.69 2.63 -1.81 -1.86 
 Financial 13 0.71 0.19 0.42 0.47 2.05 2.01 -3.00 -3.01 
 Real Estate 10 1.22 0.34 0.40 0.48 2.55 2.37 -2.72 -2.69 
 Health Care 11 0.70 0.40 0.42 0.47 2.54 2.48 -2.22 -2.15 
 Industrials 8 0.46 0.24 0.45 0.48 2.39 2.34 -2.67 -2.67 
 Materials 5 0.62 0.49 0.37 0.35 2.12 2.10 -2.56 -2.48 
 Technology 12 0.62 0.21 0.45 0.50 2.68 2.56 -2.04 -2.11 
 Utilities 4 1.19 0.64 0.36 0.27 2.99 2.89 -2.38 -2.51 
 All  165 2.24 0.40 0.33 0.25 2.84 2.77 -2.01 -2.10 
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Table 2- 2: Correlations among liquidity variables 
This table reports correlations among our liquidity measures (ETF liquidity versus relative liquidity) for the full sample of 
ETFs between January 2006 and December 2012: share creation activity (CREATION), quoted spreads (QSPR), 
Amihud’s price impact (AMIHUD), and turnover (TO).   
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Liquidity measures 
(1) CREATION 1.00       
(2) ETF QSPR 0.04 1.00      
(3) ETF AMIHUD 0.36 0.68 1.00     
(4) ETF TO 0.68 0.17 0.65 1.00    
(5) REL (QSPR) 0.19 0.65 0.67 0.39 1.00   
(6) REL (AMIHUD) 0.34 0.47 0.83 0.59 0.77 1.00  
(7) REL (TO) 0.66 0.27 0.70 0.95 0.41 0.62 1.00 
Panel B: Liquidity shocks (based on an AR(1) model) 
(1) CREATION 1.00       
(2) ETF QSPR -0.08 1.00      
(3) ETF AMIHUD 0.17 0.23 1.00     
(4) ETF TO 0.30 -0.12 0.45 1.00    
(5) REL (QSPR) -0.02 0.76 0.15 0.09 1.00   
(6) REL (AMIHUD) 0.21 0.08 0.87 0.57 0.13 1.00  
(7) REL (TO) 0.30 0.01 0.57 0.91 0.11 0.65 1.00 
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Table 2- 3: ETF share creation activity  
This table reports summary statistics for the percentage of days with share creation/redemption activity and the size 
(absolute value) of share creations/redemptions conditional on activity days. The high and low categories of REL(LIQ) 
refer to above or below median relative liquidity, which is calculated the average rank across the all four relative liquidity 
measures (spreads, price impact, turnover and share creation activity). REL(LIQ) is measured in the month prior to the 
share creation activity. There are also 3 size (AUM) categories, and 2 liquidity categories (High and Low). In calculating 
the % of days with share creation activity, I first calculate the proportion for each ETF, and then average across all ETFs 
in the cross-section. Shaded numbers (in gray) denote statistical significance at the 5 % level. The Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks test is used under the null of equality in medians between ETFs with high vs. low relative liquidity. 
  Conditional on activity days 
Category 
% of days Value (in $million) % of AUM ( = % of SHARES) 
AVG MED AVG MED STD AVG MED STD 
All 30.9 22.7 69.6 12.4 292.5 2.8 1.0 9.9 
AUM –Top tercile 
 Top 57.9 55.8 99.5 20.5 355.1 1.4 0.6 3.5 
 REL LIQ High 59.3 58.0 104.0 22.3 361.3 1.5 0.6 3.1 
 REL LIQ Low 34.6 29.4 19.0 6.6 74.5 1.0 0.4 6.6 
AUM – Middle tercile 
 Middle 29.4 23.8 16.7 7.4 30.0 3.5 1.7 10.8 
 REL LIQ High 34.6 31.3 20.0 9.5 33.2 4.1 2.0 12.5 
 REL LIQ Low 20.2 18.2 9.3 5.6 19.9 2.4 1.3 5.2 
AUM –Bottom tercile 
 Bottom 12.9 9.3 7.0 3.8 11.4 8.8 4.3 18.5 
 REL LIQ High 17.7 14.3 10.4 5.9 14.8 9.5 4.8 20.2 
 REL LIQ Low 10.4 7.5 5.6 3.2 9.1 8.5 4.2 17.7 
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Table 2- 4: Measures of ETF demand and liquidity 
This table reports summary statistics for different measures of ETF demand: net fund flows in Panel A, and measures of 
institutional demand and ownership in Panel B. The high and low categories of REL(LIQ) refer to above or below median 
relative liquidity, which is calculated the average rank across the all four relative liquidity measures (spreads, price impact, 
turnover and share creation activity). REL(LIQ) is measured in the period prior to measuring ETF demand. 
PANEL A: Net fund flow (in percent) by horizon (t) 
 t = Week t = Month t = Quarter 
Category Mean Med STD Mean Med STD Mean Med STD 
All funds 0.48 0.00 5.23 2.15 0.00 11.54 2.70 2.04 19.58 
  High REL(LIQ), t-1 0.55 0.00 6.23 2.13 0.67 12.44 2.14 2.37 20.17 
  Low REL(LIQ), t-1 0.40 0.00 3.98 2.18 0.00 10.62 3.25 1.46 19.02 
AUM – Top tercile 
 Top 0.24 0.05 4.45 1.03 0.68 7.62 1.43 1.98 13.40 
  High REL(LIQ), t-1 0.22 0.06 4.76 0.99 0.63 7.96 1.08 1.90 13.70 
  Low REL(LIQ), t-1 0.34 0.02 2.05 1.25 0.92 5.20 3.30 2.60 11.53 
AUM – Middle tercile 
 Top 0.46 0.00 5.36 1.90 0.49 11.29 2.20 2.45 18.74 
  High REL(LIQ), t-1 0.66 0.00 7.10 2.42 0.92 14.18 1.77 3.01 22.44 
  Low REL(LIQ), t-1 0.29 0.00 2.96 1.44 0.03 7.76 2.60 2.16 14.60 
AUM – Bottom tercile 
 Top 0.72 0.00 5.77 3.51 0.00 14.53 4.39 1.22 24.66 
  High REL(LIQ), t-1 1.77 0.00 8.87 6.58 0.07 20.52 7.41 9.26 32.34 
  Low REL(LIQ), t-1 0.48 0.00 4.76 2.83 0.00 12.74 3.66 0.07 22.39 
PANEL B: Institutional demand and ownership 
 Net Institutional trades Institutional buys Institutional sells Institutional ownership 
Category Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med 
All funds 1.99 0.74 10.02 5.61 8.21 4.92 41.93 37.28 
  High REL(LIQ), t-1 2.09 0.92 12.38 7.95 10.44 7.05 50.81 46.15 
  Low REL(LIQ), t-1 1.91 0.69 7.73 4.14 5.83 3.43 33.22 31.13 
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Table 2- 5: Explaining ETF inflows – base model 
This table reports a regression of monthly net fund flows on various fund characteristics and macro variables (all lagged), 
including inflows, returns, monthly average premium, AUM, age, tracking error, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate 
level of liquidity, VIX, Term-Spread and style returns (own and distant). All specifications include time (month, year), 
sector and style (based on Morningstar’s 3x3 size-valuation matrix) fixed effects. */**/*** denotes statistical significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by time (t-statistics in brackets). 
 All funds  Core styles Sector styles 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Fund characteristics      
 Inflows, t-1 -0.022 -0.066***  -0.061 -0.080*** 
 (0.91) (2.81)  (1.20) (3.54) 
 Inflows, t-2 0.038** 0.010  0.059** -0.017 
 (2.55) (0.73)  (2.61) (0.95) 
 Inflows, t-3 0.040** 0.017  0.082*** -0.009 
 (2.64) (1.09)  (3.32) (0.46) 
 ETF Return, t-1 0.196*** 0.296***  0.184*** 0.359*** 
 (4.45) (6.58)  (4.75) (6.78) 
 ETF Return, t-2 0.016 0.085**  0.052 0.113*** 
 (0.54) (2.46)  (1.37) (2.87) 
 ETF Return, t-3 0.047 0.084**  0.036 0.123*** 
 (1.45) (2.41)  (1.00) (3.10) 
 Cumulative inflows, t-4  0.058  -0.219 0.236 
  (0.36)  (1.35) (0.79) 
 Expense Ratio, t-1  -3.566***  -3.862** -9.351*** 
  (3.32)  (2.52) (5.98) 
 Age, t  -1.306***  -0.960*** -1.344*** 
  (8.00)  (5.47) (3.97) 
 Age^2, t  0.072***  0.042*** 0.100*** 
  (8.06)  (5.10) (4.88) 
 Average premium (PREM), t-1  24.682***  25.703*** 22.764*** 
  (5.24)  (4.10) (3.23) 
 Assets (AUM), t-3  -0.458***  -0.080 -1.232*** 
  (4.44)  (0.69) (5.27) 
 Tracking error, t-1  3.225  2.634 1.855 
  (1.11)  (0.76) (0.64) 
Controls – Macro      
 Own-Distant style return, t-1  0.160***  0.225*** 0.120* 
  (4.08)  (6.26) (1.87) 
 Own-Distant style return, t-2  0.025  0.066* -0.021 
  (0.61)  (1.93) (0.29) 
 Own-Distant style return, t-3  -0.022  0.020 -0.074 
  (0.72)  (0.66) (1.43) 
 VIX index, t-1  0.145***  0.146*** 0.138* 
  (2.69)  (3.28) (1.89) 
 Term Spread, t-1  1.261**  2.011*** 0.725 
  (2.45)  (3.46) (1.23) 
 P&S (2003) liquidity, t-1  -2.162  1.064 -5.124 
  (0.65)  (0.34) (1.22) 
R2 0.030 0.071  0.127 0.078 
N 12,194 11,930  5,785 6,145 
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Table 2- 6: Inflows and liquidity  
This table reports the results from regressions of monthly ETF inflows on liquidity characteristics; fund characteristics and control 
variables. I use share creation/redemption activity (Create), quoted spreads, price impact and turnover to measure liquidity (ETF, 
underlying and relative). All liquidity measures are signed such that positive numbers indicate liquidity. Panel A includes liquidity 
levels; Panel B uses shocks to liquidity. Control variables includes three lags of monthly flows and returns, cumulative inflows 
from 2006, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate level of liquidity, VIX index, term-spread and four lags of Morningstar 3x3 
style returns (own and distant). All specifications include time (year, month), sector and style fixed effects. */**/*** denotes 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by calendar time (t-statistics in brackets). 
Variables Create Quoted Spread Price Impact Turnover 
Panel A: Liquidity levels 
Exp. Ratio, t-1 -6.691*** -6.567*** -6.596*** -7.032*** -7.289*** -6.999*** -6.966*** 
 (5.45) (5.05) (5.31) (5.70) (5.95) (5.72) (5.70) 
PREM, t-1 27.487*** 26.411*** 26.439*** 26.717*** 27.116*** 27.127*** 27.034*** 
 (5.87) (5.63) (5.63) (5.67) (5.78) (5.78) (5.75) 
AUM, t-1 -0.524*** -0.547*** -0.539*** -1.733*** -1.118*** -0.739*** -0.732*** 
 (4.97) (3.43) (3.95) (5.73) (6.74) (5.79) (5.78) 
Track. Err., t-1 1.662 2.588 2.481 1.145 1.027 1.267 1.654 
 (0.58) (0.82) (0.87) (0.42) (0.37) (0.47) (0.60) 
ETF LIQ, t-1  0.678*  1.058***  1.086***  
  (1.72)  (4.82)  (5.05)  
UND LIQ, t-1  -0.586  -0.246**  -0.448  
  (1.20)  (2.20)  (1.01)  
REL LIQ, t-1 1.778***  0.644**  0.587***  1.069*** 
 (4.48)  (2.33)  (5.50)  (5.03) 
Controls: YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummies        
  Style, sector YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  Year, month YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.080 0.075 0.075 0.082 0.079 0.082 0.082 
N 11,930 11,928 11,928 11,929 11,929 11,930 11,930 
Panel B: Liquidity shocks 
Exp. Ratio, t-1 -4.159 -4.528 -4.413 -4.239 -4.565 -3.665 -3.385 
 (0.83) (0.91) (0.89) (0.86) (0.93) (0.73) (0.67) 
PREM, t-1 25.468*** 24.746*** 25.562*** 24.587*** 24.531*** 24.856*** 24.324*** 
 (5.33) (5.52) (5.39) (5.22) (5.21) (5.60) (5.24) 
AUM, t-1 -2.469*** -2.562*** -2.545*** -2.688*** -2.663*** -2.470*** -2.485*** 
 (2.78) (2.86) (2.83) (3.00) (2.98) (2.84) (2.81) 
Track. Err., t-1 -2.963 -3.436 -2.671 -2.513 -2.744 -3.193 -2.319 
 (1.14) (1.27) (1.05) (0.97) (1.07) (1.32) (0.92) 
∆ETF LIQ, t-1  -0.195  1.100***  2.731***  
  (0.33)  (4.33)  (6.62)  
∆UND LIQ, t-1  -1.315  -0.254  0.405  
  (1.30)  (0.31)  (0.24)  
∆REL LIQ, t-1 1.796**  0.090  1.106***  2.860*** 
 (2.56)  (0.15)  (4.38)  (6.89) 
Controls: YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummies        
  ETF YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  Year, month YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.118 0.117 0.116 0.118 0.118 0.124 0.124 
N 11,920 11,916 11,916 11,918 11,918 11,920 11,920 
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Table 2- 7: Horizon of net flows and liquidity 
This table reports regressions of ETF net flows (measured over weekly, monthly or quarterly horizons) on liquidity characteristics; 
fund characteristics and control variables (see Table 5 for more details). I use share creation/redemption activity (Create), quoted 
spreads, price impact and turnover to measure liquidity (ETF, underlying and relative). All liquidity measures are signed such that 
positive numbers indicate liquidity. Panel A includes liquidity levels; Panel B uses shocks to liquidity. All specifications include 
time (year, month), sector and style fixed effects. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Standard 
errors are clustered by calendar time (t-statistics in brackets). 
 Weekly  Monthly  Quarterly 
 Variables All Sector Core  All Sector Core  All Sector Core 
PANEL A: Liquidity levels 
 EXP, t-1 0.729 2.346 -0.281  -0.438 8.179 -4.724  -36.51*** -15.92 -63.36** 
 (0.72) (1.47) (0.19)  (0.08) (1.00) (0.72)  (3.19) (0.94) (2.42) 
 Age, t 1.252 -3.108 5.597***  136.196 154.686 109.028  -45.296 -99.387 -38.427 
 (0.85) (1.44) (3.95)  (1.56) (1.40) (1.43)  (0.17) (0.21) (0.14) 
 Age^2, t -0.001 0.001 0.001  0.011 0.036 -0.001  0.010 0.051 -0.020 
 (0.36) (0.26) (0.28)  (0.78) (1.51) (0.07)  (0.23) (0.72) (0.41) 
 PREM, t-1 6.802*** 7.785*** 4.819***  25.121*** 24.233*** 24.248***  74.496*** 90.163*** 53.047** 
 (7.84) (7.17) (4.63)  (5.33) (3.56) (3.90)  (3.91) (2.95) (2.63) 
 AUM, t-1 -0.492** -0.771*** -0.213  -2.965*** -3.579*** -2.757*  -7.613*** -6.181*** -9.779*** 
 (2.18) (3.05) (0.61)  (3.43) (3.65) (1.69)  (4.69) (2.84) (4.23) 
 Track. Err., t-1 0.291 0.320 0.315  -2.191 -1.993 1.060  -11.377 -17.170* 0.950 
 (0.70) (0.66) (0.62)  (0.81) (0.74) (0.27)  (1.41) (1.91) (0.07) 
 ETF LIQ, t-1 1.055*** 1.551*** 0.300***  3.047*** 4.119*** 1.636***  0.748 0.526 2.376 
 (12.22) (12.88) (2.92)  (6.67) (6.23) (3.06)  (0.54) (0.26) (1.36) 
 UND LIQ, t-1 0.053 0.080 0.051  -0.019 0.336 -0.536  -3.185* -4.006 -1.279 
 (0.41) (0.44) (0.34)  (0.03) (0.39) (0.70)  (1.67) (1.23) (0.65) 
 Controls: YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
 Dummies            
   ETF YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
   Year, month YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
 R
2
 0.054 0.059 0.063  0.125 0.125 0.171  0.194 0.180 0.293 
 N 51,699 26,458 25,241  11,927 6,144 5,783  3,832 1,958 1,874 
PANEL B: Liquidity shocks 
 EXP, t-1 -0.264 0.240 -0.216  -10.638** -6.010 -13.750**  -25.552** -8.210 -35.409** 
  (0.26) (0.15) (0.15)  (2.01) (0.74) (2.03)  (2.32) (0.42) (2.26) 
 Age, t 1.032 -3.250 5.429***  145.516* 137.024 122.260  -214.249 -497.990 -42.856 
  (0.71) (1.49) (3.92)  (1.76) (1.33) (1.59)  (0.71) (0.95) (0.18) 
 Age^2, t 0.002 0.004 0.002  0.030** 0.062*** 0.005  0.026 0.097 -0.037 
 (0.82) (0.86) (0.61)  (2.22) (2.73) (0.35)  (0.53) (1.27) (0.70) 
 PREM, t-1 6.781*** 7.739*** 4.819***  26.194*** 25.711*** 24.931***  70.074*** 79.464** 54.082*** 
 (7.62) (7.21) (4.51)  (5.93) (3.83) (4.06)  (3.63) (2.58) (2.68) 
 AUM, t-1 -0.307 -0.417* -0.221  -4.682*** -4.853*** -3.985***  -10.344*** -9.397*** -11.636*** 
 (1.36) (1.67) (0.66)  (10.37) (8.63) (6.62)  (7.95) (5.20) (7.48) 
 Track. Err., t-1 0.041 0.047 0.224  -1.743 -1.557 1.010  -5.839 -9.282 -1.448 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.44)  (0.67) (0.63) (0.24)  (0.73) (0.98) (0.12) 
 ∆ETF LIQ, t-1 0.336*** 0.482*** 0.136***  0.898*** 1.229*** 0.511***  -0.134 0.183 -0.020 
 (10.23) (10.19) (3.88)  (5.84) (5.30) (3.16)  (0.33) (0.29) (0.04) 
∆UND LIQ, t-1 0.011 -0.007 0.039  -0.128 -0.106 -0.125  0.150 0.326 -0.305 
 (0.24) (0.12) (0.77)  (0.63) (0.42) (0.57)  (0.22) (0.35) (0.34) 
 Controls: YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
 Dummies            
   ETF YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
   Year, month YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
 R
2
 0.051 0.052 0.064  0.121 0.122 0.163  0.186 0.174 0.286 
 N 51,640 26,430 25,210  11,962 6,171 5,791  3,996 2,076 1,920 
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Table 2- 8: Institutional trading and liquidity 
This table reports the results for regressions of quarterly net institutional trades, institutional buys or institutional sells on 
measures of liquidity (ETF and underlying portfolio) and fund characteristics. ETF (underlying portfolio) liquidity is 
calculated as the first principal component of ETF (underlying portfolio) across all liquidity measures. For a more detailed 
description of the fund specific variables, see Table 5. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
level. Standard errors are clustered by calendar time (t-statistics in brackets). 
 Net trades  Institutional buying  Institutional selling 
Variables Full  Full Core Sector  Full Core Sector 
Y., q-1 -0.211***  -0.023 0.065 -0.049  -0.095*** -0.022 -0.134*** 
 (7.04)  (0.62) (1.16) (1.22)  (3.82) (0.46) (4.64) 
Y., q-2 -0.078**  0.026 0.031 0.019  -0.052* 0.017 -0.085** 
 (2.66)  (0.69) (0.53) (0.51)  (2.03) (0.40) (2.51) 
ETF Ret, q-1 0.228***  0.189*** 0.195*** 0.193***  -0.026 -0.035 -0.023 
 (6.68)  (7.47) (7.27) (5.70)  (1.10) (0.99) (0.84) 
Exp. Ratio, q-1 -0.470  -0.829 7.328 0.995  -6.187 -7.157 -11.791 
 (0.05)  (0.09) (0.74) (0.06)  (0.85) (0.77) (1.69) 
Age, q 417.151**  -44.888 455.683** -529.470  -430.777 -124.801 -742.492* 
 (2.29)  (0.18) (2.66) (1.36)  (1.51) (0.67) (1.96) 
Age^2, q -0.045  -0.062 -0.028 -0.084  -0.016 -0.005 -0.018 
 (1.18)  (1.58) (0.79) (1.60)  (0.59) (0.19) (0.49) 
PREM, q-1 30.669**  -7.004 -8.371 -10.021  -24.615*** -19.672* -30.286*** 
 (2.24)  (0.56) (0.61) (0.47)  (3.89) (1.77) (3.74) 
AUM, q-1 -4.110***  -4.280*** -1.662** -5.665***  0.103 0.071 -0.020 
 (4.51)  (4.31) (2.31) (3.99)  (0.18) (0.11) (0.03) 
Track Err., q-1 -12.118**  0.283 8.058 -2.664  8.066** 9.674 5.940 
 (2.60)  (0.06) (1.01) (0.47)  (2.54) (1.19) (1.54) 
ETF LIQ, q-1 0.344  2.592*** 3.096*** 2.824*  4.297*** 2.644*** 6.174*** 
 (0.36)  (3.19) (2.90) (2.05)  (7.24) (4.32) (7.31) 
UND LIQ, q-1 0.950  0.469 1.289 0.322  0.328 0.685 0.176 
 (0.91)  (0.42) (0.98) (0.22)  (0.43) (0.75) (0.16) 
Dummies:          
   ETF YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
   Calendar YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.139  0.372 0.364 0.338  0.452 0.392 0.422 
N 3,531  2,984 1,392 1,592  2,964 1,382 1,582 
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Table 2- 9: Institutional ownership and ETF Liquidity  
This table reports the results for regressions of an ETF’s institutional ownership on various dimensions of ETF Liquidity; 
share creation activity, quoted spreads, Amihud’s price impact or turnover; and other ETF characteristics (see Table 5 for 
additional details on the variable abbreviations). All specifications include style, sector and year-month fixed effects. 
*/**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by fund (t-statistics 
in brackets).  
Variables Creation Quoted Spread Price Impact Turnover 
Exp. Ratio, q-1 4.842 7.840 5.120 3.485 0.304 1.223 1.382 
 (0.55) (0.66) (0.43) (0.44) (0.03) (0.16) (0.17) 
Age, q 0.639 -0.923 -1.521 1.586 -1.463 1.562 1.621 
 (0.57) (0.79) (1.33) (1.44) (1.23) (1.36) (1.40) 
Age^2, q 0.015 0.065 0.118** -0.123* 0.121** -0.099 -0.103 
 (0.24) (1.02) (1.99) (1.82) (1.99) (1.44) (1.48) 
AUM, q-1 2.643*** 2.325** 3.226*** -9.822*** 0.279 0.863 0.887 
 (2.83) (2.16) (2.99) (6.25) (0.16) (0.94) (0.97) 
Sector dummy 9.989*** 18.659*** 18.425*** 9.392*** 15.161*** 6.707** 6.808** 
 (4.05) (5.65) (5.44) (3.65) (4.41) (2.42) (2.44) 
ETF Ret, q-1 0.026 0.047 0.035 0.180*** 0.048 0.077* 0.065 
 (0.64) (0.93) (0.71) (3.99) (1.00) (1.87) (1.60) 
Track Err., q-1 -4.736 22.124** 9.880 0.235 1.310 -4.334 -0.487 
 (0.55) (1.97) (0.93) (0.03) (0.13) (0.47) (0.05) 
ETF LIQ, q-1  11.620***  11.338***  11.345***  
  (3.19)  (9.37)  (9.04)  
UND LIQ, q-1  0.585  1.993**  -6.585**  
  (0.16)  (2.43)  (2.23)  
REL LIQ, q-1 23.276***  7.231**  3.452***  11.270*** 
 (9.87)  (2.37)  (3.02)  (9.02) 
Dummies        
  Style YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  Calendar YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.432 0.287 0.276 0.464 0.297 0.447 0.444 
N 3,631 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 
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Table 2- 10: Determinants of short- vs. long-term institutional ownership  
This table reports results for regressions of ETF institutional ownership (by short-, long- and short-minus-long-term 
investors) on liquidity (ETF, underlying portfolio and relative liquidity) as well as fund characteristics. ETF (underlying 
portfolio) liquidity is calculated as the first principal component of ETF (underlying portfolio) share creation activity, 
spreads, price impact and turnover. Panel A is estimated for institutions classified as transient (short-term) and quasi-
indexers (long-term), while Panel B is estimated for institutions classified as investment companies and independent 
investment advisors (short-term and active) vs. bank trusts (long-term and passive). All specifications include calendar, 
sector and style fixed effects. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Standard errors are 
clustered by fund (t-statistics in brackets). 
 All funds  Core styles  Sector styles 
Variables Short Long ∆S-L  Short Long ∆S-L  Short Long ∆S-L 
PANEL A: Transient (short-term) vs. Quasi-indexers (long-term) 
Exp., q-1 10.156** -4.619 16.751***  13.588*** 13.536 0.634  4.494 -18.550** 26.767*** 
 (2.55) (0.74) (2.61)  (2.83) (1.61) (0.08)  (0.78) (2.47) (3.20) 
Age, q 1.576** 0.393 1.411  1.018 -0.806 1.814*  2.664*** 1.203 1.665 
 (2.10) (0.58) (1.58)  (1.15) (0.70) (1.82)  (3.16) (1.21) (1.24) 
Age^2, q -0.075 -0.045 -0.048  -0.038 0.008 -0.049  -0.113** -0.056 -0.082 
 (1.43) (1.22) (0.79)  (0.60) (0.12) (0.84)  (2.11) (0.88) (0.98) 
AUM, q-1 -3.512*** 1.356* -4.589***  -2.112*** 3.835*** -5.867***  -4.855*** -0.384 -3.890*** 
 (7.25) (1.76) (5.72)  (3.81) (2.84) (4.89)  (6.06) (0.44) (3.57) 
ETF Ret, q-1 0.069** 0.047 0.014  0.147** -0.050 0.197***  0.093** 0.078** -0.004 
 (2.10) (1.61) (0.29)  (2.49) (0.79) (2.84)  (2.47) (2.42) (0.07) 
Track Err., q-1 -1.053 3.935 -3.481  24.473** 30.043** -17.454  -13.767 -7.622 -0.386 
 (0.15) (0.65) (0.35)  (2.11) (2.19) (1.08)  (1.50) (1.20) (0.03) 
ETF LIQ, q-1 10.253*** 5.807*** 4.382***  7.660*** 1.521 6.113***  10.881*** 7.396*** 3.416* 
 (12.20) (4.64) (2.91)  (4.90) (0.49) (3.12)  (9.83) (5.69) (1.74) 
UND LIQ, q-1 1.458** 2.058 -0.410  1.013 3.125** -2.240  1.052 -0.104 1.763 
 (2.06) (1.51) (0.31)  (1.11) (2.01) (1.56)  (0.84) (0.05) (0.79) 
Dummies:            
   Style, sector YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
   Calendar YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.430 0.304 0.202  0.342 0.319 0.264  0.404 0.365 0.212 
N 3,608 3,594 3,592  1,667 1,665 1,664  1,941 1,929 1,928 
PANEL B: Investment companies and advisors (short-term) vs. bank trusts (long-term) 
Exp., q-1 5.552 -3.284 8.096  9.465 17.234*** -8.036  -1.748 -18.124*** 15.262* 
 (0.98) (0.79) (1.28)  (1.23) (3.04) (1.29)  (0.22) (3.47) (1.70) 
Age, q 1.096 0.916** 0.129  1.100 -0.084 1.175  1.496 2.318*** -0.953 
 (1.28) (2.14) (0.16)  (0.86) (0.14) (1.13)  (1.47) (3.24) (0.76) 
Age^2, q -0.073 -0.042 -0.030  -0.073 0.009 -0.083  -0.071 -0.117** 0.053 
 (1.30) (1.59) (0.54)  (0.87) (0.27) (1.29)  (1.04) (2.46) (0.60) 
AUM, q-1 -2.503*** 0.898* -3.406***  -0.987 2.686*** -3.665***  -3.790*** -0.616 -3.195*** 
 (3.68) (1.87) (4.45)  (0.88) (3.99) (3.70)  (4.23) (1.11) (3.04) 
ETF Ret, q-1 0.021 0.055** -0.032  0.093 -0.036 0.131**  0.051 0.074** -0.025 
 (0.62) (2.02) (0.67)  (1.36) (0.84) (2.10)  (1.37) (2.59) (0.47) 
Track Err., q-1 5.101 2.756 2.247  34.370*** 5.683 28.759  -9.008 -0.376 -8.851 
 (0.70) (0.86) (0.27)  (2.93) (0.56) (1.56)  (1.03) (0.10) (0.87) 
ETF LIQ, q-1 9.691*** 2.903*** 6.741***  6.898*** 0.795 6.096***  10.160*** 3.846*** 6.257*** 
 (8.52) (2.97) (4.09)  (2.66) (0.55) (3.82)  (7.47) (3.33) (2.88) 
UND LIQ, q-1 2.704** 0.473 2.175*  0.920 2.212** -1.300  4.458** -1.436 5.757*** 
 (2.59) (0.50) (1.66)  (0.63) (2.11) (0.81)  (2.25) (1.16) (2.84) 
Dummies:            
   Calendar YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
   Style, sector YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.307 0.288 0.159  0.237 0.367 0.194  0.329 0.322 0.207 
N 3,609 3,599 3,598  1,667 1,667 1,666  1,942 1,932 1,932 
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Table 2- 11: Short-term trading and liquidity 
This table reports the results for a regression of average institutional investors’ holding period (called ETF duration) on 
measures of liquidity (ETF, underlying portfolio and relative liquidity) and fund characteristics. ETF (underlying 
portfolio) liquidity is calculated as the first principal component of ETF (underlying portfolio) spreads, price impact and 
turnover. Relative liquidity is the first principal component of relative ETF liquidity (spreads, price impact, turnover and 
share creation activity). Inv. age is a proxy for the age of an ETF’s investor base. All other variables have been defined in 
Table 9. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by the fund 
(t-statistics in brackets).  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inv. age, q-1 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
 (11.44) (11.36) (9.85) (9.86) (6.37) (6.43) 
Exp. Ratio, q-1 -0.586* -0.611* -0.536* -0.538 1.490 1.493 
 (1.76) (1.79) (1.72) (1.63) (1.35) (1.39) 
Age, q 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.162** 0.173*** 0.382*** 0.374*** 
 (2.85) (2.86) (2.53) (2.66) (5.35) (5.26) 
Age^2, q -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (3.77) (3.78) (3.53) (3.61) (6.43) (6.71) 
AUM, q-1 0.360*** 0.366*** 0.396*** 0.389*** 0.301*** 0.307*** 
 (9.34) (9.65) (9.98) (9.95) (4.20) (4.36) 
ETF Ret, q-1 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (6.73) (6.93) (1.28) (1.16) (1.38) (1.33) 
Track Err., q-1 -0.673* -0.894*** -0.081 -0.142 0.642* 0.421 
 (1.86) (2.71) (0.22) (0.41) (1.73) (1.27) 
ETF LIQ, q-1 -0.579***  -0.547***  -0.383***  
 (9.77)  (10.01)  (5.45)  
UND LIQ, q-1 0.201***  0.089  0.191  
 (2.62)  (1.15)  (1.61)  
REL LIQ, q-1  -0.611***  -0.556***  -0.434*** 
  (10.38)  (10.10)  (5.75) 
Dummies:       
   Style, sector YES YES YES YES YES YES 
   Calendar  NO NO YES YES YES YES 
   ETF NO NO NO NO YES YES 
R2 0.571 0.568 0.607 0.602 0.724 0.725 
N 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 
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CHAPTER THREE: LIQUIDITY, STYLE INVESTING AND EXCESS COMOVEMENT 
OF EXCHANGE-TRADED FUND RETURNS  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Liquidity is generally considered to be beneficial for pricing efficiency because it facilitates 
arbitrage. In this study I argue that liquidity can sometimes also be detrimental for pricing 
efficiency because liquidity facilitates short-term trading that has the potential to generate excess 
comovements among asset returns. In Barberis and Shleifer (2003) investors allocate money at 
the style level and engage in short-term style switching for reasons unrelated to fundamentals – 
allocating more capital to styles that recently performed well and taking money out of styles that 
have done poorly. This type of correlated trading can induce a common factor in the returns of 
assets in the same style
20
.  
Investor demand should go first to the securities where the purest play exists and where 
liquidity is highest. Exchange-Traded Funds provide investors with easy access to popular 
investment styles (e.g. Large, Small, Value, Growth and Sector) at a cost that is on average lower 
                                                 
20
 Similar predictions arise in preferred habitat model of excess comovement (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005), 
which predicts that some investors restrict their trading to a subset of securities and the correlated non-fundamental 
demand of these investors is responsible for generating excess comovements.  
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relative to their underlying basket of securities (see Chapter 2). Moreover, it is easy to move 
money in and out of two different styles with ETFs and to enter into long-short strategies (e.g. 
Value-Growth) due to the relatively low short-selling costs of ETFs.  
My conjecture is that, due to the ease of investing in investment styles with ETFs and 
because of their high liquidity, ETFs attract a clientele of short-term investors with correlated 
non-fundamental demand at the style level. Consequently, the returns of ETFs will be more 
exposed to a common source of style-based non-fundamental risk relative to their underlying 
securities. This relative, or twin-based, comparison allows me to identify excess comovements 
by studying common factors in the change in misvaluation, proxied by the return difference 
between an ETF and its underlying portfolio Net Asset Value (NAV). This approach is in sharp 
contrast to existing studies that investigate anomalous return comovements around “exogenous” 
events, or by relying on a CAPM type model to filter out the fundamental component of 
returns
21
. Moreover, by properly controlling for fundamental drivers of return comovements, I 
can examine what affects the degree of excess comovements in order to provide a better 
understanding of the ETF characteristics, particularly liquidity, that facilitate excess 
comovements.  
An alternative mechanism that can generate excess comovements is differences in the 
speed of information diffusion between ETFs and their underlying portfolios. In this case the 
high liquidity of ETFs is more likely to attract investors with fundamental (long-term) 
information about abstract risk factors. Differences in information diffusion can also arise 
mechanically when there is stale pricing in the underlying securities (e.g. in small-cap stocks). 
This hypothesis is also known as the information diffusion view of excess comovements (see 
Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005).  
An important distinction between the non-fundamentals-based and the fundamentals-based 
view of excess comovement is that the former assumes that style investor have short horizons. 
Although the high liquidity of ETFs is beneficial to both long- and short-term investors, I argue 
that liquidity benefits short-term investors the most as in Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
Supporting this conjecture, in Chapter 2 I show that ETFs with high liquidity relative to their 
underlying securities have higher fund flows in the short-term, higher institutional ownership by 
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 e.g. Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005), Prinsky and Wang (2006), Green and Hwang (2009), Kumar, Page and 
Spalt (2013) 
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short-term (relative to long-term) investors and shorter institutional holding periods (relative to 
their underlying baskets). Retail investors are even more likely to be attracted to ETFs for 
liquidity reasons because the transaction costs that they face when investing in the underlying 
security basket are likely prohibitive. 
To make my tests as clean as possible, I focus on a sample 164 physically replicated ETFs 
that are traded in the U.S. and that track only U.S. equity indices. These funds have over $540 
billion in total assets as of 12/2012 – roughly 85 percent of the total assets of all U.S. equity 
ETFs. In contrast to related studies on “twin securities”; cross-listed stocks (e.g. Gagnon and 
Karolyi, 2010), international closed-end funds (Bodurtha, Kim and Lee, 1995), or even domestic 
closed-end funds (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991), my sample is unlikely to be affected by either 
non-synchronicity or stale pricing. The former is not a concern since ETFs and their underlying 
securities are traded in the same time-zone. Stale pricing is unlikely to occur because both ETFs 
and their underlying securities are generally actively traded, with the possible exception of small-
cap stocks. I conduct several tests based on reversals in misvaluation to rule out this possibility.  
 
To preview my results, I find significant evidence of commonality in misvaluation at the 
investment style level (size, valuation and sector): changes in misvaluation (ETF-NAV returns) 
comove positively across ETFs in similar styles, and negatively with ETFs in distant styles, after 
controlling for arbitrage induced mean-reversion in misvaluation. To illustrate the economic 
magnitude, a one Std. Dev. increase in the own-style misvaluation factor is on average associated 
with an increase in daily ETF-NAV return differentials of 55.73 percent of the Std. Dev. of ETF-
NAV returns. The impact of a one Std. Dev. shock to the own-style factor is also considerable 
relative to the variability in raw returns at roughly 4 percent
22
, but declines with the return 
horizon to 2.29 and 1.27 percent in weekly and monthly data respectively. Despite the decline in 
magnitudes over time, the results remain highly significant even in monthly data, which is more 
consistent with the non-fundamentals based view of excess comovement as opposed to 
information diffusion, because the latter predicts that information is assimilated rapidly to both 
ETFs and their underlying securities since both are liquid and actively traded instruments.  
The evidence of style-based commonality in misvaluation implies excess comovement of 
returns, but of which, the ETF or the NAV? To provide more direct evidence of misvaluation in 
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 Calculated as 𝛽𝑂𝑊𝑁,𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑(Own style factor)/𝑆𝑡𝑑(Raw return of ETF 𝑖), averaged across all ETFs.  
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the ETF leg, rather than the NAV, I investigate return reversals. Specifically, if an ETF is hit by 
a positive non-fundamental demand shock that pushes its price above the NAV value (resulting 
in a positive ETF premium), then we should observe a reversal in the future ETF returns (as a 
result of arbitrage) without a meaningful impact on NAV returns. Conversely, if the initial 
positive demand shock was driven by positive fundamental news that is absorbed first into ETF 
prices, then future NAV returns should be positive as the NAV catches up with a lag and the 
ETF return should remain unaffected. The empirical results confirm that ETF premiums have a 
negative and significant impact on future ETF returns over a period of three to four days, 
consistent with premiums reflecting non-fundamental demand shocks. More importantly, 
reversals in ETF returns are strongest among small-cap ETFs (the category with the highest 
liquidity relative to their underlying basket), which is consistent with the conjecture that liquidity 
attract short-term noise traders with correlated demand for investment styles. 
Moreover, current ETF premiums also forecast future NAV returns negatively over a four 
day period (positive on first day, negative on the remaining days), which is opposite to what the 
information diffusion view would predict. Such a negative relationship can, however, arise when 
investors experience non-fundamental demand shocks and trade sequentially. In this case 
liquidity goes first to the most liquid securities (ETFs) and when liquidity dries up, demand goes 
to the next most liquid ETF and so on, until no more ETFs are sufficiently liquid relative to their 
underlying securities, in which case the demand goes to the underlying securities.  
To provide further evidence that commonality in misvaluation is driven by commonality in 
demand shocks, I begin by investigating commonality in turnover and liquidity, which have been 
linked to correlated trading (e.g. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Karolyi, Lee and Van 
Dijk, 2012). I find similar style-based comovements in relative measures for turnover and 
liquidity (i.e. ETF minus underlying portfolio) with most of the effect originating from ETF leg, 
rather than the NAV. Next, I establish that commonality in demand shocks can predict one-
month ahead commonality in misvaluation, which is consistent with the idea that excess 
comovements are driven by correlated non-fundamental demand shocks. Finally, I investigate 
the determinants of the degree of commonality in misvaluation and find that ETFs with more 
desirable liquidity characteristics have a greater degree of commonality in misvaluation. This is 
to be expected if liquidity is what attracts short-term traders to ETFs.  
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Understanding what affects asset prices in the ETF market is important due to the potential 
for spillovers across markets. Staer (2014) shows that ETF fund flows have a large impact on 
underlying stock returns, almost half of which is reversed within a few days. Ben-David, 
Franzoni and Moussawi (2014) find that higher ETF ownership of stocks is associated with more 
volatile stock returns and a stronger mean-reverting component in stock returns, while Da and 
Shive (2013) link higher ETF ownership to stronger underlying stock return comovements. My 
conjecture that ETFs attract high-turnover investors with correlated trading needs is consistent 
with these findings.  
Among the most widely cited evidence in favor of correlated demand-based theories of 
excess comovement are the comovements observed around index additions (with other index 
stocks) and stock splits (with low-priced stocks)
23
. The critical assumption, that the event is 
exogenous, remains controversial and has recently been challenged by Kasch and Sarkar (2012) 
and Perez, Shkilko and Tang (2012). A broader debate in the literature concerns whether the 
observed comovement patterns among small-cap stocks (Banz, 1981) or value/growth stocks 
(Fama and French, 1993, 1995) can be explained by common variation in cash flows or discount 
rates
24
; or by unmodeled irrational behavior (see Barberis and Thaler, 2003), and to what extent 
limits-to-arbitrage can explain these findings (Brav, Heaton, Li, 2010). My contribution in this 
regard is to provide a more controlled experiment that is better suited for separating the two 
sources (fundamental vs. non-fundamental) of return comovements.  
This paper is also related to a growing literature on the relationship between correlated 
trading and return comovements. Kumar and Lee (2006) find not only that retail trades are 
systematically correlated, but also that such trades can help explain some of the anomalous 
return comovements among stocks with high arbitrage costs. Correlated retail demand has also 
been linked to investors’ tendency to place similar speculative bets (Dorn, Huberman and 
Sengmueller, 2008). Kumar, Page and Spalt (2013b) show that stocks with lottery-like feature 
comove too much with one another due to the correlated trading activity of gambling-motivated 
investors. Greenwood (2007) constructs a simple trading strategy that bets on the reversion of the 
prices of over-weighted Nikkei 225 stocks that comove too much in the short-run and finds this 
trading strategy to yield significant risk-adjusted profits. 
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 See e.g. Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005), Green and Hwang (2009), Kumar, Page and Spalt (2013). 
24
 See e.g. Fama and French (1993), (1995); Campbell, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2009); Campbell et al. (2013) 
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The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on ETF 
arbitrage and institutional details. Section 3 provides the theoretical framework and presents the 
main testable implications. Section 4 describes the data, defines the key variables and presents 
summary statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical tests for excess comovement based on an 
analysis of commonality in ETF misvaluation. Section 6 establishes that ETF premiums mainly 
reflect misvaluation in the ETF, rather than NAV leg. Section 7 documents that measures of ETF 
demand shocks also exhibit style-based comovement and that the degree of common demand 
shocks can predict commonality in misvaluation, along with ETF characteristics associated with 
higher liquidity. Section 8 concludes. 
3.2 BACKGROUND ON ETF ARBITRAGE AND INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
ETFs have an open-ended structure via the share creation and redemption process that facilitates 
arbitrage. This process is only available to some institutional investors (called Authorized 
Participants, or APs), which have signed an agreement with the ETF sponsor. APs can buy or 
sell ETF shares in bundles (or creation units) directly from the ETF sponsor in exchange for the 
underlying basket of securities at the end of the trading day (at 4 P.M. EST). Although this 
process is limited to APs (typically market makers, broker/dealers or large institutions), they can 
also create (or redeem) shares directly for their clients who wish to transact in ETFs.  
To illustrate the arbitrage process via the share creation mechanism, consider a situation 
where the ETF is trading at a premium (ETF price is above the NAV). An AP would then buy 
the underlying basket (at the NAV), exchange the basket for new ETF shares with the ETF 
sponsor and sell the newly created shares on the secondary market. In practice an AP could buy 
the underlying basket and simultaneously short the ETF. At the end of the trading day the AP 
would exchange the underlying basket for ETF shares, and close the short ETF position. 
The direct costs of creating ETF shares are small for U.S. equity funds (the focus of this 
paper). The size of a creation unit is typically 50,000 or 100,000 shares with dollar values 
ranging from $300,000 to $10 million. The fixed creation costs range from $500 to $3,000. For 
SPY, the world’s largest and most actively traded ETF tracking the S&P 500, the fixed fee of 
$3,000 amounts to about 5 bp for one creation unit worth $6 million, or 1 bp for five creation 
units worth about $30 million (Petajisto, 2013). For a sample of equity U.S. ETFs
25
, in Chapter 2 
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 Their sample is identical to mine. More details appear in the data section. 
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I report that share creations/redemptions occur on 30.9 (22.7) % of trading days on average 
(median) and conditional on such days, the magnitudes are $69.6 million ($12.4 million) or 
244.3 percent (27.4 percent) of daily dollar volume. These magnitudes indicate that AP’s 
frequently create/redeem multiple creation units at a given point in time, possibly to reduce costs.  
Arbitrage activity is also undertaken by market participants other than APs, such as hedge 
funds and high-frequency traders (Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti, 2013). For instance, 
when the ETF is trading at a premium, an investor can purchase the underpriced asset (NAV), 
short-sell the overpriced asset (ETF) and wait for prices to converge to realize an arbitrage profit. 
ETF prices can also be arbitraged against other ETFs (Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti, 
2013; Petajisto, 2013) or against futures contracts (Richie, Daigler, and Gleason, 2008).   
3.2.1 Limits-to-arbitrage 
Despite the enhanced pricing efficiency of ETFs, arbitrage remains limited by transactions costs, 
holding costs and other implicit restrictions (e.g. minimum share creation). As for transactions 
costs, both ETF and underlying portfolio spreads matter because arbitrage trades require access 
to both markets. Price impact is also of particular concern, as shown by Staer (2014). The 
potentially high price impact costs of ETF share creations combined with the large size of typical 
creation events (see Chapter 2) indicate that APs might need several days to accumulate a 
position that is big enough to offset the creation without undue price impact. This makes it 
harder to trade on small price deviations. Traditional long-short arbitrage trades with smaller 
trade sizes can be used to avoid some of the price impact costs. However, such arbitrage trades 
are exposed to holding costs (costs that accrue every period a position), especially idiosyncratic 
risk, for as long as the arbitrage trade is kept open (see Pontiff, 2006).  
Greenwood’s (2005) model can be used to justify limits-to-arbitrage further. In their model 
market-makers (or APs in the ETF market) are risk-averse and require compensation for 
providing liquidity. Similar predictions arise in Cespa and Foucault’s (2014) model with multiple 
investor classes and some degree of market fragmentation. Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi 
(2014) discuss a dynamic extension of Cespa and Foucault’s (2012) model to further justify 
temporary price discrepancies between identical assets. 
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3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 
The theoretical channel for excess comovement in ETF returns relies on limited arbitrage, 
correlated demand and clientele effects. In the Barberis and Shleifer (2003) model, investors 
allocate funds at the style level (e.g. small or value) as opposed to at the individual asset level. 
The strong demand for investment styles is evident from the large number of ETFs, mutual 
funds, and hedge funds that follow distinct styles and which are used by both individual and 
institutional investors
26
. The style investing model also assumes that investors move into styles 
that have performed well in the past, and out of styles that have performed poorly. If some of 
these style investors are also noise traders with correlated sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006), 
then coordinated shifts in investor preferences across investment styles (e.g. from value to 
growth) will induce a common factor in the returns of assets in the same style. In this case, the 
return of security i and j, belonging to style X and Y respectively, are given by
27
:  
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The first component reflects news about fundamental value (𝜀𝑡), which is often characterized via 
an asset pricing model such as the CAPM or the intertemporal CAPM (Merton, 1973). ∆𝑢𝑋,𝑡 and 
∆𝑢𝑌,𝑡 reflect common demand shocks (or noise-trader sentiment) for securities in styles X and Y 
respectively. In this theoretical setup each security i is positively exposed to demand shocks in its 
own style (𝛾𝑖,𝑋 > 0), and negatively exposed to demand shocks in distant styles (𝛾𝑖,𝑌 < 0). 
Another intepretation of Eq. (1) is that some investors restrict themselves to trading ETFs in a 
specific style giving rise to preferred habitats (Barberis, Shelifer and Wurgler, 2005). In this case 
∆𝑢𝑡  captures changes in sentiment, risk-aversion or liquidity needs of the style investors in 
habitat X or Y. As in Greenwood (2007), I refer to both intepretations as the non-fundamentals 
based view of excess comovement. 
Investor demand should go first to the securities where the purest play exists and where 
liquidity is highest. Exchange-Traded Funds provide investors with easy access to popular 
investment styles at a cost that is on average lower relative to their underlying basket of 
securities (see Chapter 2). Moreover, it is easy to move money in and out of two different styles 
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 see e.g. Brown and Goetzmann (1997); Fung and Hsieh (1997); and Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) 
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 see Eq. (20) in Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2002) 
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with ETFs and to enter into long-short strategies (e.g. Value-Growth) due to the relatively low 
short-selling costs of ETFs
28
.  
My conjecture is that, due to the ease of investing in investment styles with ETFs and 
because of their high liquidity (see Chapter 2), ETFs attract a clientele of short-term investors 
with correlated non-fundamental demand for investment styles. Hence, the returns of ETFs in 
similar styles will comove excessively – i.e. after controlling for the return on the fundamental 
underlying portfolio Net Asset Value (NAV) – with one another. To arrive at a testable 
hypothesis, I first take the return difference between ETF i and its NAV: 
      , , , , , , , , , ,ETF NAV ETF NAV ETF NAV ETF NAVi t i t i t i t i X i X X t i Y i Y Y tR R u u               (2) 
 where 𝑅𝑖 =  return for ETF i or its underlying portfolio NAV at time t  
  𝛾𝑖 =  sensitivity to demand shocks of ETF i or its underlying portfolio NAV 
The return difference (2) can be intepreted as proxy for the change in misvaluation (from an 
arbitrageurs point of view) because an ETF is a claim on its underlying portfolio of securities. 
Both securities should therefore be equally exposed to fundamental news (𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉 = 0). 
This does, however, not rule out the possibility that both securities are misvalued at the same 
point in time. In section 5.3, I rule out the possibility that Eq. (2) is driven by differences in 
systematic risk between the ETF and the NAV. The testable implication of style-based excess 
comovement is as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Changes in misvaluation (Eq. (2)) of two ETFs in the same style (𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑋) are 
positively correlated, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑖
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉 , 𝑅𝑗
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑗
𝑁𝐴𝑉) > 0, while changes in misvaluation of two 
ETFs in distant styles (𝑖 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑌)  are negatively correlated, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑖
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉, 𝑅𝑘
𝐸𝑇𝐹 −
𝑅𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝑉) < 0. 
To illustrate, investors increase their allocation to a particular style (say Value) after it has 
outperformed its distant style (Growth). This switch in allocations is financed either by selling 
securities in the distant style (Growth), or by selling securities in every other style (everything 
except Value). These demand shocks can then generate a positive correlation between changes in 
misvaluation of Value ETFs, and a negative correlation between Value and Growth ETFs. 
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 “No Shortage of Share Lending” featured in Journal of Indexes, February 17, 2010. 
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Style-based excess comovement can also arise if there are differences in the speed of 
information diffusion between the ETF and the NAV (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005). 
Specifically, because ETFs are highly liquid and represent pure plays on investment styles, 
fundamental news about abstract risk-factors may be incorporated first into ETF prices, and with 
a lag to NAV prices. In this case the ETF and NAV returns are given by:  
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 where 𝜇 =  fraction of news incorporated with a lag  
In contrast to the information diffusion view, the argument that ETFs attract short-term 
investors with correlated non-fundamental demand relies on liquidity clienteles, formalized by 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Their model predicts that short-horizon investors self-select into 
more liquid assets, such as ETFs. Supporting this conjecture, in Chapter 2 I show that higher 
ETF liquidity predicts fund flows strongly over short horizons (weekly and monthly), while 
expense ratios matter the most over longer horizons. Amongst institutional investors, they also 
show that funds with higher liquidity experience increased ownership by short-term investors 
relative to long-term, more institutional buying and more selling over the following quarter, and 
shorter holding periods. 
As for retail investors, the argument for liquidity clienteles is even stronger because the 
transactions costs that they face when investing in the underlying security basket are likely 
prohibitive in comparison to ETFs. Moreover, ETFs generally have lower expense ratios than 
even their cheapest retail mutual fund counterparts. Retail investors do pay attention to salient 
trading costs such as front-end loads and commissions (Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005) as well 
as expense ratios (Grinblatt et al., 2013) in the case of mutual funds. For ETFs, the most salient 
costs are likely to be quoted spreads and expense ratios, both of which are widely disseminated, 
while commissions are generally small, and sometimes even close to zero
29
.  
One way to separate the causes of excess comovements is to investigate its degree of 
persistence. According to the information diffusion view, excess comovements are unlikely to 
persist for long (e.g. over a week or a month) because both ETFs and their underlying securities 
are liquid and should therefore incorporate news relatively fast (e.g., the delay parameter in (3) 
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 Many ETFs have free commissions: for a list see http://etfdb.com/type/commission-free/all/.  
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could be a day or less for S&P 500 stocks). In contrast, the non-fundamental based view suggests 
that excess comovement may persist over longer horizons (e.g. monthly or quarterly) because 
styles go through cycles (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Empirical evidence also suggests that 
investors allocate funds based on past relative style performance evaluated over monthly and 
quarterly periods (Broman and Shum, 2015b).  
In order to properly disentangle the two stories we can directly examine the source of 
misvaluation (ETF vs. NAV). The non-fundamentals based view predicts that ETFs are hit by 
temporary demand shocks that subsequently revert. To illustrate the mechanism, suppose that 
noise-traders buy value ETFs due to their high recent performance and liquidity. The resulting 
price pressure is associated with an increase in the ETF price above its fundamental value 
(NAV). Over time arbitrageurs trade on the misvaluation and push the ETF price back down to 
its fundamental value.  
Hypothesis 2a: Current ETF premiums (ETF-NAV price deviations) predict future ETF returns 
negatively, while future NAV returns remain unaffected.  
In contrast, the information diffusion view predicts that ETFs impound fundamental 
information first, while their underlying securities (NAV) catch up with a lag. In this case 
investors with fundamental information about abstract style-based risk-factors trade first in ETFs 
due to their high liquidity and pure play resulting in positive price pressure. Subsequently, the 
new fundamental information will also be incorporated in the prices of the underlying securities, 
resulting in positive price pressure on the NAV.  
Hypothesis 2b: Current ETF premiums (ETF-NAV price deviations) predict future NAV returns 
positively, while future ETF returns are not affected. 
Differences in information diffusion can also arise mechanically when there is stale pricing 
in the underlying securities (NAV is based on closing prices which may be stale). Stale pricing 
could be a concern for some small-cap stocks. To rule out this possibility, I examine whether the 
results for commonality in misvaluation continue to hold among ETFs that hold underlying 
securities that are not prone to stale pricing (e.g. large-cap). 
Finally, if the degree of commonality in non-fundamental demand shocks varies across 
ETFs or over time, then this variation should be positively related to the degree of excess 
comovements (Greenwood, 2007; Greenwood and Thesmar, 2011). Moreover, with an 
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appropriate adjustment for total misvaluation, excess comovements of ETF i should also be 
stronger for more liquid ETFs because they are more likely to attract short-term noise traders. 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of commonality in misvaluation is positively related to the degree of 
commonality in non-fundamental demand and the liquidity characteristics of ETF i.  
3.3.1 Key variables 
ETF misvaluation can be measured by the premium, or the log-difference between the market 
price of an ETF and the market value of the ETF’s portfolio on a per-share basis (NAV30):  
    , , ,ln – lni t i tETF NAVi tPREM P P  (4) 
 where: 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹  = bid-ask midpoint price for ETF i at the end of day t,  
  𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉  =  underlying portfolio Net Asset Value per share for ETF i on day t 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that changes in misvaluation (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁) are correlated across ETFs in similar 
styles. When log-returns are used, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁 corresponds to the change in premium: 
    , , , , 1 , 1 , ,ln / – ln /i t i t i t i tETF NAV ETF NAV ETF NAVt i i ti tPRE R RM P P P P     (5) 
I will use log-returns throughout this study to keep the link clear between ETF-NAV return 
differences and changes in premiums. 
3.4 DATA 
My data selection starts with all U.S. traded Exchange-Traded Funds that exist both in 
Bloomberg and in Morningstar Direct. I keep funds that i) invest in U.S. equity, ii) are physically 
replicated and “passively” managed and iii) have at least 3 years of data available31. The second 
criterion, which excludes actively managed and synthetically replicated ETFs, is particularly 
important for this study. Active ETFs include ETFs designated by Morningstar as following 
active strategies, “smart beta” funds that give investor’s access fundamentally-weighted indices 
and funds based on proprietary underlying indices. These are excluded because they are less 
likely to represent pure plays on investment styles, they may be chosen by investors because of 
their investment strategy or manager performance and also because their holdings change 
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 NAV also includes accrued income from securities lending, underlying stock dividends and cash. 
31
 I exclude the first 6 months of a funds history since the data can be unreliable (see Chapter 2), leaving me with an 
estimation sample of at least 2.5 years.  
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frequently making it more difficult to measure their NAVs and misvaluation. Synthetically 
replicated ETFs (i.e. leveraged, inverse and futures-based ETFs) are excluded because their 
holdings change frequently, and because arbitrage is more risky as share creations are settled in 
cash
32
 rather than in-kind. These three exclusion criteria decrease the sample of ETFs from 363 
to 224 to 164. In terms of assets under management (AUM), the total AUM of U.S. ETFs was 
$632 billion in September 2012 according Blackrock (2012), while the AUM of my 164 funds 
was $540 billion. Given the dramatic expansion in scope and size of the ETF market in the last 
five to ten years, earlier data may not be as representative of current market conditions, which is 
why I decided to focus on a recent sample period, from January 2006 to December 2012. I also 
conduct robustness tests on a sample starting in June 2002.  
The sample of ETFs, along with NAVs
33
, shares outstanding and underlying indices, is 
obtained from Bloomberg. To ensure the reliability of NAV prices from Bloomberg, I cross-
check the NAV data with CRSP Mutual Fund Database. Specifically, NAV prices from 
Bloomberg sometimes represent stale values from the previous trading day, in which case I use 
the NAV price obtained from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. My second source is CRSP, 
which I use to obtain price, return and volume data for all funds.  
The ETF and NAV price data contains a handful of extreme observations and other outliers 
that need to be dealt with. ETF premiums greater than 20 % are mainly due to data errors 
(Petajisto, 2013), and are therefore discarded. Moreover, when the premium based on midpoint 
prices is more than ten percentage points greater in absolute terms than the premium based on 
closing prices, I use the latter instead. Finally, levels and changes in premiums are winsorized 
fund-by-fund at 5 Std. Dev. from the mean to reduce the impact of any remaining outliers.  
Third, I use the ubiquitous 3-by-3 Morningstar style classification (Small-, Mid- and 
Large; Value-Blend-Growth) to identify the investment style of a fund. I use the size and 
valuation styles based on the evidence in Froot and Teo (2009) and Kumar (2009) that both retail 
and institutional investors allocate capital at the size and value-growth level. The Morningstar 
classification has three key advantages. First, it coincides with the dichotomy often used by 
practitioners and many ETFs are named after their Morningstar style analogs (e.g. SPDR S&P 
                                                 
32
 With cash settlement arbitrageurs are exposed to idiosyncratic risk because many ETFs have a cut-off time in the 
afternoon to submit creation orders implying that arbitrageurs do not get to see the end-of-day NAVs before making 
the decision to trade.  
33
 For ETF’s by the iShares provider I use the NAV data that is directly available from their website as they contain 
fewer data errors, as suggested by Petajisto (2013).  
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600 Small-Cap Value or iShares Russell 3000 Growth fund). Investors do pay attention to fund 
names as illustrated by Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2005). They show that mutual funds that take 
rename their fund to match the current “hot style “subsequently experience abnormal inflows, 
even when the name change is unrelated to performance or any real change in holdings to match 
the new style. Second, Morningstar is a leading fund information provider and its classification 
system is publicly available. Third, the Morningstar style classification is updated monthly and it 
is based entirely on firm characteristics, which yields more stable style classifications over time 
as opposed to a latent variable approach based on the Fama and French (1993) factor loadings.   
Table 3-1 gives snapshots of the sample used in this study. At the beginning (01/2006), my 
sample contains 95 ETFs with $199.82 billion in AUM. Subsequently there are 156 ETFs with 
$257.55 billion in AUM (06/2009), and 164 ETFs with $540.01 billion at the end of the sample 
(12/2012). Roughly half of the funds are in diversified non-sector styles, while the rest are sector 
ETFs. Among the non-sector ETFs and within each size-category, the number of blend funds 
(neither value, nor growth) is roughly equal to the number of value and growth funds combined. 
Sector ETFs are generally much smaller and account overall for only one third of the total AUM. 
According to Bloomberg, 142 ETFs are fully replicated (i.e. hold more than 90 percent of the 
securities in the underlying index), while the remaining 22 use physical sample replication. 
[Table 3-1] 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3-2 provides descriptive statistics for ETF premiums and ETF-NAV returns (changes in 
premiums). Both are zero on average, and at the median, which suggests that ETFs are overall 
efficiently priced. There is, however, considerable variation around the mean as indicated by the 
standard deviation of 0.09 % and 0.12 % for the level and change in premiums. The extreme 
right and left tails (1 and 99 percentiles) are roughly +/- 27 bps for levels of premiums, and +/- 
37 % for changes in premiums. Another way to illustrate the magnitude of misvaluation is to 
calculate the variability in changes in misvaluation relative to the variability in raw ETF returns, 
or 𝑆𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁)/𝑆𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹). This equals a considerable 7.4 percent on an equally-weighted basis. 
These numbers are based on mid-point ETF prices at the end of the day. In contrast, the 
“actual” premiums based on closing prices are almost twice as volatile indicating that the true 
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cost of trading against ETF misvaluation can be much higher. I use mid-point prices in order to 
mitigate concerns about the illiquidity of the shares of smaller ETFs (Engle and Sarkar, 2006).  
  [Table 3-2] 
3.5 EMPIRICAL TESTS OF EXCESS COMOVEMENT 
Style-based excess comovement of ETF returns (Hypothesis 1) predicts a positive correlation 
between the change in misvaluation of ETFs in similar styles (”OWN style”), and a negative 
correlation with other ETFs in distant styles (”DIST style”). This hypothesis can be conveniently 
tested by investigating common factors in misvaluation (or commonality in misvaluation):  
 , , 1 , , , , ,
E N E N E N
i t i i i t i O OWN t i DI DIST t i tR PREM R R e   
  
      (6) 
 where: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁 = change in ETF misvaluation, or 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝑊𝑁  
  𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁   =  own-style misvaluation factor, ∑ 𝑤𝑗,𝑡(𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉)𝐽𝑗=1 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑂𝑊𝑁, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
  𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁   =  distant-style misvaluation factor, ∑ 𝑤𝑙,𝑡(𝑅𝑙,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑙,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉)𝐿𝑙=1 , 𝑙 ∈ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 
  𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = weight for ETF j at time t 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive correlation between the change in misvaluation of ETF i (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁) 
and the own-style misvaluation factor (𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁 , 𝛽𝑖,𝑂 > 0). Note that the factor excludes ETF i to 
avoid inducing a spurious correlation. As discussed in the previous section, some style 
dimensions only have a few funds (e.g. 3 ETFs with a Small-Value classification). In order to 
obtain a parsimonious metric for the own-style factor, and to avoid producing noisy factors based 
on a few funds, I use the following weights (𝑤𝑗,𝑡) in constructing the own-style factor: equal 
weight is given to funds that match both style dimensions (size and valuation), and half the equal 
weight to funds that are in adjacent styles. For instance, if ETF i is Large-Value, then adjacent 
styles include Mid-Value and Large-Blend. Blend funds (neither value, nor growth) are matched 
only by their size category. This approach is used for all diversified non-sector ETFs. 
The Morningstar 3-by-3 style classification only considers size and valuation, while sector 
(or industry) styles may also be important. Froot and Teo (2008) show that institutional investors 
reallocate capital across three style dimensions (size, valuation and industry), while Choi and 
Sias (2009) provide evidence of industry herding among institutional investors that is distinct 
from, and at least equally important to, herding by size and valuation styles. For sector ETFs it 
may therefore be important to account for all three style dimensions. In constructing the own-
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style factor for sector ETFs, I therefore give equal weight to other funds in the same industry, 
half the equal weight to any fund in the same size and valuation style and one fourth of the equal 
weight to any fund in adjacent Morningstar 3-by-3 styles. For the matching by Morningstar 3-by-
3 style, I do not differentiate between sector and non-sector ETFs. 
Hypothesis 1 also predicts a negative correlation between the change in misvaluation of 
ETF i (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁) and the distant-style misvaluation factor (𝑅𝐷𝐼,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁 , 𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼 < 0). As with the own-style 
factor, the distant-style factor is specific to ETF i and it is based on the weighted average ETF-
NAV return of other ETFs in distant styles (relative to i). The following weights (𝑤𝑙,𝑡) are used: 
equal weight is given to funds that are in distant styles (along both the size and valuation 
dimensions) and half the equal weight is given to funds that are in styles adjacent to the distant 
style. For instance, if ETF i is Large-Value, then Small-Growth is the distant style (equal-weight) 
and Mid-Growth and Small-Blend (half the equal weight) are in styles adjacent to Small-Growth. 
For mid-cap funds I consider large and small to be equally distant. Hence, the distant style of 
Mid-Value is Small-Growth and Large-Growth
34
. 
Even if the ETF-NAV return differentials perfectly control for fundamental risk (as in Eq. 
(2)), then the return difference reflects not only the impact of noise-trader demand shocks, but 
also the subsequent arbitrage trades and the associated reversal in misvaluation. Suppose that 
ETF i becomes overpriced relative to the NAV (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 > 0) as a result of a positive noise-
trader demand shock. In this case arbitrageurs will buy the underpriced basket of securities, 
exchange it for ETF shares and sell the newly created ETFs in the secondary market, which will 
induce a reversal in misvaluation (∆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡+1 < 0). This mechanism generates mean-reversion 
in changes in misvaluation. Given that demand shocks are theoretically expected to be 
uncorrelated (or positively auto-correlated due to some persistence in demand shocks), we can 
isolate the impact of demand shocks on misvaluation by controlling for the lagged premium in 
regression (6). 
I run time-series regressions of (6) separately for each ETF using all available observations 
and report the mean of the estimated coefficients across all ETFs. In calculating the standard 
error for the mean coefficient, I take into account the cross-equation correlations in the estimated 
coefficients following Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010):   
                                                 
34
 The results also hold if I construct own- and distant-style factors by matching on both the size and valuation styles 
while disregarding adjacent styles, or if I disregard the industry styles and match all ETFs (whether sector or non-
sector) based on their size and valuation characteristics. 
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 where √𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽𝑖)   = the White standard error of the coefficient 
  𝜌𝑖,𝑗 = the estimated correlation between the residuals for ETF i and j.   
3.5.1 Results: style-based commonality in misvaluation 
The main results for style-based commonality in misvaluation (regression (6)) are given in Table 
3-3. The results are reported separately for the daily, weekly and monthly horizons. For weekly 
and monthly data, I require at least 75 percent valid daily observations in each period. 
[Table 3-3] 
The results in Table 3-3 for the daily horizon show not only that the own-style betas are on 
average positive and significant, but also that more than 95 percent of the betas are positive and 
(individually) significant. The economic magnitudes are also considerable. To illustrate, a one 
Std. Dev. increase in the own-style misvaluation factor is associated with a 6.99 bps increase in 
ETF-NAV returns. The proportional impact, 𝛽𝑂𝑊𝑁 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁 )/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁)  is also 
considerable at 55.73 percent on average indicating that (loosely speaking) almost half of the 
variation in changes in misvaluation is driven by the own-style misvaluation factor. The 
economic magnitudes, in terms of the proportion of common variation in misvaluation, remains 
very similar at weekly and monthly horizons. This finding is more consistent with the non-
fundamentals based view of excess comovement as opposed to information diffusion (or stale 
pricing), because the latter predicts that information is assimilated relatively fast to both ETFs 
and their underlying securities since both are liquid instruments. 
Since the price pressure associated with non-fundamental demand shocks is temporary, the 
strength of excess comovements should, on the one hand, decline with the length of the return 
horizon. On the other hand, if there is some persistence in demand shocks combined with limits-
to-arbitrage, excess comovements may persist over longer horizons. To better assess whether 
commonality in misvaluation remains economically important over longer horizons, I recompute 
the proportional impacts as 𝛽𝑂𝑊𝑁 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁 )/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹). This metric tells us how important 
common misvaluation is relative to the variability in raw returns. In daily data, common 
misvaluation accounts for roughly 4 percent of the variability in raw returns. This effect declines 
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to 2.29 percent in weekly data, and to 1.27 percent in monthly. Thus, while there is some 
persistence in the degree of commonality in misvaluation even over monthly horizons, the 
importance of common misvaluation declines over longer horizons consistent with arbitrage 
forces playing a role.  
The prediction that changes in misvaluation are negatively correlated between ETFs in 
distant styles is also born out in the data as the distant-style betas are significantly negative 
(𝛽𝐷𝐼 < 0), although the average 𝛽𝐷𝐼 is only one tenth as large as the average 𝛽𝑂𝑊𝑁. The weaker 
distant-style comovements may be explained by the style-switching behaviour of noise traders. If 
style investors finance increases in own-style allocations (e.g. Large-cap Value) by selling 
securities in every other style (everything except large-cap Value), then it could explain the 
weaker distant-style comovements in misvaluation. Nevertheless, the misvaluation factors are 
successful in capturing the relevant style-based comovements in misvaluation as changes in 
misvaluation are not positively correlated with the distant-style factor, which could happen if I 
had omitted an important style category from the own-style. 
Premiums predict changes in misvaluation negatively consistent with arbitrage activity and 
mean-reversion (𝜆𝑖 < 0 in Eq. (6)). As a benchmark, the 𝜆𝑖 coefficient should theoretically equal 
-1 if shocks to premiums fully revert over one period (i.e. when premiums are stationary). There 
is, however, a considerable degree of heterogeneity in the coefficient estimates with the 5
th
, 50
th
 
and 95
th
 percentiles at -0.85, 0.49, -0.26 respectively at the daily horizon.  
Finally, it is also important to remember that the economic magnitudes documented here 
are conservative because with a twin-approach we can only identify the relative magnitude of 
excess comovements (the relative sensitivity to demand shocks 𝛾𝑖
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝛾𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉 in Eq. (2)). The total 
amounts (𝛾𝑖
𝐸𝑇𝐹 and 𝛾𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉) can be bigger if both ETFs and NAVs are affected by non-fundamental 
demands, which is likely to occur because ETFs may not have sufficient liquidity to absorb all of 
the liquidity-demand by short-term investors (to be discussed in section 6). 
3.5.2 Results: sub-samples 
Table 3-4 provides additional sub-sample results for commonality in misvaluation. If stale 
pricing is affecting the results, then we should expect the results to be mainly driven by small-
cap ETFs whose underlying stocks may not always be actively traded. In contrast, I find that the 
degree of commonality in misvaluation is relatively similar across small-, mid- and large-cap 
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ETFs. The raw coefficient estimates for the own-style beta are 0.843, 0.828 and 0.957 for large-, 
mid and small-caps respetively. Similar patterns are also observed for the proportional impact of 
common misvaluation relative to raw returns (𝛽𝑂𝑊𝑁 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁 )/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹)): 4.52, 3.84 and 
5.50 percent for large-, mid- and small-cap ETFs. Given the strength of the results for large- and 
mid-caps, stale pricing is unlikely to be a concern here. The somewhat stronger results for small-
cap ETFs is also consistent with my conjecture that liquidity faciliates excess comovements 
because small-cap ETFs are on average the most liquid (relative to their underlying securities) 
and are therefore more likely to attract short-term investors (see Chapter 2). 
[Table 3-4] 
Among the various styles, the results are strongest for value ETFs both in regards to the 
own-style comovements (𝛽𝑖,𝑂𝑊𝑁 = 1.037), as well as the distant styles comovements (𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 = -
0.173). The results for growth ETFs are weaker than for value ETFs, but similar to blend funds. 
The weaker results for blend funds, despite their higher overall liquidity, is consistent with the 
idea that growth and value ETFs are more attractive to style investors because they represent 
pure plays on investment styles. The results for sector ETFs also hold strongly, although the 
comovements are slightly weaker than for non-sector funds (𝛽𝑖,𝑂𝑊𝑁= 0.774) most likely due to 
the difficulty of constructing precise own-style misvaluation factor based on three distinct styles. 
Finally, sub-sample results by time-period show that the own-style betas have generally 
increased over time from 0.590 in the period prior to the main sample (06/2002-12/2006), to 
0.724 during the pre-financial crisis period (12/2006- 07/2008), to 0.884 during the crisis period 
(08/2008-03/2009) and to 0.799 in the post-crisis period (03/2009-12/2012). This pattern is 
consistent with a greater use of ETFs by short-term investors with non-fundamental demand as 
the overall liquidity of ETFs has increased over time (see Figure 2-1, in Chapter 2). 
3.5.3 Robustness: Exposure to systematic risk  
Differences in systematic risk between ETFs and their underlying portfolios might be able to 
explain the style-based commonality in misvaluation documented earlier. To investigate this 
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possibility, I regress ETF-NAV returns on the Fama and French 3-factors (MKT, SMB and 
HML
35
) and the lagged premium to control for mean-reversion in ETF-NAV returns.  
[Table 3-5] 
Table 3-5 shows that daily ETF-NAV returns are negatively and significantly exposed to the 
market factor (holds for the average ETF in every style); large-cap ETFs have a positive and 
significant exposure to SMB, small-caps have a negative and marginally significant exposure to 
SMB, while ETFs in every style are negatively and significantly exposed to HML (except for 
Growth ETFs). At the daily level the R
2
 increases by roughly 8 percent compared with the 
baseline model that only includes that lagged premium. A decomposition of R
2
 reveals that most 
of this increase is due to the negative exposure of ETF-NAV returns on the market factor. These 
results, particularly the uniformly negative exposure on the market factor, are not easy to 
reconcile with the style-based commonality in misvaluation documented earlier, nor do the 
results line up with the explanation that ETF returns are fundamentally more risky relative to 
NAV returns. Moreover, these findings disappear at lower return horizons.  
Another possibility is that ETFs are differentially exposed to systematic liquidity risk, 
especially because there are large differences in liquidity between the ETF and its underlying 
portfolio. This story is, however, unlikely because recent evidence on the pricing of liquidity risk 
in U.S. stocks suggests that the characteristic liquidity premium has declined considerably over 
time and is priced only among the smallest stocks, while systematic liquidity is priced primarily 
among NASDAQ stocks (Ben-Rephael, Kadan and Wohl, 2013). In contrast, my results are not 
driven by small-cap ETFs. To formally investigate this issue I augment the Fama-French 3-factor 
model with the market-wide funding liquidity factor based on Hu, Pan and Wang (2013), which 
is available at the daily level from the author’s website. In specification (b) I show that HPW’s 
funding liquidity variable enters with a positive and significant coefficient for large-cap ETFs, 
but not for small-caps as we might have expected. As before, the results are insignificant at lower 
horizons. Thus, differences in systematic risk are unlikely to be able to explain the comovement 
patterns documented earlier among ETF-NAV returns.  
                                                 
35
 It is possible that ETF-NAV returns are correlated with SMB and HML if these return premiums are related to 
correlated non-fundamental demand. However, identification of this relationship is likely to be weak given that 
SMB and HML are not filtered from fundamental sources of risk. 
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3.6 SOURCE OF MISVALUATION: ETF OR NAV? 
In this section I provide more direct evidence that ETF premiums are driven by misvaluation in 
the ETF leg (non-fundamental demand shocks) as opposed to in the NAV leg (slow diffusion of 
information). To illustrate the testable implications, suppose that the ETF i is hit by a positive 
non-fundamental demand shock that pushes its price above the underlying portfolio NAV value 
(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 > 0). If 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  truly reflects misvaluation of the ETF, then we should observe a 
reversal in the future returns of ETF i (𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐸𝑇𝐹 < 0) with no impact on NAV returns (𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑉 = 0).  
The alternative hypothesis is that the initial demand shock was driven by positive 
fundamental news. In this case ETF i is correctly valued because the fundamental information is 
incorporated first into ETF prices, while its underlying portfolio NAV is incorrectly priced 
because it reacts more slowly, either because the high liquidity of ETFs attract fundamental 
traders, or due to stale pricing. The difference from before is that the price is correct for ETF i 
and its future returns remain unaffected (𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐸𝑇𝐹 = 0). In contrast, future NAV returns will be 
positive as the NAV catches up to reflect the fundamental news already incorporated in the price 
of ETF i (𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑉 > 0). To test these implications, I estimate the following regressions while 
controlling for lagged returns: 
 
3 3
, 1 , , 10 0
ETF ETF ETF ETF ETF ETF
i t i k i t k k t k i tk k
R a b PREM c R e          (8) 
 
3 3
, 1 , , 10 0
NAV NAV NAV NAV NAV NAV
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R a b PREM c R e          (9) 
 where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐸𝑇𝐹
 = ETF return measured on day t+1 (over two consecutive trading days) 
  𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑉
 = NAV return measured on day t+1 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  = ETF premium relative to NAV on day t  
If 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 reflects misvaluation for ETF i, then a future reversal in misvaluation implies that 
𝑏𝑘
𝐸𝑇𝐹 < 0, while NAV returns remain unaffected 𝑏𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝑉 = 0. In contrast, the information diffusion 
story predicts that 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 reflects fundamental news already incorporated into the price of ETF 
i (𝑏𝑘
𝐸𝑇𝐹 = 0), but future returns of NAV will catch up with a lag (𝑏𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝑉 > 0). I also report the 
signifiance of the overall effect over a four day period (∑ 𝑏𝑘 = 0) using an F-test. 
The main challenge in estimating regressions (8-9) is the dependence in residuals across 
funds because we have not accounted for common fundamental risk. To address this issue, I 
estimate (8-9) using pooled OLS with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors that are robust 
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to general forms of cross-sectional and time-series dependence. In unreported tests, I also very 
that similar results hold if we aggregate (8-9) to the style level by taking an equally-weighted 
average of the LHS and RHS across all style categories (9 size-valuation styles for non-sector 
ETFs, 11 sector styles).   
 [Table 3-6] 
Consistent with the reversal of non-fundamental demand shocks, the results in Table 3-6 show 
that premiums predict ETF returns negatively over a four day period with the overall effect being 
significant at the 5 percent level. Individually, the coefficients are negative for the first three 
lags, but significant only for the first two. The economic magnitude of the effect can be 
illustrated by using a one Std. Dev. shock to premiums: the overall effect (∑ 𝑏𝑘 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡)) 
equals a decline in ETF returns of 19.5 bps over a four day period. The magnitude of this effect 
is considerable when compared to the overall variability in changes in ETF misvaluation, which 
is 12 bps per day. In contrast, the overall effect of premiums on NAV returns over a four day 
period is insignificantly different from zero.  
These results might also be affected by arbitrage activity, namely, from the price impact of 
buying the underpriced NAV and selling the overpriced ETF. In order to provide a more 
conservative test I investigate the net effect of premiums on future ETF returns relative to NAV 
returns (𝑏𝑘
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑏𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝑉). If premiums reflect non-fundamental demand shocks in ETF prices that 
subsequently revert, then 𝑏𝑘
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑏𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝑉 < 0, whereas if premiums reflect fundamental demand 
shocks in ETF prices and which are subsequently incorporated into NAV prices, then 𝑏𝑘
𝐸𝑇𝐹 −
𝑏𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝑉 > 0. Surprisingly, the overall net effect (∑(𝑏𝑘
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑏𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝑉) ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡)) is even more 
negative than before, at -30.1 bps, because premiums predict NAV returns with a negative sign 
on days two and three.  
This finding is in contradiction with the information diffusion story predicts, but it can be 
explained in the context of non-fundamental demand shocks. Suppose investors trade 
sequentially, possibly because information (whether fundamental or non-fundamental) arrives 
sequentially. In this case, a positive non-fundamental demand shocks goes first to the most liquid 
ETFs. Once liquidity dries up in the most liquid ETF, it goes to the next most liquid and so on, 
until no more ETFs are liquid enough relative to their underlying basket, in which case the 
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demand goes to the underlying securities
36
. Thus, a positive premium reflects misvaluation in 
both the ETF and the NAV because both are hit by the demand shock, but the ETF is hit harder 
because it is more liquid. Consequently, both ETF and NAV prices are above their true 
fundamental values, in which case the returns of both must revert.  
I also estimate regression (8-9) on sub-samples based on non-sector vs. sector, and for 
large-, mid- and small-cap funds. The results hold strongly for both non-sector and sector funds, 
although among the non-sector funds, only small-cap ETFs show significant evidence of return 
reversals following a positive premium. This finding is not only consistent with non-fundamental 
demand, but it also agrees with the conjecture that more liquid securities attract short-term 
investors with non-fundamental demand because small-cap ETFs have on average higher relative 
liquidity compared to either mid- or large-cap ETFs (Chapter 2).  
3.7 CORRELATED DEMAND AND EXCESS COMOVEMENT IN RETURNS 
The non-fundamentals-based view of excess comovement predicts that if the degree of 
commonality in demand shocks varies across securities or over time, then this variation should 
be positively related to the degree of commonality in misvaluation and the liquidity of the fund 
(Hypothesis 3). In order to test this hypothesis, we need empirical proxies for correlated demand 
shocks. In section 7.1, I propose two such measures. In section 7.2 I show that these demand 
shock proxies exhibit similar style-based comovements as do changes in ETF misvaluation. In 
section 7.3, I provide formal tests for Hypothesis 3. 
3.7.1 Measuring correlated demand shocks 
To arrive at a proxy for abnormal demand shocks
37
, I build on the concept of abnormal trading 
activity. In the context of portfolio theory, turnover is a natural proxy for trading activity (Lo and 
Wang, 2000). Hence, I use the turnover of an ETF relative to its underlying basket of securities: 
   , , , ,,
1
ln /
K
ETF UND
i t i k t k ti t
k
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
 
  
 
  (10) 
                                                 
36
 An alternative explanation is that liquidity demand by retail investors goes first to the most liquid ETF, then to the 
next most liquid, and all the way to the least liquid ETF, because trading in the underlying securities is always too 
costly. For institutional investors with the capacity to invest in the underlying securities, the demand would go to 
ETFs only as long as ETF liquidity is above the liquidity of the underlying securities. 
37
 Here I do not attempt to differentiate between the various sources (i.e. sentiment, risk aversion, or liquidity needs) 
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 where: 𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 = 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹/𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹, or the share volume divided by the number of shares 
    outstanding for ETF i on day t.  
  𝑇𝑂𝑘,𝑡
𝑈𝑁𝐷 = turnover of underlying security k on day t.  
  𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 =  dollar-weight invested by ETF i in security k at the end of day t 
Lo and Wang (2000) use a similar measure of portfolio turnover. Higher numbers for REL(TO) 
indicate that the ETF is more actively traded relative to its underlying basket, presumably 
because the ETF attracts high-turnover investors. To arrive at a measure for unexpected shocks 
to relative turnover, I use the residual from an AR(1) model, which I denote by ∆𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝑇𝑂). 
Unexpected increases in ∆𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝑇𝑂) may reflect either an unexpected increase in ETF, or NAV 
trading activity. The shocks are, however, most likely to come from the ETF rather than the 
NAV because the correlation between ∆𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝑇𝑂) and a similarly constructed measure for shocks 
to ETF turnover is roughly 0.9 (see also Chaper 2, Table 2-2).  
To investigate commonality in relative turnover, I adopt the same approach that I used for 
ETF-NAV returns. Specifically, I regress shocks to relative trading activity on the equally-
weighted shock to relative trading activity of other funds in ETF i's own or distant styles (as 
defined in the previous section): 
       
1
, , , , ,, , ,
1
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j
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 

        (11) 
The one-day leading and lagged terms are meant capture any lagged adjustment in commonality 
(Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000). Correlated demand at the style level implies positive 
concurrent own-style betas (𝛽𝑖,𝑂). One caveat is that I cannot rule out comovements across styles 
(𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼 > 0) because ∆𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝑇𝑂) may also capture fundamental demand shocks. Nevertheless, I 
would expect to find stronger own- than distant-style comovements if the non-fundamental style 
component is strong. 
As another measure of correlated demand, I use the degree of commonality in relative 
liquidity. There is an extensive literature documenting that liquidity comoves across stocks. The 
demand-side view argues that commonality in liquidity arises because of correlated trading 
activity (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk, 2012), demand by 
institutional owners (Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 2008), by investor sentiment (Huberman and 
Halka, 2001) or by the price impact of correlated liquidity needs (Greenwood and Thesmar, 
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2011). In this case we can view commonality in ETF liquidity as a proxy for correlated demand. 
The supply-side view provides a different interpretation. In this case liquidity commonality is 
explained by the funding constraints of financial intermediaries. Several theoretical models 
predict that commonality in liquidity, via illiquidity spirals or feedback loops, increases during 
periods when arbitrage capital is limited
38
. However, as we shall see in section 7.2, the results are 
more consistent with the demand-side view of liquidity commonality. 
To measure relative liquidity, I use the difference between the (log of) Amihud’s price 
impact
39
 for the underlying portfolio and the ETF: 
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 where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑈𝑁𝐷 =  mid-quite return (in %) for security k held by ETF i, on trading day t  
  𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑈𝑁𝐷  =  dollar volume (in $millions) for security k, on trading day t 
Amihud’s Price Impact (PI) has been widely used in the literature. Hasbrouck (2009) reports 
that, “among the daily proxies, the Amihud measure is most strongly correlated with the TAQ-
based price impact coefficient” (p. 1459). Amihud’s measure is also endorsed by several other 
papers as good proxy for price impact; others have used it to study commonality in liquidity
40
. A 
similar measure of portfolio liquidity has been used by Idzorek, Xiong and Ibbotson (2012). 
Having defined REL(PI), parallel calculations are done to compute measures of commonality 
with REL(TO) replaced by REL(PI) in Eq. (10). The data for portfolio weights comes from 
Morningstar Direct
41
. For a more detailed description and summary statistics of these variables, 
see Chapter 2. 
According to the non-fundamentals based view of excess comovement there is a positive 
relationship between the degree of commonality in misvaluation and turnover/liquidity because 
both are driven by a common factor, namely correlated demand shocks. It is important to 
emphasize that this prediction does not imply that ETF-NAV returns can be explained by relative 
                                                 
38
 see Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk (2012) for an extensive list of references. 
39
 Daily observations of the price impact ratio above the 99.5
th
 percentile of the sample have been discarded as in 
Amihud (2002). Similar results obtain if I use the CRSP-based quoted spreads to measure liquidity. 
40
 Lesmond (2005), Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009), Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2010) endorse Amihud, 
while Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk (2012) and Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008) use Amihud for liquidity commonality. 
41
 Since my holdings data for the underlying holdings of an ETF is generally at the monthly level, the implicit 
assumption is that changes in weights only reflect changes in market values of the constituents. 
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turnover/liquidity (or by the own-style turnover/liquidity factors). In particular, commonality in 
turnover/liquidity tends to be high during market downturns when volatility is high and when 
returns are extremely low (Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk, 2012), while liquidity is high in the 
opposite state and turnover can be high in either extreme state.  
The theoretical model by Cherkes, Sagi and Stanton (2008) does, however, predict a 
positive relationship between the return difference of twin securities and their liquidity difference 
because premiums reflect a trade-off between liquidity and expense ratios. Their prediction can 
explain the style-based commonality in misvaluation documented previously only if changes in 
relative liquidity are correlated across ETFs at the style level, and if such common changes in 
liquidity can explain ETF-NAV return differences. In unreported tests, I investigate this issue by 
regressing changes in premiums (i.e. ETF-NAV returns) on shocks to relative turnover and 
relative liquidity (Eq. (10) and (12)) and the own- and distant-style factors for turnover/liquidity. 
The liquidity measures are consistently insignificant.  
3.7.2 Results: commonality in demand shocks 
Table 3-7 presents the results for correlated demand shocks, as estimated from Eq. (11) for 
shocks to relative turnover (Panel A), or relative liquidity (Panel B). I report the following 
results: average and median values for the concurrent, lagged, lead, sum coefficients and R
2
; the 
percentage of funds with positive coefficients, the percentage of funds with positive and 
significant coefficients, negative and significant coefficients. Test of statistical significance for 
the average (median) coefficient is based on the cross-sectional t-statistic (sign-test) similar to 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Brockman et al. (2009). The results show that 
shocks to relative turnover ∆𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝑇𝑂) comove positively and significantly across ETFs in the 
same style both at the mean and the median. More than 93 percent of the concurrent own-style 
betas (𝛽𝑖,𝑂) are positive and (individually) significant at least at the 5 % level. Although shocks 
to relative trading activity also comove across distant styles (𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼 > 0), the magnitude of the 
distant-style betas are less than a third as large as the own-style betas. 
[Table 3-7] 
The results for relative liquidity are even stronger: shocks to relative liquidity exhibit 
positive and significant own-style comovements (in 99 percent of cases), while the distant-style 
comovements are significantly negative (𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼 < 0). This is consistent with the earlier results for 
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commonality in misvaluation and with the prediction by Barberis and Shleifer (2003) that 
increases in own-style allocations are at least partly financed by decreases in distant-style 
allocations. Moreover, these style-based comovements in turnover and liquidity are more 
consistent with demand than supply-side explanations given that the theoretical effects behind 
the latter (illiquidity spirals and feedback loops) are generally described as a market-wide 
phenomenon. 
Overall, the results in this section highlight that proxies for demand shocks (relative 
turnover and price impact) exhibit similar style-based comovements as do ETF-NAV returns. 
Similar results are also obtained when turnover/liquidity shocks are measured at the ETF level 
(ETF turnover or price impact instead of relative turnover or relative price impact), suggesting 
that commonality in demand shocks is mainly coming from the ETF, rather than the NAV leg. 
3.7.3 Explaining the amount of commonality in misvaluation 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a link between the degree of commonality in misvaluation, commonality in 
demand shocks and the level of fund liquidity. In this context, what is the appropriate measure of 
the degree of commonality? The existing literature mainly uses the regression R
2
 (e.g. Morck, 
Yeung and Yu, 2000; Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan, 2010; Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk, 2012), 
although the beta coefficient is also used (Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 2008).  
I use the R
2
 measure for three reasons. First, the beta is sensitive to scaling effects that arise 
from differences in factors and their volatilities (i.e. the beta denominator) across ETF styles. 
Second, it is difficult to make cross-sectional comparisons of betas in short samples due to large 
cross-sectional differences in the Std. Dev. of ETF-NAV returns, which is also directly related to 
arbitrage costs (funds with higher arbitrage costs have more volatile ETF-NAV returns). The R
2
-
measure does not suffer from these problems as it is a function of both the variance of the 
dependent variable and the factors. Another interpretation of the R
2
-measure is that it captures 
the proportion of common vs. idiosyncratic risk, in which case it is less sensitive to total 
misvaluation. This metric is also suitable for testing the hypothesis that commonality in 
misvaluation is stronger for more liquid ETFs. In unreported robustness tests I verify that the 
main results continue to hold for beta coefficients. 
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Following Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk (2012), I estimate the regression R
2
 (labelled 𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑚
2 ) 
from Eq. (6) every month m on daily data (at least 15 non-missing observations per month). 
Since regression (6) also controls for the lagged premium, I decompose the model R
2
 as: 
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and use the sum of the last two normalized covariance terms, denoted 𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑚
2 , to measure the 
degree of commonality in misvaluation. 𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑚
2  can be interpreted as the fraction of the model R
2
 
attributable to the own- and distant-style factors (Graham, Li and Qiu, 2013). Similarly, I 
measure commonality in relative turnover/liquidity shocks from the fraction of model R
2
 
attributable to the concurrent own and distant-style factors from Eq. (11). The degree of 
commonality in relative turnover and price impact is denoted by 𝑅𝑟𝑇𝑂,𝑚
2  and 𝑅𝑟𝑃𝐼,𝑚
2  respectively. 
To investigate the relationship between commonality in misvaluation, commonality in 
demand shocks and the attractiveness of an ETFs liquidity characteristics (both direct and 
indirect), I estimate the following regression using pooled OLS:  
 
2 2
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 where 𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑚−1
2   = commonality in demand shocks based on 𝑅𝑟𝑇𝑂,𝑚
2  or 𝑅𝑟𝑃𝐼,𝑚
2  
  𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 = ETF & underlying portfolio liquidity during month t-1 
  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑚−1  = vector of fund characteristics (incl. indirect liquidity characteristics) 
  𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑚  = vector of macro variables 
  𝐹𝐸  = fixed effects: year, month, sector, style and/or fund 
All independent variables are lagged by one month to mitigate concerns about reverse causality. 
As a direct and salient measure of liquidity, I use the monthly average quoted spread for ETF i:  
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 where: 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹and 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 = CRSP ask and bid price at the close on trading day t for ETF i  
  Nm  = nr. of trading days in calendar month m 
I use the log-transformation to mitigate the impact of outliers and to deal with the apparent non-
stationarity in the data. I estimate the portfolio quoted spread by dollar-weighting the monthly 
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quoted spread of each security included in the ETF’s basket ( 𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑚
𝑈𝑁𝐷 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑚𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑘,𝑚
𝑈𝑁𝐷 ). 
According to Chung and Zhang (2014), the CRSP-based spread is highly correlated with the 
(more accurate) TAQ spread in the cross-section, which is the dimension of primary interest. I 
also include the expense ratio because it is a salient cost for retail investors (Grinblatt et al., 
2014). Another implicit measure of liquidity is total misvaluation, measured by the absolute 
value of the monthly average premium (Eq. (4)), because funds with high misvaluation have high 
arbitrage costs.  
Arbitrage activity should be negatively related to the degree of commonality in 
misvaluation because it is associated with greater pricing efficiency. To measure arbitrage 
activity, I use share creation/redemption activity, defined as in Chapter 2: 
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 where: 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑 = shares outstanding for ETF i on day d;  
  Nt  = number of trading days in calendar month t. 
Commonality in misvaluation should be greater when market-wide arbitrage costs are high 
because they leave more “room” for excess comovement (Kumar and Lee, 2006; Kumar and 
Spalt, 2013). I use the funding liquidity factor by Hu, Pan and Wang (2013), which is based on 
price deviations between on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury securities, averaged across a wide 
range of maturities. Market volatility is also an important determinant of the risk to market 
makers of maintaining inventories of their securities (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000), 
and changes in market volatility can cause changes in inventories and create correlated 
institutional trading. Market volatility is also related aggregate uncertainty in financial markets 
either via higher transaction costs or lower funding liquidity (i.e., less capital is devoted to ETF 
arbitrage) as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). In either case, the prediction is that 
commonality in misvaluation should be positively related to market volatility, which I proxy for 
by the Std. Dev. of NAV returns.  
[Figure 3-1] 
Before I discuss the regression results, I illustrate the time-series dynamics for the cross-
sectional mean degree of commonality in misvaluation (𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑚
2 ) in Figure 3-1. Panel A depicts 
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𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑚
2  across three terciles based on the degree of commonality in relative liquidity (via price 
impact) in the prior month (𝑅𝑟𝑃𝐼,𝑚−1
2 ), while in Panel B, I instead use three terciles based on 
relative quoted spreads (𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑚−1
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑚−1
𝑈𝑁𝐷 ). We can see that ETFs in the top tercile of 
commonality in relative price impact have a higher degree of commonality in misvaluation in 99 
% of quarters (93 % are significant at the 5 % level) relative to ETFs in the lowest tercile. 
Moreover, ETFs in the highest tercile of relative quoted spreads have stronger commonality in 
misvaluation in 98 % of the quarters (70 % are significant at the 5 % level). These preliminary 
findings agree with the conjecture that commonality in misvaluation is higher when commonality 
in demand shocks is high, and for ETFs with more desirable liquidity characteristics. 
 [Table 3-8] 
The results in Table 3-8 show that commonality in misvaluation is positively and 
significantly related to commonality in demand shocks (via 𝑅𝑟𝑇𝑂
2  and 𝑅𝑟𝑃𝐼
2 ). When both measures 
for commonality in demand shocks are included simulatenously, 𝑅𝑟𝑃𝐼
2  remains highly significant 
while 𝑅𝑟𝑇𝑂
2  is only marginally significant. This is not surprising because the two measures are 
designed to capture the same thing. Moreover, commonality in misvaluation is significantly 
higher for ETFs with more attractive liquidity characteristics (lower quoted spreads, expense 
ratios and total misvaluation), for less liquid underlying portfolios, and during times when 
arbitrage is limited (high market volatility, low funding liquidity). Similar results are obtained in 
sub-samples of non-sector vs. sector funds, or if we control for time or ETF fixed effects in 
addition to style fixed effects.  
Overall, the findings in this section show that the degree of commonality in misvaluation is 
stronger for ETFs with more correlated demand shocks and more desirable liquidity 
characteristics, which supports my conjecture that excess comovements in ETF returns are 
driven by correlated non-fundamental demand and facilitated by investors with short horizons 
that are attracted to ETFs because of their high liquidity. 
3.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study analyzes whether the returns of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) comove excessively 
with other ETFs in similar investment styles. My conjecture is that, due to the ease of investing 
in ETFs and because of their high liquidity, ETFs attract a clientele of short-term investors who 
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are more exposed to common non-fundamental demand shocks at the style level relative to the 
investor in the ETFs underlying baskets.  
In order to identify excess comovements, I look for common factors in changes in 
misvaluation (ETF-NAV returns); in order to attribute this misvaluation to the ETF leg, I study 
return reversals following shocks to misvaluation; and in order to link the degree of excess 
comovement to common non-fundamental demand shocks and to liquidity clientele differences, I 
investigate how the degree of commonality in misvaluation is related to the degree of 
commonality in turnover/liquidity (proxy for demand shocks) and ETF characteristics that are 
attractive to investors with short-term trading needs.  
My findings indicate that there is significant style-based commonality in misvaluation: 
changes in misvaluation comove positively across ETFs in similar styles, and negatively with 
ETFs in distant styles. Although the importance of common misvaluation is found to persist 
across daily, weekly and monthly horizons, the economic magnitude of these shocks declines 
with the return horizon consistent with arbitrage. The source of misvaluation is found to be the 
ETF since current ETF premiums negatively predict future ETF returns consistent with 
temporary demand shocks in the ETF prices. Such reversals are strongest for small-cap ETFs, 
which is consistent with the conjecture that more liquid securities (small-cap ETFs have the 
highest relative liquidity) attract short-term investors with non-fundamental demand.  
Moreover, shocks to the abnormal trading activity of ETFs and to the liquidity of ETFs 
(both relative to their underlying baskets) exhibit similar style-based commonality. These proxies 
for correlated demand shocks also predict the future amount of commonality in ETF 
misvaluation. In accordance with liquidity being a factor in inducing clientele differences 
between ETFs and their underlying portfolio, I show that the degree of commonality in 
misvaluation is higher among ETFs more desirable liquidity characteristics.  
My overall conclusion is that the excess comovement in ETF returns is mainly driven by 
the correlated non-fundamental demand of a liquidity-based clientele. Thus, more liquid 
securities may encourage trading for reasons unrelated to fundamentals, which can at times be 
detrimental for pricing efficiency.  
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Figure 3- 1: Commonality in misvaluation, commonality in demand shocks and the level of liquidity 
The cross-sectional mean degree of commonality in misvaluation is plotted over time for three groups. Terciles are 
based on commonality in relative price impact (𝑅𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑞,𝑞−1
2 ) and the level of relative quoted spreads in Panels A and B 
respectively. The degree of commonality is based on the model R
2
, or the fraction of the variation in the dependent 
variable (ETF-NAV returns, relative turnover or liquidity) attributable to the own and distant style factors. 
Panel A: Cross-sectional mean of 𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒕,𝒒
𝟐  by 𝑹𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒒,𝒒−𝟏
𝟐  tercile 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional mean of 𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒕,𝒒
𝟐  by (𝑸𝑺𝑷𝑹𝒊,𝒎−𝟏
𝑬𝑻𝑭 − 𝑸𝑺𝑷𝑹𝒊,𝒎−𝟏
𝑼𝑵𝑫 ) tercile 
 
  
  
82 
 
Table 3- 1: Snapshot of ETF statistics 
This table reports the number of ETFs and the total Assets under Management (AUM) at the beginning, the middle and at 
the end of the sample. The statistics are reported by Morningstar 3-by-3 style classification (size and valuation) for ETFs 
with a core style, and by Morningstar industry styles for sector ETFs.  
 Nr. of ETFs AUM (in $millions) 
Category 01/2006 06/2009 12/2012 01/2006 06/2009 12/2012 
Core styles 53 73 79 168,391 210,116 425,491 
  Large-Value 8 12 11 16,042 20,398 43,041 
  Large-Blend 12 16 21 81,368 105,540 220,168 
  Large-Growth 8 11 12 31,840 33,355 64,670 
  Mid-Value 3 5 5 4,589 4,020 7,373 
  Mid-Blend 4 6 6 6,906 16,174 34,492 
  Mid-Growth 4 5 5 4,008 4,404 7,854 
  Small-Value 5 4 3 5,228 4,178 6,661 
  Small-Blend 4 8 10 13,874 16,321 31,925 
  Small-Growth 5 6 6 4,537 5,727 9,307 
Sector 42 83 85 31,438 47,428 114,520 
  Communication  2 2 2 551 650 936 
  Cons. Cyclical  3 7 7 759 3,158 9,348 
  Cons. Defens. 3 4 4 1,334 2,756 7,258 
  Energy 4 9 9 6,657 8,067 12,877 
  Financial 4 11 13 2,383 8,756 14,098 
  Real Estate 4 10 10 5,012 5,652 26,087 
  Health Care 4 11 11 5,216 5,448 11,498 
  Industrials 4 8 8 1,314 2,188 5,953 
  Materials 3 5 5 1,241 2,406 4,675 
  Technology 8 12 12 3,851 5,562 14,239 
  Utilities 3 4 4 3,120 2,788 7,552 
All 95 156 164 199,829 257,545 540,011 
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Table 3- 2: Descriptive Statistics 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 (𝑅𝑖
𝐸−𝑁) is the level of (change in) premium calculated as the log-price (return) differential between ETF i and its 
underlying portfolio Net Asset Value (NAV). Both levels and changes in premiums are reported in percentage. Closing and 
mid-point refers to premiums calculated using closing or mid-point prices/returns. Summary statistics are calculated using 
daily data, over the 01/2006 to 12/2012 period. Statistics are reported by Morningstar’s 3-by-3 style classification for funds 
with a core (non-sector) style, and by Morningstar industry style for sector funds. 
Variable Style Mean Median Std. Dev. 1 % 99 % 
Closing: 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑇𝐹/𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉) All funds -0.005 0.000 0.163 -0.553 0.522 
Mid-point: 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑇𝐹/𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉) 
All funds -0.005 -0.003 0.091 -0.268 0.271 
By size 
  Large -0.015 -0.013 0.115 -0.372 0.307 
  Mid -0.007 -0.007 0.083 -0.220 0.248 
  Small 0.001 0.000 0.080 -0.198 0.252 
By valuation 
  Blend -0.003 0.000 0.088 -0.257 0.262 
  Value -0.004 0.000 0.092 -0.277 0.289 
  Growth -0.007 -0.007 0.093 -0.277 0.270 
By core vs. sector  
  Core  -0.005 -0.003 0.091 -0.268 0.271 
  Sector  -0.005 -0.007 0.121 -0.302 0.361 
Closing: 𝑅𝑖
𝐸−𝑁 = 𝑅𝑖
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉 All funds 0.000 0.000 0.224 -0.730 0.710 
Mid-point: 𝑅𝑖
𝐸−𝑁 = 𝑅𝑖
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉 
      
 
All funds 0.000 0.000 0.120 -0.371 0.356 
By size 
  Large 0.000 0.000 0.150 -0.457 0.444 
  Mid 0.000 0.000 0.119 -0.338 0.334 
  Small 0.000 0.000 0.103 -0.311 0.301 
By valuation 
  Blend 0.000 0.000 0.113 -0.350 0.337 
  Value 0.000 0.000 0.121 -0.388 0.373 
  Growth 0.000 0.000 0.127 -0.383 0.371 
By core vs. sector  
  Core  0.000 0.000 0.120 -0.371 0.356 
  Sector  0.000 0.000 0.169 -0.463 0.465 
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Table 3- 3: Style-based commonality in misvaluation  
This table reports results from estimating the following regression, fund-by-fund:  
, , , , , , , ,, 1
E N E N E N
i t i i i OWN OWN i t i DI DIST i t i ti tR R R ePREM   
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where 𝑅𝑖
𝐸−𝑁 is the ETF-NAV return difference (or equivalently the change in premium, ∆𝑃𝑖
𝐸−𝑁) and 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖 is the ETF premium. 𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁
𝐸−𝑁  is the own-style misvaluation 
factor, which is based on the average ETF-NAV return of other ETFs in matching styles: equal weight is given to funds that match both style dimensions (size and 
valuation), and half the equal weight to funds that are in adjacent styles (if ETF i is Large-Value, then adjacent styles include Mid-Value and Large-Blend). For ETFs 
belonging to sector styles, equal weight is given to funds in the same industry, half the equal weight to funds in the same size and valuation category and one fourth of the 
equal weight to funds in adjacent core styles. 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇
𝐸−𝑁  is the distant-style misvaluation factor and it is based on the average ETF-NAV return of other ETFs in opposite 
styles: equal weight is given to funds that are in opposite styles (both size and valuation) and half the equal weight to funds that are in styles adjacent to the opposite style. 
For instance, if ETF i is Large-Value, then Small-Growth is the opposite style (equal-weight) and Mid-Growth and Small-Blend (half the equal weight) are in styles 
adjacent to Small-Growth. For mid-cap funds we consider large and small to be equally distant. Blend funds (neither value, nor growth) are matched only by their size 
category. Hence, the distant style of Mid-Value is Small-Growth and Large-Growth. The t-statistic for the average coefficient is adjusted for cross-correlation as in 
Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010). Impact (basis points) is the impact of a 1 Std. Dev. increase in the RHS variable on the dependent variable, while impact 
[%𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁)] and impact [%𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹)] are the impact in basis points scaled by the Std. Dev. of the dependent variable and raw ETF return respectively. Coefficients 
and t-statistics are also reported at the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution. In this case the t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %. 
 Daily horizon  Weekly horizon  Monthly horizon 
 𝜆𝑖 𝛽𝑖,𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇  𝜆𝑖 𝛽𝑖,𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇  𝜆𝑖 𝛽𝑖,𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 
 Average coefficient -0.523*** 0.819*** -0.071***  -0.567*** 0.783*** -0.057  -0.580*** 0.737*** -0.025 
 (26.44) (26.65) (2.61)  (14.59) (13.34) (1.13)  (10.51) (8.46) (0.34) 
 Econonomic significance: 
   Impact [basis points]:  -5.43 6.99 -0.63  -5.47 7.54 -0.55  -6.56 7.97 -0.26 
   Impact [%𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁)] -38.61 55.73 -3.72  -37.34 56.22 -4.38  -38.06 45.91 -0.39 
   Impact [%𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹)] -2.94 4.01 -0.33  -1.56 2.29 -0.19  -1.01 1.27 -0.02 
 Distribution of coefficients:            
   5th percentile -0.848*** 0.314* -0.399***  -0.950*** 0.158 -0.531***  -1.119*** -0.210 -0.853*** 
 (-14.48) (1.91) (-4.48)  (-8.73) (0.68) (-3.15)  (-7.27) (-0.36) (-2.97) 
   50th percentile -0.488*** 0.792*** -0.071  -0.560*** 0.783*** -0.050  -0.568*** 0.720*** -0.019 
 (-8.77) (9.54) (-1.00)  (-4.50) (4.37) (-0.41)  (-3.01) (2.76) (-0.08) 
   95th percentile -0.258*** 1.403*** 0.234***  -0.195 1.376*** 0.462***  -0.008 1.497*** 0.601*** 
 (-3.96) (24.61) (2.92)  (-1.48) (13.53) (2.22)  (-0.03) (8.72) (2.41) 
 Average R2  0.64    0.67    0.62  
 N obs  260,451    53,764    13,664  
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Table 3- 4: Sub-sample results for commonality in misvaluation  
This table reports results from estimating the following regression on daily data, fund-by-fund:  
, , , , , , , ,, 1
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where 𝑅𝑖
𝐸−𝑁  is the ETF-NAV return difference (or equivalently the change in premium,  ∆𝑃𝑖
𝐸−𝑁) and 𝑃𝑖
𝐸−𝑁 is the ETF 
premium. 𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁
𝐸−𝑁  is the own-style misvaluation factor, which is based on the average ETF-NAV return of other ETFs in 
matching styles. 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇
𝐸−𝑁  is the distant-style misvaluation factor and it is based on the average ETF-NAV return of other 
ETFs in opposite styles. For further details on the construction of these factors and the own vs. distant style classification, 
see Table 3. The beta coefficients reported are average betas across all funds in a given style. The t-statistic for the average 
coefficient is adjusted for cross-correlation as in Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010). Impact [%𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁)] = 100 ∗
𝛽𝑂𝑊𝑁,𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁
𝐸−𝑁 )/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁) , or in words, the impact of a 1 Std. Dev. increase in the own-style factor as a 
percentage of the Std. Dev. of the dependent variable. Similarly, Impact [%𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹)] = 100 ∗ 𝛽𝑂𝑊𝑁,𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁
𝐸−𝑁 )/
𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹), or the impact of a 1 Std. Dev. increase in the own-style factor as a percentage of the Std. Dev. of raw ETF 
returns. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %. 
Sub-
sample 𝛽𝑖,𝑂𝑊𝑁 [t-stat] 
Impact 
[%𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁)] 
Impact 
[%𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹)] 𝛽𝑖,𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 [t-stat] Avg. R
2 N obs 
All 0.819 [26.65] 55.73 4.01 -0.071 [2.61] 0.644 260,451 
         
Diversified non-sector 
  Large 0.843 [37.82] 65.17 4.52 -0.039 [3.51] 0.702 66,255 
  Mid 0.828 [19.96] 65.22 3.84 -0.083 [2.19] 0.680 28,613 
  Small 0.957 [49.05] 68.39 5.50 -0.088 [2.86] 0.728 31,197 
         
  Blend 0.800 [42.76] 62.81 4.38 0.000 [1.32] 0.717 52,821 
  Value 1.037 [35.14] 75.56 5.54 -0.173 [6.86] 0.725 34,475 
  Growth 0.805 [32.09] 61.41 4.09 -0.071 [3.59] 0.665 38,769 
         
Sector 0.774 [18.99] 46.22 3.44 -0.081 [2.13] 0.588 134,881 
         
Time-period: 01/2002 to 12/2006 
 All 0.590 [8.60] 31.82 2.47 -0.028 [0.55] 0.553 65,003 
         
Time-period: 12/2006 to 07/2008 
 All 0.724 [21.68] 47.16 3.54 -0.042 [1.51] 0.724 82,927 
         
Time-period: 08/2008 to 03/2009 
 All 0.884 [15.62] 63.17 5.34 -0.102 [1.84] 0.673 25,300 
         
Time-period: 03/2009 to 12/2012 
 All 0.799 [30.27] 54.94 3.04 -0.070 [3.37] 0.660 152,719 
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Table 3- 5: Differences in systematic risk? 
This table reports regressions of ETF-NAV returns on the lagged level of premium to control for mean-reversion, MKT, 
SMB, HML and funding liquidity (NOISE) factors, estimated fund-by-fund using all available observations. T-statistics 
for the mean are adjusted for cross-correlation as in Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010). */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level. ∆R2 is the average improvement in R-squared compared to the model where ETF-
NAV returns are only regressed against the lagged level of premium. 
  Daily horizon Weekly horizon Monthly horizon 
Factor By style (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
MKT All -0.0193*** -0.0197*** -0.0050** -0.0052** -0.0036 -0.0016 
 Small -0.0204*** -0.0204*** -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0079** -0.0046 
 Large -0.0184*** -0.0190*** -0.0041* -0.0044* -0.0016 -0.0004 
 Value -0.0216*** -0.0221*** -0.0053* -0.0055* -0.0049 -0.0037 
 Growth -0.0192*** -0.0194*** -0.0046** -0.0049** 0.0002 0.0002 
SMB All 0.0056 0.0072 0.0066 0.0063 -0.0035 -0.0007 
 Small -0.0126* -0.0113* -0.0023 -0.0023 0.0021 -0.0049 
 Large 0.0123** 0.014*** 0.0078 0.0072* 0.0001 0.0016 
 Value 0.0075 0.010 0.0059 0.0054 0.0020 -0.0004 
 Growth 0.0088* 0.0102** 0.0054 0.0050 0.0002 0.0013 
HML All -0.0116*** -0.0106*** 0.0030 0.0034 -0.0005 -0.0017 
 Small -0.0118** -0.0116** 0.0048 0.0047 -0.0017 -0.0034 
 Large -0.0091** -0.0076* 0.0029 0.0036 0.0010 0.0003 
 Value -0.0222*** -0.0211*** 0.0017 0.0021 0.0022 0.0013 
 Growth -0.0024 -0.0020 0.0041 0.0046 -0.0021 -0.003 
NOISE All  0.0146*  -0.0089  0.0134 
 Small  0.0100  0.0042  0.0221 
 Large  0.0171**  -0.0165  0.0076 
 Value  0.0219**  -0.0129  0.0079 
 Growth  0.0117*  -0.0105  0.0131 
∆R2 All 0.080 0.082 0.019 0.032 0.064 0.102 
N All 258,529 254,405 53,764 53,288 13,664 13,502 
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Table 3- 6: Source of mispricing: ETF or NAV?  
This table reports results from estimating pooled OLS regressions of the following:  
3 3
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where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is the raw ETF return (in Panel A), or the NAV return (in Panel B). 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖 is the ETF premium relative to 
NAV. Standard errors are adjusted for serial and cross-sectional correlation as in Driscoll and Kraay (1998). I also provide 
an F-test for the hypothesis that the sum ∑bk equals zero.. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %. 
 Sample: 
 Variables Full Sector Core Large Mid Small 
PANEL A: Y = ETF return, t 
 PREM, t-1 -0.570* -0.511* -0.677 0.016 -0.850 -1.284** 
 (1.86) (1.76) (1.55) (0.03) (1.34) (2.48) 
 PREM, t-2 -0.964*** -0.860** -1.142*** -1.366** -1.113** -1.011** 
 (3.01) (2.60) (3.26) (2.53) (2.37) (2.48) 
 PREM, t-3 -0.352 -0.257 -0.531 -0.553 -0.897 -0.317 
 (0.92) (0.80) (0.94) (0.85) (1.22) (0.59) 
 PREM, t-4 0.071 0.015 0.200 0.348 0.402 -0.076 
 (0.20) (0.05) (0.44) (0.53) (0.69) (0.20) 
 ETF Ret, t-1 -0.091*** -0.095*** -0.086*** -0.091*** -0.058* -0.101*** 
 (3.23) (3.50) (2.68) (2.75) (1.81) (2.89) 
 ETF Ret, t-2 -0.046 -0.043 -0.052 -0.056 -0.053 -0.047 
 (1.25) (1.25) (1.21) (1.24) (1.19) (1.13) 
 ETF Ret, t-3 -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 0.004 -0.011 -0.014 
 (0.24) (0.30) (0.15) (0.10) (0.30) (0.40) 
 ETF Ret, t-4 -0.014 -0.016 -0.011 -0.004 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.30) (0.09) (0.42) (0.45) 
F-test:  
 ∑ 𝑏𝑘 = 0
3
𝑘=0  
7.79*** 6.91**  7.98***  3.17*  3.84* 13.20*** 
 R2 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.018 
 N 260,449 134,621 125,828 66,126 28,559 31,143 
PANEL B: Y = NAV return, t 
 PREM, t-1 0.358 0.468 0.147 0.756 0.216 -0.489 
 (1.15) (1.62) (0.34) (1.54) (0.33) (0.93) 
 PREM, t-2 -1.040*** -0.921*** -1.238*** -1.414** -1.273** -1.102** 
 (3.25) (2.80) (3.42) (2.51) (2.59) (2.60) 
 PREM, t-3 -0.351 -0.251 -0.542 -0.551 -0.965 -0.329 
 (0.87) (0.72) (0.92) (0.80) (1.26) (0.60) 
 PREM, t-4 0.043 -0.005 0.157 0.365 0.380 -0.183 
 (0.12) (0.02) (0.32) (0.51) (0.62) (0.45) 
 NAV Ret, t-1 -0.090*** -0.094*** -0.085** -0.093*** -0.051 -0.099** 
 (3.13) (3.39) (2.61) (2.78) (1.57) (2.80) 
 NAV Ret, t-2 -0.051 -0.047 -0.057 -0.062 -0.058 -0.052 
 (1.35) (1.35) (1.30) (1.33) (1.30) (1.21) 
 NAV Ret, t-3 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 0.002 -0.011 -0.017 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.19) (0.04) (0.30) (0.50) 
 NAV Ret, t-4 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 -0.004 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.44) (0.49) (0.34) (0.10) (0.45) (0.53) 
F-test:  
 ∑ 𝑏𝑘 = 0
3
𝑘=0  
 2.16  1.26  3.29*  0.78  1.50  7.61** 
 R2 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.020 0.011 0.015 
 N 259,800 134,350 125,450 65,904 28,445 31,101 
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Table 3- 7: Comovement in relative trading activity and liquidity 
Daily shocks to relative turnover (price impact) for ETF i are regressed on equally-weighted shocks in relative turnover 
(liquidity) of other ETFs in the own- and distant styles:  
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The regressions include concurrent, lagged and lead values for the factors. I report the average and median values for the 
concurrent, lagged, lead, sum coefficients and the average R2; the percentage of funds with positive coefficients, the 
percentage of funds with positive and significant coefficients, negative and significant coefficients. Test of statistical 
significance for the mean is based on the cross-sectional t-statistic for the average coefficient, while the significance for the 
median is based on a sign-test. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level. 
 Own-style betas  Distant-style betas  
Statistic Conc Lag Lead Sum  Conc Lag Lead Sum Avg. R
2
 
PANEL A: Relative turnover 
Mean 0.616*** 0.104*** 0.089*** 0.810***  0.205*** -0.043*** -0.056*** 0.107*** 0.086 
 (26.51) (5.49) (5.13) (16.68)  (10.79) (2.91) (3.50) (2.85)  
Median 0.606*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.689***  0.162*** -0.041** -0.032** 0.073*** 0.084 
% pos 100.00 71.95 65.85 94.51  82.32 40.24 37.20 57.93  
% pos & sig 93.90 23.78 23.17 87.20  51.83 6.71 7.32 44.51  
% neg & sig 0.00 11.59 4.88 0.61  0.61 18.29 15.24 20.73  
PANEL B: Relative price impact 
Mean 0.972*** -0.006 -0.012 0.955***  -0.082*** 0.012 0.020* -0.049 0.281 
 (42.66) (0.34) (1.03) (25.21)  (4.38) (1.06) (1.78) (1.41)  
Median 0.982*** 0.030 -0.008 1.017***  -0.106*** 0.012 0.021 -0.063*** 0.257 
% pos 100.00 54.88 48.17 96.34  32.93 53.66 56.10 46.34  
% pos & sig 99.39 25.61 10.98 93.29  16.46 24.39 22.56 35.98  
% neg & sig 0.00 28.66 22.56 1.83  43.90 15.24 15.24 42.68  
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Table 3- 8: Explaining the degree of excess return comovement 
This table reports results from regressions of the amount of return comovement (𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑚
2 ) for ETF i on the following measures 
of correlated demand shocks: commonality in abnormal trading activity (𝑅𝑟𝑇𝑂,𝑚−1
2 ), commonality in relative price impact 
(𝑅𝑟𝑃𝐼,𝑚−1
2 ). Comovements are based on the model R2, or the fraction of model R2 attributable to the own and distant style 
factors. R2 is estimated every month (m) using daily data. Other variables included are expense ratios, share 
creation/redemption activity (CREATE), magnitude of average misvaluation [abs(PREM)], monthly ETF and underlying 
portfolio proportional quoted spreads (ETF QSPR, UND QSPR; signed to indicate liquidity), volatility of NAV returns 
(STD(NAV)), Hu, Pan and Wang (2013) funding liquidity (NOISE). All variables are measured at the end of the previous 
month except for the macro variables STD(NAV) and NOISE that are contemporaneous. */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund and calendar time. 
    Core style Sector style   
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Exp. Ratio, t-1 -0.173*** -0.142** -0.143** -0.335*** -0.008 -0.315*** -0.154 
 (2.63) (2.20) (2.23) (5.02) (0.09) (5.53) (1.09) 
CREATE, t-1 -6.901*** -6.595*** -6.425*** -4.453** -6.518*** -9.192*** -1.365 
 (5.10) (4.87) (4.79) (2.17) (4.29) (6.64) (1.33) 
abs(PREM), t-1 -61.968*** -59.117** -61.518*** -73.541*** -42.255 1.333 -49.100** 
 (2.82) (2.53) (2.64) (2.72) (1.51) (0.08) (2.28) 
ETF QSPR, t-1 6.748*** 5.896*** 5.815*** 6.113*** 4.601** 7.764*** 5.530*** 
 (4.99) (4.48) (4.46) (4.46) (2.05) (5.84) (3.08) 
UND QSPR, t-1 -3.351 -3.073 -2.955 -4.305* -2.070 -9.215*** -4.144* 
 (1.63) (1.53) (1.47) (1.75) (0.84) (3.48) (1.76) 
STD(NAV), t 3.003** 3.057** 2.988** 3.591* 3.273** 0.046 3.247** 
 (2.22) (2.18) (2.10) (1.92) (2.19) (0.03) (2.04) 
NOISE, t 1.740*** 1.657*** 1.662*** 1.712*** 1.322***  1.424*** 
 (3.97) (3.88) (3.86) (2.84) (3.31)  (3.21) 
𝑅𝑟𝑡𝑜,𝑡−1
2  0.077***  0.049** 0.050 0.049 0.031 0.048** 
 (3.18)  (2.04) (1.60) (1.50) (1.41) (2.10) 
𝑅𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑞,𝑡−1
2   0.095*** 0.092*** 0.056*** 0.103*** 0.097*** 0.048*** 
  (6.77) (6.46) (3.06) (5.06) (6.25) (4.13) 
Dummies        
  Sector, style  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  Calendar time NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
  ETF NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
R
2
 0.222 0.235 0.233 0.225 0.108 0.291 0.342 
N obs 11,843 11,794 11,689 5,722 5,967 11,689 11,689 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LOCAL TRADING HABITATS AND COMMONALITY IN 
MISVALUATION: EVIDENCE FROM TWIN-SECURITIES  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are more than 650 plain vanilla Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) tracking European equity 
indices with a stock market listing in Europe. Many of these funds are, however, duplicates of 
one another as they are either cross-listed from a different European exchange, or they track an 
identical benchmark index. The most popular benchmark index, Euro Stoxx 50, is tracked by 78 
different ETFs. For instance, the shares of iShares Euro Stoxx 50 are traded on six different 
European exchanges, while Lyxor Euro Stoxx 50 is traded on five. The only fundamental 
difference between cross-listed ETFs (e.g. the shares of iShares Euro Stoxx 50 traded in London 
vs. Frankfurt), or more generally between ETFs passively tracking an identical benchmark index 
(e.g. the shares of iShares and Lyxor Euro Stoxx 50 traded in Italy vs. France), is that they are 
owned and traded by different groups of investors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the primary 
reason for ETF providers to list cross-list existing funds (or establish new funds) is to support 
local clientele demand
42
. This provides a unique opportunity to investigate whether the trading 
by a local clientele can induce excessive return comovements. The theoretical motivation is 
                                                 
42
 See section 2 for examples. 
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based on “preferred habitat” theory of Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005). When local 
securities are predominantly owned by local investors, changes in their sentiment, risk-aversion, 
or liquidity needs can generate a common factor in the returns of securities in the habitat.    
Empirically the challenge is how to measure excess comovement because there is no 
consensus on how to measure comovements due to common fundamentals. To control for 
common fundamentals, I use return differentials between twin-securities traded in different 
countries. The existing literature has also used the twin-security approach. Lee, Shleifer and 
Thaler (1991) argue that changes in the premiums of U.S. Closed-End Funds relative to NAV 
tend to move together due to unpredictable variations in local sentiment that are impounded in 
CEF prices. Bodurtha, Kim and Lee (1995) find that changes in the premiums of international 
country CEFs comove positively (negatively) with local (foreign) market returns. Similar 
evidence is also found for pairs of “Siamese twins” such as Royal Dutch and Shell (Froot and 
Dabora, 1999) and for cross-listed stocks (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010). 
An important contribution of this study is to provide tests that differentiate between the 
two possible sources of excess comovement, namely common non-fundamental demand shocks 
and the alternative explanation of differences in information diffusion between twin-securities 
(Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005).  
Differences in information diffusion can arise in three different ways. First, it can arise 
mechanically in the presence of non-trading when trading hours are misaligned. For example, the 
prices of U.S. traded securities will generally reflect local news as it arrives, while foreign 
markets will react the following morning. This is a concern in Bodurtha, Kim and Lee (1995) 
because they rely on Friday’s closing prices for both local and foreign markets, and in Froot and 
Dabora (1999) because they use “Siamese-twin” securities traded in the U.S. vs. Europe (five 
hour misalignment in trading hours). Second, stale pricing between twins can generate 
differences in information diffusion: more actively traded securities will comove “too much” 
with one another compared to securities that have stale prices. This is a concern not only for 
CEFs that typically invest in illiquid securities (Cherkes, Sagi and Stanton, 2008), but also for 
cross-listed stocks in the U.S.. While Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) use time synchronized prices 
whenever possible for their sample of ADRs traded in the U.S., trading activity in the middle of 
the U.S. day (at the European market close) is lower and stale pricing is therefore a potential 
concern, and for Asian ADRs it is not even possible to obtain time-synchronized prices. Third, if 
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local investors are better or faster at processing local information about fundamentals, then 
locally traded securities will be more price informative about local fundamentals relative to 
foreign securities. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) investigate Canadian stocks listed on both the 
Toronto Stock Exchange and a U.S. exchange and find that the U.S. share of price discovery is 
directly related to the U.S. share of trading activity and the ratio of U.S. liquidity to home 
liquidity, while Agarwal, Liu and Rhee (2007) demonstrate that for Hong-Kong stocks cross-
listed in London, price discovery occurs mainly in the home market.  
To make my tests as clean as possible, I only include funds tracking either regional (Pan-
European), or individual country indices for the six ETF markets included in this study (France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K.). The majority of ETFs in the final 
sample are regional ETFs (292 total listings) followed by country funds (124). I exclude all 
actively managed, fundamentally-weighted and leveraged funds leaving me with a final sample 
of 416 funds spanning 8 years and with assets of $140 billion as of 11/2013. 
Without limits-to-arbitrage, there can be no misvaluation between twin securities. ETFs 
have an open-end structure via the share recreation/redemption process that facilitates arbitrage 
by allowing Authorized Participants (APs) to exchange the underlying basket for ETF shares 
with the ETF manager when there is excess demand for the ETF, and vice-versa when the 
opposite occurs. However, arbitrage remains limited by direct and indirect costs. In comparison 
to the U.S. market where misvaluation among domestic equity ETFs is relatively low (as 
measured by the absolute value of ETF premium relative to NAV) and liquidity is high (see 
Chapter 3), European ETFs have higher misvaluation due to a fragmentation of liquidity across 
multiple exchanges, risk of settlement failure and costs associated with the transfer and 
settlement of ETF shares across national markets. Additional costs faced by cross-border 
arbitrageurs include the requirement to have depository accounts in each country, follow post-
trading rules in each jurisdiction, and specific costs that depend on the type of ETF listing.  
To preview my results, I show that twin return differentials (between an ETF and its own 
shares traded abroad) contain a strong country-specific common factor which I refer to as the 
local habitat factor. This common factor accounts for almost half of the variation in twin return 
differentials. Economically the commonality in twin return differentials is strong: a 1 Std. Dev. 
increase in the local habitat factor is associated with a 20.6 bp increase in daily return 
differentials. The proportional impact, measured relative to the variability in raw ETF returns, is 
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also considerable at 15.34 percent. The strength of this effect declines rapidly with the return 
horizon. At the monthly horizon, the proportional impact of a shock to the local habitat factor 
accounts for only 3.75 percent of the variation in raw returns. Exchange rates do not matter 
because sub-sample results for the Eurozone countries (with local and foreign representing 
locations only within the Eurozone) are very similar to the full sample results. A placebo test 
confirms that twin return differentials of ETFs from the same trading location (e.g. a pair of 
ETFs tracking FTSE 100, both traded in the UK) are not exposed to the local habitat factor.  
Non-trading is generally not a concern in this study because trading hours among the 
European markets studied are almost perfectly aligned. Stale pricing is a potential concern that I 
address. First, I exclude ETFs from the sample that have excessive non-trading during the entire 
sample period, or individual fund-months with excessive non-trading. Next, I compare the 
degree of commonality in twin return differentials among ETFs with identical benchmark 
indices, but different levels of liquidity and non-trading probability. Commonality in return 
differentials actually increases as the liquidity of the ETF in the short-leg increases, holding 
constant the liquidity of the ETF in the long-leg. This finding is opposite to the stale pricing 
argument, but it is consistent with local-trading induced misvaluation when local demand shocks 
reflect short-term demand. This is because liquidity is more valuable to short-term investors 
relative to long-term (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; also see the results in Chapter 2).  
To rule out the alternative explanation of commonality in misvaluation due to differences 
in the speed of information diffusion, I conduct three tests. First, I focus on a sub-sample of 
ETFs tracking Pan-European equity indices where local investors are unlikely to have an 
informational advantage. The results are not materially different in this sample. Second, I design 
a cleaner experiment where local investors are highly unlikely to have an informational 
advantage. Specifically, I compare the degree of commonality in misvaluation for two sub-
samples: a) the trading location of ETF-pairs is different from to the trading location of their 
underlying securities vs. b) the trading locations of the ETF-pairs and their underlying securities 
match. The results do not materially differ between the two samples. Third, I show that 
premiums of the local ETF (relative to NAV) predicts a reversal in future returns for the local 
ETF, while premiums of the foreign twin (relative to NAV) has little impact on future returns of 
the local ETF, which is more consistent with the reversal of local demand shocks as opposed to 
local ETF prices catching up to fundamental news already incorporated into foreign ETF prices.  
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Korniotis and Kumar (2013) argue that local misvaluation can be caused by undiversifiable 
incomes shocks that affect the risk-aversion or risk-sharing ability of local investors. Due to 
limited arbitrage, cross-border arbitrageurs cannot immediately absorb this liquidity demand, 
which can generate persistence in misvaluation. This mechanism could expose both locally 
traded stocks and ETFs to local-trading induced misvaluation. Consistent with this hypothesis, I 
find that twin return differentials are positively (negatively) correlated with stock market returns 
in the local (foreign) market. This relationship is strongest at the daily horizon, weaker but still 
significant at weekly horizon, and disappears entirely at the monthly horizon, which is consistent 
with a smaller fraction of misvaluation in local stock returns at longer horizons. 
The motivation for local clienteles in ETFs is closely related to the literature on home and 
local bias. Home bias, or the tendency for investor to invest in equity securities at home, is 
pervasive around the world (e.g. Chan, Covrig an Ng, 2005), while local bias reflects the 
tendency for investors to invest in nearby domestic securities (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). 
While there are several potential explanations for the existence of home bias
43
, many are not 
relevant here. For instance, there is no exchange-rate uncertainty for local investors trading 
locally traded ETFs denominated in the local currency. Also, information asymmetry between 
local and foreign investors is less relevant in the context of ETFs tracking foreign indices. The 
preference for locally traded ETFs can arise if local investors have lower deadweight costs when 
investing in the domestic market (or higher costs when investing abroad) relative to the world 
investor (Chan, Covrig an Ng, 2005). In the case of European ETFs, local investors face 
additional costs for cross-border trades related to the trading, transfer and settlement of ETF 
trades as well as legal requirements to have depository accounts in each country and follow post-
trading rules in each jurisdiction. Local investors may therefore prefer to invest in locally traded 
ETFs in order to gain exposure to foreign stock markets.  
This paper is also related to a growing literature studying the importance of ownership 
structure on asset prices. Prinsky and Wang (2006) document anomalous return comovements 
among neighbouring firms headquartered in the same geographical area. Garcia and Norli (2012) 
find that truly local firms (based on the locality of their business operations) earn higher returns 
than those of geographically dispersed firms, presumably because local firms are risky due to 
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 E.g. transaction costs, real exchange rate risks, information barriers, corporate governance issues, familiarity, 
loyalty, patriotism and overconfidence (see Bekeart and Wang, 2009; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009). 
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lower investor recognition (as in Merton, 1987). Bartram, Griffin and Ng (2014) find that foreign 
ownership linkages affect stock returns. My contribution in this regard is to offer a cleaner test to 
filter out the fundamental variation in asset returns. 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theories and presents testable 
implications. Section 3 describes the data, formally defines misvaluation and presents summary 
statistics. Section 4 presents empirical tests for local habitats. Section 6 provides further tests to 
disentangle misvaluation from information diffusion. Section 7 provides additional robustness 
tests and Section 7 concludes. 
4.2 LOCAL TRADING HABITATS AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) (henceforth BSW) formalize a “habitat” view of return 
comovement where a) some investors limit their trading to a particular subset of securities, such 
as local stocks; or b) some securities are primarily owned by a specific subset of investors, such 
as local investor. The correlated trading of these investors can then generate a common factor in 
the returns of securities in the habitat. In BSW’s Eq. (4), asset returns are given by two factors:  
 , , , , where i t i t i L L tR u i L       (17) 
The first component reflects news about fundamental value (𝜀𝑡), which is often characterized via 
common industry, country or global return factors in the international finance literature (see e.g. 
Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang, 2009). The second component reflects common demand shocks for 
the investors in habitat L (∆𝑢𝐿,𝑡), which can arise from changes in investors’ sentiment, risk 
aversion or liquidity needs. 
In this study L denotes a local (or country “L”-specific) trading habitat and i denotes an 
ETF that is traded on the local market. A local ETF habitat can arise when local investors restrict 
their trading to local ETFs, or more generally when local ETFs are primarily owned by local 
investors. The reason why local ETF habitats are likely to exist is because local ETFs provide 
investors with easy access to foreign stock market indices without having to incur costs 
associated with the trading, settlement or transfer of ETF shares across national markets, 
operational costs that arise from the requirement to have depository accounts in each country and 
follow post-trading rules in each jurisdiction. Other costs that can be avoided include 
withholding taxes, which apply to dividend income that foreign investors (non-residents) pay to 
  
96 
 
the government where the stocks are domiciled, and in many cases also to the government where 
the ETF is located
44
. International trading restrictions and lack of information (Merton, 1987) or 
constraints on investors’ attention (Peng and Xiong, 2006) can also contribute to the formation of 
local habitats. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that ETF providers list new (or cross-list 
existing) funds primarily to support local clientele demand
45
. 
4.2.1 Identifying the local habitat factor and testable implications 
In order to control for fundamental variation in returns, I use the return difference between ETF i 
and its twin security pi (defined shortly): 
    , , , , , , , where ,i t p t i t p t i L t p F t ii i iR R u u i L p F              (18) 
 where 𝑅𝑖 =  return for ETF i or its twin pi at time t  
  ∆𝑢𝐿,𝑡 =  common demand shock in country L where ETF i is traded  
  ∆𝑢𝐹,𝑡 =  common demand shock in country F where the ETF 𝑝𝑖 is traded  
ETFs can have multiple twins. There are two approaches to form pairs of twin ETFs. First, 
I use an ETFs own (cross-listed) shares traded on a foreign market. For instance, the shares of 
iShares Euro Stoxx 50 are traded in the Netherlands, Germany and Italy (in EUR), and in 
London (in GBP) and Switzerland (in CHF). In this case the fundamentals of the shares, 
wherever they are traded, are by definition the same. However, even identical ETF shares trading 
in different markets are not fully fungible due to direct and indirect costs associated with the 
trading, settlement and transfer of ETF shares across national markets; arbitrage remains risky. 
Second, the twin can be chosen from among the set of foreign ETFs that passively track the same 
underlying index. Consider, for example, iShares Euro Stoxx 50 traded in the Netherlands. The 
foreign twins of this ETF include (but is not limited to) Lyxor ETF Euro Stoxx 50 (traded in 
France and Germany), and HSBC Euro Stoxx 50 ETF (traded in France and the U.K.). In the 
case of ETF pairs tracking an identical index, both ETFs hold the same underlying basket of 
securities (aside from differences that arise from different replication methods), implying that a 
                                                 
44
 see Appendix A3 for additional details on the mechanics and costs of cross-border trades 
45
 Examples of press releases by: State Street Global Advisors (28.01.14), HSBC Global Asset Management (27 
September, 2013), UBS (20 March 2013), Source UK Services Ltd (11 September 2014) 
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long-short position can be established with little fundamental risk
46
. Table 4-1 provides 
additional examples and further information on selecting twins. 
In either case ETF i and its twin pi are both claims to the same underlying securities and 
they should therefore inherit the systematic risks of their underlying securities (facilitated by 
arbitrage). Hence, the twin return differential effectively controls for news about fundamental 
value (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 0). However, ETF i and pi are traded in different markets (L and F) and can 
be influenced by correlated local demand shocks (∆𝑢𝐿,𝑡 − ∆𝑢𝐹,𝑡). If trading location matters for 
misvaluation, then we should expect to find a common factor in the twin return differentials of 
ETF pairs traded in countries L and F.  
Hypothesis 1: Twin return differentials are correlated across ETF-pairs traded in the same set 
of countries (L and F). Specifically, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑝𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗 − 𝑅𝑝𝑗) > 0, where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐿 and 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑗 ∈ 𝐹. 
Such excess comovements can, acccording to the behavioural view, arise as a result of 
noise trader sentiment (Delong et al., 1990; Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991). In this case the term 
∆𝑢𝐿,𝑡 − ∆𝑢𝐹,𝑡 can be interpreted as the differential sentiment shock between local investors in 
country L and F. Alternatively, local demand shocks can also arise in a rational, but frictions-
based setting. Kumar and Korniotis (2013) argue that, when levels of local ownership are high, 
changes in the risk-aversion of local investors and changes in their ability to engage in risk 
sharing can generate misvaluation among local securities. To support their argument, the authors 
show that a geography-based trading strategy earns significant abnormal returns and that the 
predictability in local returns is arbitraged away by non-local investors within a time-period of 
one year. When local stock ownership is high, we should expect to find a positive correlation 
between twin return differentials Ri − Rpi and local stock market returns since both are exposed 
to correlated local trading in countries L and F: 
Hypothesis 2: The return differential between ETF i (traded in country L) and its foreign peer pi 
(traded in country F) is positively correlated with the stock market returns in country L and 
negatively correlated with the stock market return in country F.  
                                                 
46
 An alternative arbitrage strategy is to use the share creation mechanism. Consider two ETFs A and B traded in 
France and Germany respectively. Suppose ETF A is trading at $150, while ETF B is trading at $75 with the 
fundamental price at $100. An arbitrage trade would then involve buying the underpriced ETF (B), redeem it for 
underlying securities using the share creation/redemption mechanism, create new ETF B shares using the underlying 
securities that were just received and sell the over-priced ETF B shares in Germany. 
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An alternative explanation to the demand-based view of excess comovements is 
differences in the speed of information diffusion between twin securities traded in different 
countries (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005). In this case ETF returns are given by: 
 
 
 
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
1 where 
1 where 
i t i t i t L t F t
p t p t p t L t F t ii i i
R e e e i L
R e e e p F
 
 
      
      
 (19) 
 where 𝜇 =  fraction of news incorporated with a lag  
In Eq. (3) the returns of locally traded securities reflect local news instantaneously, while foreign 
news is incorporated with a lag. Taking the return differential of ETF i and pi would only 
eliminate the news about fundamental value unrelated to country L and F (𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 0). This 
yields the same predictions as in Hypothesis 1 and 2. 
Such differences in information diffusion can arise mechanically due to systematic 
differences in non-trading (or stale pricing) between local and foreign twin ETFs. For example, if 
the shares of iShares Euro Stoxx 50 traded on the Italian stock market are less liquid and more 
prone to non-trading (or stale pricing) relative to the ETFs shares traded in France, then it would 
mechanically create a divergence in return differentials that is positively (negatively) correlated 
with local (foreign) stock market returns, and positively correlated with the twin return 
differential of other ETF pairs traded in the same country pairs that also suffer from stale pricing. 
In order to ensure that non-trading is not driving the results, I eliminate ETFs with excessive 
non-trading (more details in the next section) and perhaps even more importantly, I analyze 
differences in the degree of commonality in twin return differentials for sub-samples of ETF-
pairs sorted on their liquidity characteristics. 
There is another, more interesting, story based on differences in information diffusion. 
Specifically, if local investors are better or faster at processing information about abstract local 
fundamental factors, then it can give rise to commonality in the return differential between local 
ETFs relative to their foreign twins. Van Niewerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) present a model 
where investors have a small home information advantage. Information asymmetry persists in 
their model not because investors cannot learn what locals know, nor because such information 
is expensive, but because investors choose not to learn. It is simply more profitable to specialize. 
Recent studies have also confirmed that local investors have an informational advantage over 
non-local investors: local analysts make more precise earnings forecasts (Bae, Stulz and Tan, 
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2008), hedge funds with a local research office presence outperform other hedge funds (Teo, 
2009), the institutional ownership of geographically proximate investors is a better predictor of 
future returns relative to the ownership of non-local investors (Baik, Kang and Kim, 2010). To 
rule out this alternative explanation, I perform tests based on: 1) reversals in the degree of 
commonality in twin return differentials over longer horizons and 2) a comparison of the degree 
of commonality in twin return differentials for sub-samples where the ETF owners differ in their 
likelihood for having an informational advantage (e.g. ETFs traded in countries other than the 
trading location of the ETFs underlying securities vs. ETFs traded in the same countries as their 
underlying securities).  
4.2.2 Key variables 
The main dependent variable in this study is the twin return differential, Ri−p,t ≡ Ri,t − Rpi,t. In 
order to more accurately capture the impact of local-trading induced misvaluation, we need to 
remove the impact of arbitrage trades on the twin return differentials, which can be accomplished 
by a regression of the twin return differential (Ri−p,t ) on the lagged twin price differential 
(Pi−p,t−1). Before discussing the rationale any further, I first need to define the price differential. 
The standard definition of ETF misvaluation is the premium, or the log differential between the 
market price of an ETF and the market value of the ETF’s portfolio on a per-share basis (NAV47):  
  , , ,ln /i t i t i tPPR NAVEM   (20) 
 where: 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  ETF mid-quote price at the close of day t for ETF i,  
  𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡  =  Net Asset Value per share for ETF i on day t 
To mitigate the possibility that prices are affected by microstructures issues such as bid-ask 
bounce, I use closing mid-quote prices rather than end-of-day prices. Engle and Sarkar (2006) 
also suggest using mid-quote prices in order to mitigate concerns about the illiquidity of the 
shares of smaller ETFs. Next, I define two versions of the twin price differential:  
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 where  𝑃𝑝1𝑖,𝑡  = the price of an ETF’s (own) shares traded on a foreign market,  
                                                 
47
 NAV also includes accrued income from securities lending, underlying stock dividends and cash. 
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   𝑃𝑝2𝑖,𝑡  = the price of a different ETF with an identical benchmark index  
The first, 𝑃𝑖−𝑝1, is the log price differential between ETF i and its shares traded abroad. The share 
price of an ETF should not depend on its trading location (in efficient markets). 𝑃𝑖−𝑝2 is the log 
price differential between two different ETFs, ETF i and a foreign traded ETF with the same 
benchmark index. Because price levels are not directly comparable across different ETFs, I scale 
the ETF prices by their corresponding NAV prices before taking the price difference. This 
corresponds to taking the difference in premiums (relative to NAV) between ETF i and its twin. 
The interpretation is straightforward. Consider an ETF tracking FTSE 100. If the shares of the 
ETF are trading at a premium (relative to NAV) of 20 basis points, while the ETFs foreign peer 
tracking FTSE 100 trade at a discount of 30 basis points, then the former is overpriced relative to 
the latter by a magnitude of 50 basis points. Petajisto (2013) use a similar method to calculate the 
misvaluation of U.S. traded ETFs that track international equities (and other illiquid asset 
classes) in an effort to control for stale pricing in the underlying securities. 
The twin return differential 𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 is equivalent to the change in 𝑃𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 when log-returns and 
prices are used
48
. To keep this link clear, I will use log-returns throughout this study.  
Even if 𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡  perfectly controls for fundamental risk (as in Eq. (2)), then the return 
differential reflects not only the impact of local demand shocks, but also the subsequent arbitrage 
trades and the associated reversal in misvaluation. Suppose that local investors buy ETF i in the 
local market causing price pressure, which results in a price appreciation of ETF i relative to its 
foreign twin pi (𝑃𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 > 0). In this case arbitrageurs can buy the relatively underpriced foreign 
ETF and sell the relatively overpriced local ETF, and wait for prices to converge. This will 
eventually lead to a reversal in twin return differentials (𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 < 0). This mechanism generates 
mean-reversion in changes in misvaluation. Given that demand shocks are theoretically expected 
to be uncorrelated (or positively auto-correlated due to some persistence in demand shocks), we 
can remove the effect of arbitrage trades by regressing 𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 on 𝑃𝑖−𝑝,𝑡−1. 
                                                 
48
 This definition is exact for shares of the same ETF traded in different markets (∆𝑃𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 ≡ 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡). However, when 
an ETF is compared against a different ETF with an identical benchmark, we obtain: (∆𝑃𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡 + ∆ln𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖 −
∆ln𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑝2. The last two terms drop out when ETF i and its twin pi have identical NAV returns (i.e. when both ETFs 
use identical replication methods).  
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4.3 DATA 
My data selection starts with all ETFs traded on the main exchanges in France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K. I keep funds that i) invest in any of the six 
aforementioned countries or in the regional (Pan-European) market, ii) are passively managed, 
iii) have reached a minimum size of $15 million
49
 and iv) have at least 2.5 years of complete data 
available. To mitigate the possibility of stale pricing induced comovement in twin return 
differentials, I also discard v) any funds from the sample with more than 20 percent non-trading 
days over the full sample, or vi) individual fund-month observations where the non-trading days 
are in excess of 25 percent. These exclusion criteria do not have a major impact on the size of the 
sample
50
. I focus on a recent sample period from January 2006 to December 2013 when the size 
of the entire market is reasonably large and the data quality is good.  
My main data source for the sample of ETFs, ETF prices, NAV prices and underlying 
indices is Bloomberg. I collect data on the number of shares outstanding and Assets Under 
Management (AUM) primarily from Morningstar Direct instead of Bloomberg because 
Morningstar has fewer misplaced decimals and higher accuracy (Bloomberg shares are rounded 
to the nearest thousand units). In order to verify the accuracy of the NAV data, I collect two sets 
of NAV prices. The first is the official NAV provided by the fund provider (available from both 
Bloomberg and Morningstar). The second is the closing price for the intraday NAV (iNAV). 
iNAV is disseminated every 15 seconds throughout the trading day by a third party data provider 
who has been selected by the fund sponsor (from Bloomberg). Since I use closing iNAV prices 
the calculation is done at the same time as for NAV prices, but by different entities. 
I screen the ETF and NAV price data for a number of obvious data errors. These include 
screens for misreported currency denominations, stale NAV prices when the underlying market 
has traded and the occasional misplaced decimal. A detailed treatment of these cases is discussed 
in Appendix A1.  
Table 4-2 provides a snapshot of the number of ETF listings as well as the Assets Under 
Management. The number of listings is broken down to two categories: original or primary 
                                                 
49
 I exclude the first 6 months of a fund's history since the data is often extreme, leaving me with an estimation 
sample of at least 2 years. For instance, the liquidity of newly created ETFs can be low when they are first created.  
50
 According to Blackrock’s ETF Global handbook from 09/2012, the total assets under management (AUM) of 
European single country funds and pan European funds are $61.3 billion and $53.3 billion respectively. This 
compares well with my sample that has a total AUM of $55.9 billion and $45.8 billion respectively. 
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listings (where the original IPO took place) and cross-listings (subsequent to the initial IPO). At 
the end of 2013, the total number of European equity ETF listings (main) is 416 (182). At the 
start of my sample (01/2006), the total AUM is $22.6 billion. Subsequently the total AUM grows 
to $86.1 billion in 01/2010, and to $140.1 billion at the end of the sample (12/2013). Overall, 
there are more than twice as many ETFs that track regional as opposed to country indices (292 vs 
124), but regional funds are generally much smaller. The bulk of regional ETFs (both number of 
and in terms of AUM) track European Large-Cap indices. Germany has the largest number of 
both total and primary ETF listings (126 and 79), while nearly all funds traded in Italy and the 
Netherlands are secondary-listings (70/71 and 16/18). In terms of the domicile of ETFs 
underlying securities, the most popular location in terms of number of listings is U.K. (52 total 
listings), while ETFs tracking German country indices have the biggest AUM ($31.8 billion). 
The share of synthetically replicated ETFs (i.e. funds that use swaps to gain exposure to an 
index) has declined over time; the share was 42 % in 01/2006, 38 % in 01/2010 and 30 % in 
11/2013.  
 [Table 4-2] 
4.3.1 Descirptive statistics  
Table 4-3 provides summary statistics for the various proxies for the level and changes in twin 
price differentials, at the weekly horizon. First, the level and change in premiums is zero on 
average, and at the median, which suggests that across funds and time ETFs are overall 
efficiently priced. However, there is considerable variation around the mean as indicated by the 
standard deviation of 0.28 % and 0.65 % for the level and change in premiums. The extreme 
right and left tails (1 and 99 percentiles) are roughly +/- 80 bps for levels of premiums, and +/- 2 
% for changes in premiums. The variability of ETF premiums is also considerable when 
compared against the variability in raw ETF returns: the ratio 𝑆𝑇𝐷(∆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡)/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖.𝑡)  is 
roughly 45 %. 
I also make a comparison with the magnitude of premiums of U.S. equity funds in Chapter 
2. In his study, the volatility of weekly premium levels and changes are 0.127 % and 0.39 % 
respectively. Restricting the sample to large-cap non-sector funds (to retain comparability with 
my European ETF sample) further reduces the volatility of the level (change) of premiums to 
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0.095 % (0.29 %)
51
. Overall, the indication is that European equity ETFs have considerably 
higher variations in premiums when compared to domestic U.S. ETFs, presumably due to higher 
arbitrage costs.  
The summary statistics for the twin return differential based on an ETF and its own foreign 
traded shares (𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡) indicate an even higher variability of 0.96 % per week, despite the tight 
arbitrage link between an ETFs various listings across Europe. The average ETF in the sample 
has roughly 3.6 cross-listings implying that for every ETF, 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡  can be calculated in 3.6 
different ways. In computing the twin return differential of ETFs with identical benchmark 
indices (𝑅𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡 ), the average (median) number of pairs is as high as 94 (18). Overall, the 
variability of 𝑅𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡 is comparable to the variability of 𝑅𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡 indicating that the arbitrage link 
between an ETFs own shares is no more efficient than between an ETF and its foreign peers 
tracking the same index. In total there are 400 different pairs of ETFs using an ETFs own foreign 
traded shares, and as many as 2727 different ETF pairs with identical benchmarks. 
[Table 4-3] 
4.4 EMPIRICAL TESTS OF LOCAL HABITATS 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive correlation between twin return differentials 𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑗−𝑝,𝑡 for 
ETF-pairs traded in the same country-pairs (𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐿  and 𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗 ∈ 𝐹 ) due to local trading induced 
misvaluation. Specifically, the long-leg of each ETF pair (i and j) is exposed to local demand 
shocks in country L (∆𝑢𝐿,𝑡) and the short-leg of each ETF pair (pi and pj) is exposed to ∆𝑢𝐹,𝑡. In 
order to obtain a convenient summary measure for this common factor, I use the equally-
weighted twin return differential of all ETFs traded in country L relative to F (same country-
pairs as ETF i and its peer pi): 
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 where  L and F  = countries L (“Local”) and F (“Foreign”) respectively 
I compute two different versions of the factor 𝑅𝐿−𝐹. The first (𝑅𝐿−𝐹1), restricts the set of twins (pj) 
to ETF j’s own shares traded abroad, while the second (𝑅𝐿−𝐹2) uses the entire set of foreign twins 
with identical benchmark indices. To avoid inducing a spurious correlation between 𝑅𝑖−𝑝 and the 
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 These numbers do not appear in Chapter 3, but they are based on the same data.  
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factors, I exclude ETF i and pi from 𝑅𝐿−𝐹1 and 𝑅𝐿−𝐹2. Moreover, I also exclude any other ETFs 
tracking the same benchmark index from 𝑅𝐿−𝐹2. With these exclusions the factor is specific to 
ETF i and pi, but to avoid unecsessary clutter, I do not add any additional subscripts to the factor. 
I refer to 𝑅𝐿−𝐹  as the composite local habitat factor because it is a summary measure for the 
relative local habitat factor ∆𝑢𝐿,𝑡 − ∆𝑢𝐹,𝑡. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that twin return differentials of ETF-pairs traded in countries L and F 
are positively correlated with the equally-weighted twin return differential of other ETF-pairs 
traded in countries L and F (𝛽𝐿−𝐹,𝑖 > 0).  
 0, 1, ,, , 1 ,,i p t i p t L Fi i L F i it tR P R            (23) 
The lagged twin price differential 𝑃𝑖−𝑝,𝑡−1 is included to account for the mean-reversion induced 
by arbitrage trades (see section 2.2). Regression (7) is estimated separately for twin return 
differentials 1) between an ETF and its own shares traded abroad (𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡; 𝑃𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡−1, 𝑅𝐿−𝐹1,𝑡) and 
2) between an ETF and a different ETF traded abroad with an identical benchmark index 
(𝑅𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡; 𝑃𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡−1, 𝑅𝐿−𝐹2,𝑡). 
I run time-series regressions of (7) for each ETF-pair using all available observations and 
report the mean of the estimated coefficients across ETF-pairs. In calculating the standard error 
for the mean coefficient, I take into account the cross-equation correlations in the estimated 
coefficients following Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010):  
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 where √𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝛽𝑖)   = the White standard error of the coefficient 
  𝜌𝑖,𝑗 = the empirical correlation between the regression residuals for  
    ETF i and j.  
4.4.1 Results: composite local habitat factor 
Table 4-4 provides the results for estimating (7) at the daily and monthly return horizons. Panel 
A provides the results for the return differential between an ETF and its own own foreign shares 
traded abroad (𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡). The 𝛽𝐿−𝐹  coefficient is on average positive and highly significant. To 
illustrate the economic magnitude, the impact of a 1 Std. Dev. shock to the local habitat factor 
(𝛽𝐿−𝐹 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑅𝐿−𝐹1,𝑡)) is associated with an increase in twin return differentials of 20.6 bps. The 
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proportional impact, 𝛽𝐿−𝐹 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝐿−𝐹1,𝑡)/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡) is also considerable at 41.1 % indicating 
that (loosely speaking) almost half of the variation in twin return differentials is driven by the 
local habitat factor. The distribution of the 𝛽𝐿−𝐹 coefficients is almost symmetric. Moreover, the 
coefficients are positive and individually significant already at the 5
th
 percentile of the 
distribution.  
The results remain similar, or even slightly stronger at the monthly horizon with the 
average impact of a 1 Std. Dev. shock corresponding to a 27.2 bps (or 43.7 % of the Std. Dev) 
increase in the dependent variable. Although the impacts remain similar to those observed in 
daily data, the economic magnitude is considerably smaller when compared against the 
variability in raw ETF returns. Specifically, 𝛽𝐿−𝐹 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝐿−𝐹1,𝑡)/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) equals 15.34 percent 
at the daily horizon, but only 3.75 % at the monthly horizon. These findings indicate that while 
the proportion of common vs. idiosyncratic misvaluation remains similar across horizons, the 
importance of common misvaluation relative to raw returns decreases rapidly at longer horizons 
consistent with arbitrage forces playing a role.  
 [Table 4-4] 
Panel B provides the results for 𝑅𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡, or ETF returns relative to foreign traded ETFs with 
an identical benchmark index.  The advantage of using foreign peers is the increase in degrees of 
freedom (there are 2727 ETF-pairs vs. 400 ETF-pairs when an ETFs own shares are used). 
Perhaps more importantly, there could be systematic differences between the liquidity of an 
ETFs shares in the primary and secondary (cross-listing) market. Although practitioners often 
claim that liquidity is similar across an ETFs various listings
52
, in unreported tests I find that 
ETFs with a main listing have significantly lower spreads and less volatile premiums relative to 
cross-listed ETFs. Even when twin return differentials are calculated relative to foreign ETFs 
with identical benchmark indices, the results remain very similar.  
Exchange rates cannot explain the commonality in twin return differentials at the country-
level because similar results are obtained even when I restrict the sample (and the construction of 
the local habitat factors) to the Eurozone countries. These results are unreported for conciseness. 
Finally, the twin price differentials 𝑃𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡−1  enter with the correct (negative) sign 
consistent with mean-reversion in misvaluation following arbitrage trades. The coefficient on 
                                                 
52
 http://www.professionaladviser.com/etfm/feature/1866073/building-liquidity 
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𝑃𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡−1 should theoretically equal -1 if shocks to premiums fully revert over one period, instead 
there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity in the coefficient estimates with the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles at -0.24 and -0.92 respectively at the daily horizon. This suggests that, in the cross-
section of ETF-pairs, roughly 24 to 92 % of the misvaluation reverts over one day.  
4.4.2 Separating the local habitat factors for L and F 
The results in the previous section indicate that twin return differetials are positively correlated 
with the composite local habitat factor. However, this factor is identified only relative to ETF i’s 
foreign peer. In order to separately identify the local habitat factors of country L and F, and to 
examine whether there is any remaining comovement in twin return differentials not captured by 
these two factors, I also consider an alternative method. Here I use the return differential 
between an ETF and its underlying portfolio NAV (𝑅𝑖−𝑁,𝑡 ≡ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − ∆ln𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑁,𝑡). The 
local habitat factors can then be calculated as follows:  
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 (25) 
An ETF represents a claim on its underlying basket of securities (facilitated by the share 
creation mechanism). In order to identify the local habitat factor from the difference between 
ETF and NAV returns, the ETF has to be more exposed to the local habitat factor relative to the 
underlying basket. This is likely to be the case because ETFs are mainly held by local investors, 
while their underlying securities are owned by both local and foreign investors. To obtain an 
even cleaner measure of the local habitat factors, I restrict the sample to ETFs tracking Pan 
European equity indices when calculating Eq. (9). Even with a local bias of 100 %, the 
proportion of assets in the underlying portfolio held by local investors is at most the proportion 
of market cap of the underlying basket invested in local securities. Finally, I also include a 
remainder factor 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇  to test whether there is any remaining comovement in twin return 
differentials not captured by the country-specific habitat factors. 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇  is calculated as the 
equally-weighted ETF-NAV return difference for ETFs traded in countries other than L and F.  
The following time-series regression is estimated for each fund:  
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 , 0, 1, , 1 , , , , , , ,i p t i i i p t L i Local t F i Foreign t R i REST t i p tR P R R R               (26) 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that twin return differentials are positively correlated with the local habitat 
factor (𝛽𝐿,𝑖 > 0), vice-versa for the foreign habitat factor (𝛽𝐹,𝑖 < 0) and no comovement with the 
average ETF-NAV return of ETFs outside the local and foreign markets (𝛽𝑅 = 0). 
[Table 4-5] 
The results in Table 4-5 are in agreement with Hypothesis 1: the mean 𝛽𝐿  and 𝛽𝐹 
coefficients are significantly positive and negative respectively. Economically, the impact of a 1 
Std. Dev. shock to the local habitat factors of country L (F) is associated with an increase 
(decrease) in ETF returns relative to its own foreign shares 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 of 11.1 bps (-16.0 bps), or 
23.1 % (-33.0 %) of the Std. Dev. of the dependent variable. Commonality in twin return 
differentials is entirely country-specific as indicated by the insignificant mean coefficient on the 
remainder term (𝛽𝑅). The results are very similar for ETF returns relative to foreign ETFs with 
an identical benchmark index (𝑅𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡 ). Overall, these findings provide further evidence to 
support my conjecture that local demand shocks induce commonality in twin return differentials. 
4.4.3 Placebo test 
To provide further evidence that the local habitat factor is country-specific, I construct a placebo 
test using the twin return differential between an ETF and its domestic peer, 𝑅𝑖−𝑑,𝑡. A domestic 
peer refers to another ETF that is traded in the same country as i (i.e. 𝑖, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐿). When domestic 
ETFs are used both for the long- and the short-leg, 𝑅𝑖−𝑑,𝑡 should not have any exposure to the 
local habitat factor in the following regression: 
 0, 1, ,, , , , ,, 1i i L ii d t i d t Local t RESTR ti i d tR P R R            (27) 
Eq. (11) only includes the local habitat factor for country L (there is no foreign market F in this 
case) and the remainder factor to capture any remaining comovement in twin returns beyond 
country L. The twin log-price differential 𝑃𝑖−𝑑,𝑡 is calculated as 𝑃𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡 in Eq. (5). The results in 
Table 4-6 confirm that 𝑅𝑖−𝑑,𝑡 is on average uncorrelated both with the local habitat factor and the 
remainder term confirming that the local habitat factor is country-specific. 
 [Table 4-6] 
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4.5 LOCAL MISVALUATION IN THE STOCK MARKET 
Korniotis and Kumar (2013) argue that local misvaluation might be caused by undiversifiable 
incomes shocks that affect the risk-aversion and risk-sharing ability of local investors. 
Specifically, when the local economy enters a recession the risk aversion of local investors is 
likely to increase while their risk-sharing ability might deteriorate. Consequently, local investors 
should sell some of their local securities to reduce portfolio risk, which in turn will depress 
current prices. Due to limits-to-arbitrage, it may take some time for cross-border arbitrageurs to 
fully absorb this liquidity demand, which can generate peristence in misvaluation. This 
mechanism could expose both locally traded stocks and ETFs to misvaluation. Consequently, we 
should find a positive correlation between twin return differentials and local stock returns.  
Such a correlation might also reflect fundamental differences in information diffusion 
between local and foreign-traded ETFs. For instance, if local investors are better informed about 
the local economy, they might impound fundamental news about the local economy faster into 
the prices of local securities (including ETFs) relative to foreign-traded securities which are 
primarily owned by foreign investors. The returns of local ETFs would then comove excessively 
with other locally traded securities (excessive because in a frictionless economy all information 
is immediately reflected in prices). To disentangle local-trading induced misvaluation from 
differences in information diffusion, I investigate the relationship between twin return 
differentials and local stock market returns over different horizons. The former hypothesis 
predicts stronger comovements at higher frequencies where misvaluation is more pronounced. In 
contrast, information diffusion about abstract fundamental risk factors (e.g. market risk, or other 
risk factors such as size and BE/ME) may persist for longer.  
It is also possible that twin return differentials are not only correlated with local stock 
market returns, but also with local versions of commonly used risk-factors such as the Fama and 
French SMB and HML factors because these factors also correlate with local-trading induced 
misvaluation. Specifically, smaller stocks and growth stocks are more likely to be held by local 
investors (Kumar and Kornioitis, 2013).   
Another possible source of local risk is liquidity. Bernile et al. (2013) find that local (U.S. 
state-level) macro-economic conditions can predict the liquidity of local firms, which suggests 
that there is a common factor in the liquidity of local firms. The authors argue that when a large 
proportion of the ownership and trading of stocks is local, changes in local economic conditions 
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can influence the risk-aversion of local investors, which in turn has theoretically been shown to 
affect asset liquidity (Vayanos and Wang, 2012). Commonality in local liquidity can also affect 
the liquidity risk of local securities (e.g. Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). To investigate this 
possibility, I examine whether twin return differentials are exposed to innovations in market-
wide liquidity based on the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure. 
4.5.1 Constructing local stock market factors 
I construct local versions of market returns, SMB and HML returns using price and shares 
outstanding data primarily from Bloomberg, supplemented by accounting data from Datastream 
and Worldscope similar to Fama and French (2012). To build a reliable sample, I follow the 
static and dynamic screens suggested by Ince and Porter (2006) and extended by Schmidt et al. 
(2014), among others. The static screens restrict the sample to common equity that are traded on 
the country’s major exchange(s), excluding stocks with special features suchs as ADRs, REITs, 
prefered stocks, warrants, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds etc. Several dynamic screens 
are used to handle obvious data errors (see Appendix A2 for additional details). 
Fama and French (1993) introduce common risk factors related to size (SMB) and book-to-
market (HML), while Fama and French (2012) provide an international extension with regional 
and global factors. In constructing the country-specific SMB and HML factors, I follow Fama and 
French (2012) and Schmidt et al. (2014). 
Firm characteristics used in the construction of the risk-factors include size and book-to-
market ratio (B/M). Size is the product of Bloomberg last trade price (PX_LAST) and number of 
shares outstanding (BS_SH_OUT). Big stocks are those in the top 90 % of market cap, and small 
stocks are those in the bottom 10 %. B/M is the ratio of book equity of the previous fiscal year 
(Datastream: WC03501) to size at the same point in time. At the end of June of year t, the B/M 
breakpoints are calculated at the 30
th
 and 70
th
 percentiles of B/M for the big stocks. The SMB and 
HML factors are then calculated as in Fama and French (2012), with the exception that the 
factors are country-specific, as opposed to region (EU) specific. 
I also construct local versions of the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure, 
which is based on the idea that large order flows typically reverse for illiquid stocks. Greater 
illiquidity-driven reversals should be associated with a more negative γ-coefficient in the 
following regression:  
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 where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = return of stock i on day t 
  𝑅𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑡  = value-weighted stock return for country L (𝑖 ∈ L) on day t 
 𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡  = dollar volume in $millions 
Order flow is captured here simply by the dollar volume signed by excess stock returns. 
Regression (12) is estimated for each stock using daily data within a month (minimum 15 
observations). To mitigate the impact of outliers, I winsorize the γ-estimates at the 5th and 95th 
percentile of the cross-sectional distribution within a country. Market-wide innovations in 
liquidity are based on the equally-weighted change in γ across all stocks in a given month and 
country. This metric is then filtered through an autoregressive model to eliminate any residual 
autocorrelation (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003).  
4.5.2 Results: misvaluation and local stock market returns 
Table 4-7 provides the results from regressions of twin return differentials of an ETF relative to 
its own shares traded abroad (𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡) on local stock market returns (specification 1), plus the 
local SMB and HML factors (specification 2) and the local liquidity risk factor (specification 3). 
Note that each local factor appears twice, once for country L and once for country F. All 
regressions include the lagged twin price differential 𝑃𝑖−𝑝,𝑡−1 to account for the mean-reversion 
induced by arbitrage trades (see section 2.2).  
As hypothesized, there is a positive and significant relationship between 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 and local 
stock market returns of country L, and vice-versa for country F. This relationship is strongest at 
the daily horizon, weaker but still significant at weekly horizon, and disappears entirely at the 
monthly horizon. This rapid decline in strength is consistent with local-trading induced 
misvaluation. The reason is that the dependent variable is a measure of misvaluation, while the 
fraction of local stock returns attributable to misvaluation is likely to decline with the return 
horizon due to arbitrage. Similar results are obtained by Froot and Dabora (1999), but as noted 
by the authors, their findings might also be explained by less misalignment in trading hours over 
longer horizons. 
There is also some evidence to suggest that twin return differentials are positively 
correlated with the local SMB factor, and negatively with the HML factor, which is consistent 
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with notion that local-trading induced misvaluation is more prevalent among smaller stocks and 
growth stocks. This effect is, however, significant only at the weekly horizon. 
Panel B provides the results for 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 averaged to the country-pair level. This aggregation 
corresponds to using the local habitat factor (𝑅𝐿−𝐹1,𝑡 in Eq. (6)) as the dependent variable. The 
goal is to demonstrate the overall strength of the relationship between local stock market returns 
and the local habitat factor: a decomposition of R-squared reveals that roughly 10 % of the 
variation in the local habitat factor can be attributed to the local stock market returns of countries 
L and F at the daily horizon, and 8.67 % percent at the weekly horizon (for additional details on 
the decomposition, see section 6.1). 
[Table 4-7] 
As for local liquidity risk, I do not find any significant relationship with 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡  at the 
monthly horizon. Although commonality in local liquidity does not seem to matter, the liquidity 
and arbitrage costs of ETF-pairs are important determinants for the strength of the commonality 
in twin return differentials, as I will show in the next section. 
4.5.3 Robustness: regional risk factors 
Previous results suggest that twin return differentials 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 are positively correlated with local 
stock market returns and negatively correlated with foreign stock market returns. Exposure to 
regional or global risk factors cannot explain these findings; if some ETFs are overexposed to 
regional/global risk (relative to their foreign peer), others must be underexposed by definition. 
The result in Table 4-5 that 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 are correlated only with the local habitat factors for countries 
L and F, but not the remainder factor which captures misvaluation in countries other than L or F 
is consistent with the idea that regional or global factors cannot explain the commonality in 
𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡. Nevertheless, in unreported results I verify that 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 are insignificantly correlated with 
regional market returns (at any frequency), or regional variants of the size (SMB), value-growth 
(HML) and momentum (WML) factors at the monthly level (available from Kenneth French’s 
website). 
4.6 FURTHER EVIDENCE OF MISVALUATION VS. INFORMATION DIFFUSION 
Thus far I have shown that twin return differentials contain a strong common factor at the 
country level. This common factor, denoted the local habitat factor, is hypothesized to reflect 
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misvaluation. An alternative explanation is that this commonality in twin return differentials 
reflects differences in information diffusion, either non-trading mechanically induces a spurious 
correlation between return differentials among ETF-pairs from the same country-pairs with 
similar non-trading probabilities, or local investors are better informed about the local economy 
relative to foreign investors and therefore impound fundamental news faster into the prices of 
locally traded ETFs. 
In the previous section I already provided some evidence against the alternative 
explanation of information diffusion by showing that the correlation between ETF misvaluation 
and local stock market returns declines rapidly with the return horizon, consistent with 
misvaluation. In this section I provide further evidence based on three tests. 
First, I analyze how the degree of commonality in return differentials is related to the 
liquidity characteristics and arbitrage costs of ETF-pairs. According to the alternative 
explanation of information diffusion, commonality in return differentials should be stronger for 
less liquid ETFs that have a higher degree of non-trading (or stale pricing) probability. The 
prediction is less clear if commonality in return differentials reflects local-trading induced 
misvaluation. Previous studies suggest that commonality in return differentials should be 
stronger during periods of market-wide illiquidity and limits to arbitrage (Kumar and Lee, 2006; 
Kumar and Spalt, 2013). Alternatively, in the cross-section of securities, demand is likely to go 
first to the most liquid securities, implying that commonality in return differentials could be 
stronger for more liquid securities. Previous findings also suggest that liquid securities are more 
attractive to short-term noise traders, which can make these assets more exposed to non-
fundamental demand shocks (as argued in Chapter 2). 
Second, I provide an experiment that attempts to remove any local information advantage 
that local investors may have by focusing on ETFs traded in countries other than the trading 
location of their underlying securities. In this case commonality in return differentials is highly 
unlikely to reflect differences in information diffusion. 
Third, I test an important implication of the local-trading induced misvaluation hypothesis, 
namely that premiums of the local ETF (relative to NAV) should predict future returns of the 
local ETF negatively, as opposed to premiums of the foreign ETF (relative to NAV) predicting 
future returns of the local ETF positively as it catches up to reflect the fundamental information 
reflected in foreign ETF prices. 
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4.6.1 Liquidity and commonality in misvaluation 
Several liquidity measures have been proposed in the literature, but many of them are not 
comparable across countries due to differences in trading mechanisms and conventions, 
especially measures related to trading volume (e.g. Amihud’s price impact and turnover). 
Instead, I use the simplest and perhaps the most widely used measure of liquidity for normal-
sized transactions, which is the proportional quoted spread, defined as the difference between the 
closing ask and bid prices divided by the mid-quote prices, averaged over a monthly period. 
My second measure is an implicit measure of liquidity, namely arbitrage costs. 
Idiosyncratic risk is one of the most important measures of arbitrage costs. Pontiff (2006) 
demonstrates theoretically that a rational investor’s demand for a mispriced asset increases with 
the magnitude of misvaluation, but decreases with the asset’s idiosyncratic risk. His argument 
relies on the idea that the hedge position intended to capture the misvaluation must, by design, be 
uncorrelated with the market and any other hedge positions. An arbitrageur will therefore be 
exposed to idiosyncratic risk whenever she has to delay liquidating the position
53
. Empirical 
evidence by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) in the context of cross-listed stocks also demonstrates 
the importance of idiosyncratic risk for misvaluation. To measure idiosyncratic risk, I use the 
standard deviation of ETF-NAV return (Std. Dev. of the change in premium in Eq. (3)) measured 
over a monthly period. 
As with the liquidity measures, I estimate the degree of commonality in twin return 
differentials using daily data over a calendar month. For the estimation I require valid (non-
missing) data for a minimum of 75 percent of trading days. Commonality in twin return 
differentials is measured either from a regression of twin return differentials on the composite 
local habitat factor (Eq. (6)), or from a regression of twin return differentials on the local stock 
market returns of countries L and F. In either case I also control for the lagged level of ETF 
premiums. 
                                                 
53
 In the context of ETFs, limited delays can occur because share creations only take place at end-of-day NAVs, 
while the underlying portfolio may have to be accumulated over an extended period of time for several reasons: 1) 
the APs need to hedge their exposure to the underlying securities when an ETF is sold in the secondary market until 
enough demand is available to meet the minimum creation unit size, 2) the additional costs and risks faced by cross-
border arbitrage trades may deter arbitrage activity until mispricing is large enough, 3) arbitrageurs may wish to 
avoid price impact costs by splitting up the purchases over an extended period of time. Moreover, search and delay 
costs are more likely to arise when the position to be liquidated is large. 
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In this context, how should one measure the degree of commonality? The existing 
literature mainly uses the regression R
2
 (e.g. Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan, 2010; Karolyi, 
Lee and Van Dijk, 2012), although the beta coefficient is also used (Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 
2008). Unlike the R
2
-measure, the beta coefficient is sensitive to scaling effects that arise from 
differences in factors and their volatilities (i.e. the beta denominator) across ETFs in different 
countries (Brockman et al., 2009). For this reason I focus primarily on the R
2
-measure, although 
for robustness I report results for both. In order to remove the influence of the lagged twin price 
differential on model R
2
, I perform a decomposition as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
, ,,, 1, , 1
, ,
,ˆ,2 i p t L F tL F ii p t i i p t
i p t i p t
COV R RCOV R P
i VAR R VAR R
R
    
 
   (29) 
I use the second normalized covariance term, denoted 𝑅𝐿−𝐹,𝑖
2 , to measure the degree of 
commonality in twin return differentials for a given ETF-pair and month. 𝑅𝐿−𝐹,𝑖
2  can be 
interpreted as the fraction of the model R
2
 attributable to the local habitat factor (Graham, Li and 
Qiu, 2013). I perform a similar decomposition for the second regression that uses local stock 
market returns instead of the composite habitat factor:  
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I use the sum of the second and third normalized covariance terms, denoted 𝑅𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖
2 , as my second 
measure for commonality in twin return differentials. 
Table 4-8 provides estimates for the average degree of commonality in twin return 
differentials (𝑅𝐿−𝐹
2  or 𝛽𝐿−𝐹) using a two-way sort on the prior month liquidity of ETF i (long-leg 
of misvaluation), and the liquidity of its foreign twin pi (short-leg). This allows us to compare the 
degree of commonality in twin return differentials among ETFs, holding constant the 
fundamentals (i.e. identical underlying benchmark indices). There are three liquidity terciles each 
for ETF i, and pi, which yields nine liquidity groupings in total. To be included in the sample, I 
require a minimum of 9 foreign peers per ETF, or at least one per liquidity group. This is not a 
serious restriction because the average (median) ETF has 94 (18) foreign peers.  
[Table 4-8] 
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The results in Table 4-8 suggest that if we hold the liquidity of ETF i constant (long-leg), 
commonality in twin return differentials increases with the liquidity of the foreign peer pi (short-
leg). The results hold for both measures of liquidity (proportional quoted spreads and 
idiosyncratic risk) as well as for both measures of commonality (𝑅𝐿−𝐹
2  and 𝛽𝐿−𝐹). Holding ETF 
i’s idiosyncratic risk constant at high: 𝑅𝐿−𝐹
2  increases from 28.6 to 40.2 to 62.9 percent as the 
idiosyncratic risk of the short-leg decreases from high to medium to low. These increases are 
highly significant on any conventional level. Similar, albeit less pronounced and significant 
increases are observed when the liquidity of the long-leg is fixed at medium or high. The 
increase in commonality for more liquid funds in the short-leg is consistent with the local-trading 
induced misvaluation story where demand shocks materialize first in the most liquid ETFs, but 
the results are opposite to the predictions of the information diffusion story. 
Overall, commonality in twin return differentials is most pronounced when the liquidity of 
the short-leg is high, while there is little difference in the degree of commonality when the 
liquidity of the long-leg increases. This asymmetry – liquidity matters only for the ETF in the 
short-leg – may be related to country-specific characteristics in the sample. Since every ETF-pair 
is unique, the ordering by country-pairs is arbitrary. In my sample U.K. and Switzerland 
combined account for more than half of the sample of ETFs in the long-leg, while Italy and 
Netherlands account for roughly half of the sample of ETFs in the short-leg
54
. 
4.6.2 No information advantage 
In this section I provide an experiment where local investors have no informational advantage, in 
which case commonality in twin return differentials is highly unlikely to reflect differences in 
information diffusion. Specifically, I estimate regression of twin return differentials on the local 
habitat factors for two sub-samples. The first sample contains ETF-pairs where the trading 
location of one of the ETFs matches the trading location of the underlying securities (e.g. pair of 
ETFs tracking FTSE 100, where one of the pairs is traded in the U.K., the other is traded in 
France). The second sample contains ETF-pairs where the trading location of both ETFs is 
                                                 
54
 I start the matching from U.K., followed by SWI, FRA, GER, ITA and NET. In my case U.K. is the first country 
in the long-leg and therefore never appears in the short-leg (as every ETF-pair consists of an ETF from different 
countries). For example, the most popular benchmark index is Eurostoxx 50 with 78 ETFs tracking this index. When 
forming pairs of ETFs, I start with U.K. listed ETF. I match this ETF, one-by-one, with every identical ETF traded 
in Switzerland, then I move on to the next country (France), followed by the next (Germany) and so on. The 
sequence of countries is fixed (UK, SWI, FRA, GER, ITA, NET), which is why U.K. appears most frequently in the 
long-leg, while Italy and Netherlands appear most often in the short-leg. 
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separated from the trading location of the underlying securities. For instance, pairs of ETFs 
tracking CAC 40 where both pairs are traded in countries other than France. If commonality in 
twin return differentials is driven by information diffusion, then we should expect the results to 
be stronger for the first sample relative to the second. The regressions are otherwise identical to 
those estimated before using regression (7) with the composite local habitat factor, or regression 
(10) with separate habitat factors for the local markets of countries L and F. 
[Table 4-9] 
The results in Table 4-9 reveal no meaningful differences in the degree of commonality in 
twin return differentials between the two samples, whether at the daily or monthly horizons, and 
regardless of the regression specification used. The absence of results supports my conjecture 
that commonality in twin return differentials is in fact driven by misvaluation, and not 
information diffusion. 
Although the sample size used in this experiment is only 11 percent of the full sample, the 
number of daily ETF-pair observations is still considerable at more than 200,000. Nevertheless, I 
also conduct a similar test of no information advantage by using sub-samples of ETFs tracking 
either single-country indices vs. Pan-European indices. Local investors are unlikely to have an 
informational advantage over regional equities. These results (unreported for conciseness) also 
do not reveal any economically significant differences between the two samples. 
4.6.3 Return predictability and the reversal of misvaluation 
An important testable implication of local-trading induced misvaluation is its subsequent reversal 
as arbitrage forces restore pricing efficiency. Let us assume that the ETF i is hit by a positive 
local demand shock that pushes its price above the fundamental NAV value (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 > 0), while 
its twin security ETF pi is not affected (because it is owned by foreign investors) and remains 
correctly priced (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 0). If 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 truly reflects misvaluation of the ETF, then we should 
observe a reversal in the future returns of ETF i (𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 < 0) with no impact on future returns of 
ETF pi (𝑅𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 = 0) in the absence of news to fundamentals.  
The alternative hypothesis is that the initial demand shock was driven by positive 
fundamental news. In this case ETF i is correctly valued and its future returns are unaffected in 
the absence of other fundamental news (𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 = 0). In contrast, future returns for the twin 
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security pi will be positive as it catches up to reflect the fundamental news already incorporated 
in the price of ETF i (𝑅𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 > 0). To test these implications, I estimate the following regression: 
 , , , ,i t i i i t i p t i tiR a b PREM c PREM e       (31) 
 , , , ,p t p p i t p p t p ti i i i i iR a b PREM c PREM e       (32) 
 where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝜏  = Return measured over the interval t+τ for ETF i, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐿   
  𝑅𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 = Return measured over the interval t+τ for ETF pi, 𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝐹   
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  = ETF premium relative to NAV on day t  
The LHS and RHS variables are standardized to obtain coefficient estimates that are comparable 
across various return intervals (τ). If 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  reflects misvaluation for ETF i, and 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑖,𝑡 
reflects misvaluation for ETF pi, then a future reversal in misvaluation implies that 𝑏𝑖 < 0 and 
𝑐𝑝𝑖 < 0. In contrast, the information diffusion story predicts that 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 reflects fundamental 
news already incorporated into the price of ETF i, implying that future returns of pi will catch up 
with a lag (𝑏𝑝𝑖 > 0). Similarly, when 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑖,𝑡 reflects fundamental news incorporated in pi, then 
future returns of ETF i will catch up with a lag (𝑐𝑖 > 0). 
In order to account for the dependence in residuals across funds (because we have not 
accounted for common fundamental risk) and possibly also over time, I estimate regressions (15-
16) using pooled OLS with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors that are robust to general 
forms of cross-sectional and time-series dependence. The maximum lag order of autocorrelation 
is set to the number of overlapping days per return horizon. 
[Table 4-10] 
The results in Table 4-10 show that an ETFs own premium predicts future returns negatively 
( 𝑏𝑖 < 0  and 𝑐𝑝𝑖 < 0 ) consistent with the reversal of local demand shocks. As the data is 
standardized, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates can be intepreted as percentages of Std. 
Dev. of the dependendent variable. Thus, a one Std. Dev. increase in an ETFs own premiums is 
associated with a 14.9 percent and 13.4 percent decline in returns for ETF i and pi respectively 
over a daily period. The magnitudes decline by roughly half over a weekly horizon, and by two 
thirds over a monthly horizon. Nevertheless, the coefficients are significant at least over a return 
horizon of six months. 
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In contrast to local trading induced mispricing, the cross-terms are positive implying that 
current misvaluation of ETF i predicts future returns of ETF pi positively (𝑏𝑝𝑖 > 0), and current 
misvaluation of ETF pi predicts future returns of i positively (𝑐𝑖 > 0). Economically these results 
are much weaker as the coefficient estimates for the cross-terms are less than half as strong as 
those for the own-terms, and the cross-terms are generally significant only for return horizons up 
to a week. Another interpretation is that the return predictability partially reflects arbitrage 
activity. For instance, when ETF i is trading at a premium relative to NAV and relative to pi, then 
arbitrageurs would buy the underpriced asset (ETF pi) and sell the overpriced asset (ETF i), 
which would induce a reversal in the future returns of ETF i and an appreciation of the future 
returns of ETF pi. With this interpretation it may be more useful to investigate the difference in 
coefficient estimates for an ETFs own premium and the premium of its peer pi. Since the cross-
terms are always weaker by half, the results continue to support the reversal of local-trading 
induced mispricing. 
4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study I investigate whether differences in local clienteles between identical ETF-pairs 
from different countries can be used to identify commonality in misvaluation among locally 
traded securities. My sample contains 416 plain-vanilla Exchange-Traded Funds from six 
European countries tracking European equity indices; the total number of ETF-pairs is 2727. The 
theoretical justification is based on the “preferred habitat” theory of Barberis, Shleifer and 
Wurgler (2005) where some securities (locally traded ETFs) are predominantly owned and 
traded by a specific subset of investors (local investors).  
This paper expands on existing research in several ways. First, local clienteles are clearly 
identified because the primary motivation for listing new (or cross-list existing) funds is to 
support local clientele demand, according to ETF providers. Second, because trading hours are 
almost perfectly aligned in Europe and because ETF misvaluation can be calculated relative to i) 
own (cross-listed) shares traded abroad, ii) foreign peers tracking the same underlying 
benchmark passively or iii) underlying portfolio NAV, I can control for not only non-trading, but 
also stale pricing.  
My findings indicate that daily twin return differentials (Local-Foreign) comove strongly 
with a local habitat factor constructed from the equally-weighted twin return differential of other 
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ETF-pairs in the same country-pairs L and F. The degree of commonality in return differentials 
is also considerable when compared against the variability in raw returns (15.34 percent), but 
declines rapidly with the return horizon (only 3.75 percent in monthly horizons), consistent with 
misvaluation.  
I conduct several tests to rule out the alternative explanation that commonality in return 
differentials reflects (fundamental) differences in information diffusion between countries. First, 
I compare the degree of commonality in return differentials for two sub-samples: a) a sample 
where the trading location of ETF-pairs is different from to the trading location of their 
underlying securities with b) a sample where the trading locations of the ETF-pairs and their 
underlying securities match. The results do not materially differ between the two samples. Third, 
I compare the degree of commonality in twin return differentials among ETFs with identical 
fundamentals, but different levels of liquidity (and non-trading probability). In contrast to the 
information diffusion argument which predicts that commonality in return differentials should 
increase with illiquidity and non-trading probability, my findings indicate the opposite.  
Consistent with the conjecture that both locally traded ETFs and stocks are exposed to 
local-trading induced misvaluation, I find that twin return differentials are positively correlated 
with stock market returns in the local market, and negatively with the returns in the foreign 
market. This relationship is strongest at the daily horizon, weaker but still significant at weekly 
horizon, and disappears entirely at the monthly horizon.  
Overall, my findings indicate that local clienteles and the trading by local investors can 
generate commonality in misvaluation.  
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Table 4- 1: Selecting ETF twins 
This table provides several examples to illustrate how ETF twins are selected. Panel A shows a randomly selected ETF (ETF 
i), while Panel B shows the potential twin securities for ETF i. ID is a unique identifier for a given ETF and trading location. 
The variable ticker includes the ticker of the security and the exchange country (as reported by Bloomberg). Listing type is 
either primary (where original IPO took place), or cross-listing. FX is the currency in which the ETF shares are traded (GBX 
= penny sterling, or GBP/100). There are three different methods to select twins. First, we can use an ETFs own shares 
traded in a foreign market. Second, we can use the shares of a different ETF with an identical benchmark index traded in a 
foreign country or third, traded in the same country.  
      ETF-pair ID (by twin type) 
Name ID Ticker Exchange 
Listing 
type FX 
1: Foreign 
(own) 
2: Foreign 
(different) 3: Domestic 
PANEL A: ETF i 
iShares Euro Stoxx 50 1 EUEA NA London Cross GBX 
  
 
PANEL B: twin ETF pi 
iShares Euro Stoxx 50 
2 EUE IM Borsa Italian Cross EUR Pair: 1, 2 Pair: 1, 2  
3 EUE LN Euronext Amst. Primary EUR Pair: 1, 3 Pair: 1, 3  
4 EUN2 GR Xetra ETF Cross EUR Pair: 1, 4 Pair: 1, 4 
 
5 EUNE SW SIX Cross CHF Pair: 1, 5 Pair: 1, 5 
 
LYXOR ETF Euro 
Stoxx 50 
6 LYSX GR Xetra ETF Cross EUR  Pair: 1, 6 
 
7 MSE FP Euronext Paris Primary EUR  Pair: 1, 7  
AMUNDI ETF Euro 
Stoxx 50 C 
8 C50 FP Euronext Paris Primary EUR  Pair: 1, 8  
9 C50 IM Borsa Italian Cross EUR  Pair: 1, 9  
HSBC Euro Stoxx 50 
ETF 
10 H50E LN London Cross GBX   Pair: 1, 10 
11 50E FP Euronext Paris Primary EUR  Pair: 1, 11  
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Table 4- 2: Snapshot of ETF sample 11/2013 
This table provides a snapshot of the Assets Under Management (AUM) at the beginning (01/2006), middle (01/2010) and 
end of the sample (11/2013). The number of ETFs is reported at the end of the sample. The number of ETFs is reported 
both for primary listings (i.e. an ETF’s first, or original listing), as well as the total number of listings (including both 
original and cross-listings). AUM is measured as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the ETF share price in 
the market of the original IPO. 
Sample 
AUM (in $million)  Number of ETF listings 
01/2006 01/2010 11/2013  Primary Total 
All 22,563 86,072 140,800  186 416 
By replication method       
  Synthetic 9,373 32,425 42,474  82 185 
  Sample  8,474 16,479  19 55 
  Full 13,190 45,174 81,848  85 176 
By Trading Location       
  UK     28 62 
  SWI     30 87 
  FRA     46 52 
  GER     79 126 
  ITA     1 71 
  NET     2 18 
By Investment Location       
  UK 65 8,661 16,099  25 52 
  SWI 2,521 6,431 9,622  15 22 
  FRA 5,000 6,224 6,327  7 12 
  GER 3,352 9,658 31,766  11 19 
  ITA 264 570 2,739  5 14 
  NET  607 569  4 5 
Country 11,202 32,152 67,122  67 124 
Regional 11,360 53,921 73,678  119 292 
  Europe Large-Cap 10,956 49,696 66,336  85 212 
  Europe Mid-Cap 175 666 1,594  9 19 
  Europe Small-Cap 73 1,766 3,246  9 23 
  Other 156 1,793 2,502  16 38 
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Table 4- 3: Summary statistics on ETF misvaluation 
Panel A provides summary statistics for the level of (change in) premiums, or the log-price (return) differential between 
an ETF and its underlying portfolio NAV. Panel B, C and D provide summary statistics for the log-price (return) 
differential between pairs of twin ETFs. In panel B, the twin of an ETF refers to the same ETF share traded in a foreign 
market. In Panel C and D the twin refers to a different ETF with an identical benchmark index as ETF i and which is 
traded in the foreign (domestic) market relative to i. In this case the price levels are not directly comparable, which is 
why I scale the ETF prices by their corresponding NAV prices before taking the log-price difference (this corresponds to 
taking the difference in ETF premiums relative to NAV). All variables are measured in percentage. Summary statistics 
are calculated over the 01/2006-11/2013 period (weekly data) separately for four different samples: a) all funds, b) funds 
that use synthetic replication, c) sample replication or d) full replication.  
Variable Sample Mean Median Std. Dev. 1 % 99 % 
Panel A: Twin = underlying portfolio NAV 
Premium: 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =
   𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖,𝑡 /𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡) 
All -0.004 -0.005 0.275 -0.803 0.792 
  ∆Premium:  
   ∆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
All 0.006 0.002 0.644 -1.964 2.040 
Panel B: Twin = same ETF share traded abroad 
Nr. of ETF pairs All 3.670 3.000 2.746 1.000 10.000 
Twin price differential:  
 𝑃𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝑃𝑝1,𝑡) 
All 0.027 0.014 0.295 -0.771 0.912 
Synthetic replication 0.025 0.015 0.181 -0.438 0.565 
Sample replication 0.019 0.009 0.171 -0.451 0.580 
Full replication 0.031 0.015 0.197 -0.405 0.670 
Twin return differential:  
 𝑅𝑖−𝑝1,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑝1,𝑡 
All 0.015 0.002 0.964 -3.077 3.112 
Synthetic replication 0.034 0.011 1.483 -4.375 4.311 
Sample replication 0.132 0.031 1.606 -3.906 5.239 
Full replication 0.067 0.017 1.374 -4.065 4.315 
Panel C: Twin = different ETF (foreign traded) with an identical benchmark index 
Nr. of ETF pairs All 94.035 18.000 239.161 4.000 1065.000 
Twin price differential: 
𝑃𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡
= 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑝2,𝑡 
All -0.005 -0.006 0.243 -0.604 0.602 
Synthetic replication -0.005 -0.007 0.226 -0.551 0.606 
Sample replication 0.000 0.000 0.187 -0.540 0.527 
Full replication 0.003 -0.002 0.265 -0.596 0.617 
Twin return differential: 
 𝑅𝑖−𝑝2,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑝2,𝑡 
All 0.018 0.003 0.962 -3.033 3.095 
Synthetic replication 0.015 0.004 1.010 -3.358 3.299 
Sample replication 0.023 0.001 0.913 -2.851 2.971 
Full replication 0.017 0.003 0.968 -2.943 3.024 
Panel D: Twin = different ETF (domestic traded) with an identical benchmark index 
Nr. of ETF pairs All 27.478 6.000 63.675 1.000 261.000 
Twin price differential:  
𝑃𝑖−𝑑,𝑡
= 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  − 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑑,𝑡 
All 0.017 0.007 0.202 -0.517 0.537 
Twin return differential: 
  𝑅𝑖−𝑑,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑡 
All -0.009 -0.001 0.694 -2.235 2.219 
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Table 4- 4: Trading location specific misvaluation 
This table reports the results from the following regression: 
0, 1, ,, , 1 ,,i p t i p t L Fi i L F i it t
R P R   
    
     
where 𝑃𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 (𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡) is the log price (return) twin return differential based on the difference between 1) an ETF and its 
(own) shares traded in a foreign market or 2) ETF i and a different ETF with an identical benchmark index traded in a 
foreign market. The local-minus-foreign habitat factor 𝑅𝐿−𝐹,𝑡 is calculated as the equally-weighted twin return differential 
of other ETF-pairs traded in the same country-pairs as ETF i and its foreign twin pi. Coefficients are shown for the 
average, the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of the distribution. T-statistics for the mean are adjusted for cross-correlation as 
in Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010). T-statistics at the 5th, 50th and 95th refer to fund specific t-statistics and are 
based on white standard errors. Avg. R2 is the average R-squared across all funds, Nobs is the number of observations. 
Impact (basis points) is the impact of a 1 Std. Dev. shock increase in the factor on the dependent variable, or 𝛽𝐿−𝐹 ∗
𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑅𝐿−𝐹,𝑡), while Impact (% of SD) is the proportional impact, or 𝛽𝐿−𝐹 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝐿−𝐹,𝑡)/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡)  
Sample 𝛼1 [t-stat] 𝛽𝐿−𝐹 [t-stat] 
Impact 
(bp) 
Impact 
(% SD) 
Avg. 
R2 
N obs 
PANEL A: Twin = own ETF shares traded in a foreign market 
Daily         
   Average -0.614 [73.28] 0.596 [76.33] 0.206 0.411 0.561 491,319 
   P05 -0.924 [16.60] 0.209 [2.22]     
   Median -0.634 [9.28] 0.589 [9.58]     
   P95 -0.237 [4.70] 1.071 [32.19]     
Monthly         
   Average -0.522 [18.82] 0.652 [19.54] 0.272 0.437 0.470 22,351 
   P05 -1.145 [5.83] -0.040 [0.10]     
   Median -0.506 [2.28] 0.665 [3.25]     
   P95 0.006 [0.02] 1.269 [9.35]     
PANEL B: Twin = a different ETF with an identical benchmark index 
Daily         
   Average -0.454 [64.84] 0.727 [103.05] 0.250 0.543 0.633 2,481,573 
   P05 -0.818 [15.29] 0.247 [3.61]     
   Median -0.430 [8.20] 0.707 [15.33]     
   P95 -0.176 [4.84] 1.178 [39.43]     
Monthly         
   Average -0.537 [18.25] 0.691 [23.07] 0.277 0.494 0.569 112,982 
   P05 -1.131 [5.99] 0.048 [0.18]     
   Median -0.483 [2.63] 0.727 [4.15]     
   P95 -0.109 [0.58] 1.252 [9.88]     
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Table 4- 5: Separating the local and foreign habitat factors 
This table reports the results from the following regression: 
, 0, 1, , 1 , , , , , , ,i p t i i i p t L i Local t F i Foreign t R i REST t i p t
R P R R R     
   
       
where 𝑃𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 (𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡) is the log price (return) twin return differential based on the difference between 1) ETF i and its 
(own) shares traded in a foreign market or 2) ETF i and a different ETF with an identical benchmark index traded in a 
foreign market. The local habitat factor factor 𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑡 is calculated as the equally-weighted ETF-NAV return differential 
of other ETFs in the same country as ETF i (long-leg), while the foreign habitat factor 𝑅𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛,𝑡 is calculated as the 
equally-weighted ETF-NAV return of other ETFs traded in the same country as the ETFs peer (short-leg).  𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇,𝑡 is the 
equally-weighted ETF-NAV return difference of ETFs traded outside the two markets. Coefficients are shown for the 
average, the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of the distribution. T-statistics for the mean are adjusted for cross-correlation as 
in Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010). T-statistics at the 5th, 50th and 95th refer to fund specific t-statistics and are 
based on white standard errors. A. R2 is the average R-squared across all funds, N is the number of observations. 
*/**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels respectively. 
Sample 𝛽𝐿 [t-stat] 𝛽𝐹  [t-stat] 𝛽𝑅 [t-stat] A. R
2 N 
PANEL A: Twin = own ETF shares traded in a foreign market 
Daily         
   Average 0.540 [35.50] -0.569 [53.11] 0.036 [2.37] 0.566 483,897 
   P05 0.106 [0.60] -1.025 [26.26] -0.284 [2.29]   
   Median 0.515 [3.35] -0.566 [11.85] 0.005 [0.97]   
   P95 1.058 [5.91] -0.171 [7.20] 0.458 [0.07]   
Monthly         
   Average 0.443 [7.89] -0.582 [11.23] -0.012 [0.17] 0.488 22,351 
   P05 -0.387 [0.69] -1.235 [8.00] -0.971 [2.21]   
   Median 0.471 [0.44] -0.613 [4.06] -0.072 [1.04]   
   P95 1.135 [1.50] 0.122 [2.52] 1.164 [0.26]   
PANEL B: Twin = a different ETF with an identical benchmark index 
Daily         
   Average 0.680 [40.39] -0.707 [61.33] 0.016 [1.32] 0.659 2,089,110 
   P05 0.164 [1.45] -1.221 [37.93] -0.197 [2.33]   
   Median 0.720 [5.37] -0.733 [20.09] 0.004 [1.02]   
   P95 1.165 [9.38] -0.182 [10.50] 0.305 [0.10]   
Monthly         
   Average 0.545 [8.82] -0.673 [14.78] -0.006 [0.14] 0.603 95,038 
   P05 -0.211 [0.58] -1.235 [6.85] -0.428 [1.88]   
   Median 0.578 [0.94] -0.712 [4.83] -0.006 [0.80]   
   P95 1.262 [2.16] 0.039 [3.32] 0.398 [0.03]   
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Table 4- 6: Placebo test for local misvaluation in ETF returns 
This table reports the results from the following regression : 
0, 1, ,, , , , ,, 1i i L ii d t i d t Local t RESTR ti i d t
R P R R    
  
      
where 𝑃𝑖−𝑝,𝑡 (𝑅𝑖−𝑝,𝑡) is the log price (return) twin return differential based on the difference pairs of ETFs with identical 
benchmark index traded in the same country. The local habitat factor factor 𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑡 is calculated as the equally-weighted 
ETF-NAV return differential of other ETFs in the same country as ETF i (long-leg). 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡,𝑡
𝐸−𝑁  is the equally-weighted ETF-
NAV return difference of ETFs traded outside the local market. Coefficients are shown for the average, the 5th, 50th and 
95th percentile of the distribution. T-statistics for the mean are adjusted for cross-correlation as in Hameed, Kang and 
Viswanathan (2010). T-statistics at the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile refer to fund specific t-statistics and are based on white 
standard errors. A. R2 is the average adjusted R-squared, N is the number of observations. */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels respectively. 
Sample 𝛼1 [t-stat] 𝛽𝐿 [t-stat] 𝛽𝑅 [t-stat] A. R
2 N 
Daily         
   Average -0.011 [2.38] 0.004 [0.62] -0.011 [2.38] 0.381 485,379 
   P05 -0.327 [5.78] -0.092 [2.37] -0.327 [5.78]   
   Median -0.002 [0.14] -0.001 [-0.04] -0.002 [0.14]   
   P95 0.221 [4.10] 0.142 [2.40] 0.221 [4.10]   
Monthly         
   Average -0.005 [0.25] 0.007 [0.37] -0.005 [0.25] 0.453 22,622 
   P05 -0.298 [1.68] -0.251 [1.67] -0.298 [1.68]   
   Median 0.007 [0.09] 0.003 [0.03] 0.007 [0.09]   
   P95 0.237 [1.71] 0.274 [1.60] 0.237 [1.71]   
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Table 4- 7: Twin return differentials and local stock market returns 
This table reports the results from regressions of twin return differentials (of ETF i relative to its own shares traded abroad) 
on country-specific risk factors and the lagged log price differential (omitted for conciseness). Local and foreign stock 
market returns are value-weighted returns across all stocks traded in the local market (of ETF i) and the foreign market (of 
ETF i's foreign twin). The country-specific size (SMB) and value (HML) factors are calculated similar to Fama and French 
(2012) with the exception that the cut-offs are country specific. The P&S LIQ factor corresponds to the innovation in 
country specific liquidity, calculated as in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). The average coefficients are reported. T-statistics 
for the mean are adjusted for cross-correlation as in Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010). Avg. R2 is the average R-
squared, N is the number of observations. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels respectively. 
 Daily  Weekly  Monthly 
Variables (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A: Unit of observation = ETF-pair  
 VW-MKT (Local) 0.064*** 0.068***  0.027*** 0.038***  -0.009 -0.007 -0.011 
 (9.76) (9.53)  (4.21) (5.33)  (-1.02) (-0.60) (-0.91) 
 VW-MKT (Foreign) -0.056*** -0.056***  -0.019*** -0.029***  0.001 0.002 0.004 
 (10.48) (6.57)  (3.69) (4.37)  (0.19) (0.17) (0.42) 
 SMB (Local)  -0.001   0.013*   -0.020* -0.021* 
  (0.23)   (1.89)   (1.87) (1.95) 
 SMB (foreign)  0.008   -0.006   0.000 -0.002 
  (0.68)   (0.82)   (0.02) (0.17) 
 HML (Local)  -0.007   -0.017***   -0.014 -0.013 
  (1.2)   (2.79)   (1.31) (1.27) 
 HML (Foreign)  0.009   0.013***   0.008 0.009 
  (1.41)   (2.10)   (0.99) (1.08) 
 P&S LIQ (Local)         -2.540 
         (0.67) 
 P&S LIQ (Foreign)         -3.408 
         (1.78) 
 Avg. R2 0.43 0.43  0.38 0.40  0.30 0.38 0.41 
 N  491,887 491,845  100,246 100,246  22,764 22,764 22,764 
PANEL B: Unit of observation = Country-pair 
 VW-MKT (Local) 0.058*** 0.060***  0.020*** 0.021***  0.005 0.001 0.002 
 (13.21) (11.29)  (3.91) (3.86)  (1.08) (0.15) (0.32) 
 VW-MKT (Foreign) -0.048*** -0.050***  -0.017*** -0.016***  -0.012*** -0.005 -0.005 
 (12.11) (10.36)  (3.69) (3.40)  (2.39) (0.92) (0.91) 
 SMB (Local)  0.001   -0.002   -0.009* -0.009* 
  (0.13)   (0.48)   (1.72) (1.72) 
 SMB (foreign)  -0.001   0.004   0.005 0.005 
  (0.23)   (0.92)   (1.21) (1.09) 
 HML (Local)  -0.003   -0.005   0.005 0.005 
  (0.62)   (1.16)   (0.89) (0.94) 
 HML (Foreign)  0.005   0.002   -0.005 -0.005 
  (1.37)   (0.73)   (1.26) (1.12) 
 P&S LIQ (Local)         0.299 
         (0.15) 
 P&S LIQ (Foreign)         -1.714 
         (1.37) 
 Avg. R2 0.43 0.43  0.38 0.39  0.26 0.30 0.32 
 N 26,668 26,664  5,667 5,667  1,304 1,304 1,304 
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Table 4- 8: Degree of commonality in twin return differentials and fund-pair liquidity 
The first set of columns (1 and 2) reports comovements from a regression of twin return differentials (between ETF i and its 
own shares traded abroad) on the local-minus-foreign habitat factor (see Table 4). The second set of columns (3 and 4) 
reports comovements from a regression of twin return differentials on the local and foreign stock market returns (see Table 
7). The degree of commonality in twin return differentials is measured either as the fraction of R-squared attributable to the 
local-minus-foreign factor or ii) the beta (or regression) coefficient on the local-minus-foreign factor, using daily data with 
at least 15 observations per month. Results are reported for sub-samples of ETF pairs sorted by their liquidity (quoted spread 
in Panel A; idiosyncratic risk in Panel B). 
 Measures of comovement 
 (1): 𝑅𝐿−𝐹
2  (2): 𝛽𝐿−𝐹  (3): 𝑅𝑀𝐾𝑇
2  (4): 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 
Long-leg Short-leg Mean 
∆Mean 
[t-stat] Mean 
∆Mean 
(t-stat)  Mean 
∆Mean 
(t-stat) Mean 
∆Mean 
(t-stat) 
PANEL A: Sorting variable = Quoted Spread 
  High    High  47.554 
 
0.692   11.580  0.157  
  High    Med  50.706 [7.41] 0.720 [4.84]  11.962 [2.68] 0.192 [7.63] 
  High    Low  54.173 [8.53] 0.777 [10.20]  12.331 [2.62] 0.239 [9.66] 
  Med    High  43.492 
 
0.672   10.721  0.126  
  Med    Med  44.983 [4.40] 0.678 [1.15]  11.263 [4.76] 0.155 [8.03] 
  Med    Low  46.963 [5.80] 0.724 [9.37]  11.680 [3.65] 0.202 [11.75] 
  Low    High  43.969 
 
0.712   10.694  0.147  
  Low    Med  45.849 [4.69] 0.719 [1.22]  11.242 [4.15] 0.184 [8.06] 
  Low    Low  49.316 [8.17] 0.777 [9.51]  11.473 [1.66] 0.218 [6.53] 
PANEL B: Sorting variable = Idiosyncratic Risk 
  High    High  28.589 
 
0.476   9.273  0.033  
  High    Med  40.216 [30.22] 0.606 [21.26]  11.325 [14.90] 0.140 [29.71] 
  High    Low  62.952 [61.43] 0.853 [47.49]  13.818 [18.21] 0.326 [39.57] 
  Med    High  33.539 
 
0.615   9.266  0.031  
  Med    Med  38.320 [15.92] 0.633 [3.66]  10.399 [10.74] 0.112 [26.98] 
  Med    Low  59.458 [69.35] 0.842 [46.78]  13.149 [24.74] 0.274 [40.99] 
  Low    High  50.452 
 
0.764   11.753  0.190  
  Low    Med  52.881 [6.49] 0.786 [4.30]  12.024 [2.16] 0.232 [9.80] 
  Low    Low  54.945 [4.67] 0.841 [9.00]  12.512 [3.15] 0.272 [6.60] 
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Table 4- 9: Does local comovemnet reflect local information? 
This table reports the results from regressions of twin return differentials on the composite local habitat factor (specification 
1 and 2), or separately on the local and foreign habitat factors (specifications 3 to 6). For additional details on the regression 
specification, see Table 4 and 5. Panel A is reported for a sample where the trading locations of the ETF-pairs and their 
underlying securities match, while Panel B is reported for a sub-sample where the trading location of ETF-pairs is different 
from to the trading location of their underlying securities. Coefficients are shown for the average, the 5th, 50th and 95th 
percentile of the distribution. T-statistics for the mean are adjusted for cross-correlation as in Hameed, Kang and 
Viswanathan (2010). T-statistics at the 5th, 50th and 95th refer to fund specific t-statistics and are based on white standard 
errors. A. R2 is the average R-squared across all funds, Nobs is the number of observations. */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels respectively. 
  Daily Monthly  Daily Monthly 
 1: 𝛽𝐿−𝐹 2: 𝛽𝐿−𝐹  3: 𝛽𝐿 4: 𝛽𝐹  5: 𝛽𝐿 6: 𝛽𝐹  
PANEL A: ETF trading location = underlying stock trading location 
 Average coeff. 0.609 0.483  0.623 -0.659 0.397 -0.672 
    (51.82) (11.82)  (27.92) (-40.88) (6.13) (-10.58) 
 Impact (bp) 0.221 0.216  0.117 -0.178 0.115 -0.203 
 Impact (% SD) 0.484 0.380  0.265 -0.400 0.194 -0.367 
 Avg. R2 0.57 0.49  0.59  0.53  
 N obs 273,367 125,08  273,367  12,508  
PANEL B: ETF trading location ≠ underlying stock trading location 
 Average 0.576 0.469  0.606 -0.610 0.497 -0.620 
    (49.86) (8.55)  (28.94) (-35.46) (6.00) (-7.30) 
 Impact (bp) 0.199 0.206  0.102 -0.170 0.140 -0.207 
 Impact (% SD) 0.459 0.381  0.265 -0.394 0.265 -0.370 
 Avg. R2 0.54 0.44  0.56  0.49  
 N obs 229,033 10,394  229,033  10,394  
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Table 4- 10: Return predictability and reversal of mispricing 
This table reports results for estimating pooled OLS regressions of ETF returns in the local (Panel A) or foreign (Panel B) 
market on lagged ETF premiums. In order to distinguish between misvaluation in the local and foreign markets, I calculate 
ETF premiums relative to their underlying portfolio Net Asset Values. The premium of ETF i in the local market is defined 
as 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖,𝑡 /𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡), while the premium of ETF i's shares in the foreign market are defined as 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑝𝑖,𝑡  /𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡) . All regressions include ETF-pair fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in parentheses beneath the 
estimates use serial and cross-sectional correlation adjusted Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors with the maximum lag 
for autocorrelation determined by the number of overlapping days per return horizon. */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels respectively.  
 Return horizon 
Variable Day Week Month Quarter Semi-annum Year 
PANEL A: Y = Local ETF returns  
 PREM Local, t-1 -0.149*** -0.071*** -0.042*** -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.012* 
 (21.56) (12.54) (6.72) (4.49) (3.23) (1.71) 
 PREM Foreign, t-1 0.076*** 0.029*** 0.012 0.010 -0.003 -0.012 
  (7.75) (3.69) (1.39) (1.28) (0.47) (1.29) 
 R2 0.016 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.025 0.055 
 N obs 498,492 496,893 490,493 474,502 448,515 398,149 
PANEL B: Y = Foreign ETF returns 
 PREM Local, t-1 0.079*** 0.045*** 0.018*** 0.008 0.005 0.004 
 (11.81) (8.02) (2.63) (1.34) (0.83) (0.64) 
 PREM Foreign, t-1 -0.134*** -0.079*** -0.044*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.027*** 
  (12.77) (9.78) (4.67) (2.83) (2.97) (2.91) 
 R2 0.014 0.006 0.007 0.015 0.024 0.053 
 N obs 498,492 496,893 490,493 474,502 448,515 398,149 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Exchange-Traded Funds provide investors with easy access to popular investment styles (e.g. 
large, small, value, growth and sector) and foreign stock market indices at low costs. Apart from 
being exchange-traded with real-time prices, a unique feature of ETFs is their open-end structure 
via the share creation/redemption process, which facilitates arbitrage and adds an additional layer 
of liquidity on top of the liquidity of the ETF in the secondary market.  
In the second chapter I build on this idea of a liquidity clientele in ETFs. Specifically, I ask 
whether the liquidity of ETFs relative to its underlying basket encourages shorter-term trading 
(greater net demand for ETFs at shorter horizons and more institutional buying as well as 
selling), greater institutional ownership by shorter-term investors relative to longer-term and 
reduced institutional holding periods. As a starting point, I calculate the relatively liquidity for 
each ETF in the sample. To illustrate, relative liquidity via quoted spreads is highest for small-
cap ETFs, followed by mid- and by large-cap. After the financial crisis in 2008, the underlying 
basket spreads of small-cap ETFs have been around 50 to 100 percent higher than that for the 
ETF itself. As for Amihud’s price impact, I document an increasing trend over time in the large- 
and small-cap size categories. The average small-cap fund has consistently provided positive 
relative liquidity via price impact, while for the average large-cap funds relative liquidity is 
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negative. There are also considerable variations in relative liquidity over time. For ETFs that are 
less liquid than their underlying portfolios at a given point in time, investors may instead buy 
ETFs in the primary market at the cost of the underlying securities, or they can time their 
purchase to coincide with a negative premium.  
If liquidity truly facilitates short-term trading, then fund flows at higher frequencies should 
be more responsive to liquidity than at lower frequencies. I show that relative liquidity (via all 
four dimensions) indeed predicts net flows positively, particularly for weekly and monthly flows. 
In contrast, trading costs that are more relevant for longer-term investors – namely expense ratios 
– are more than 10 times stronger for quarterly net flows as opposed to weekly. 
The decisions that I am considering are that of institutional investors, who have the ability 
to choose between investing in an ETF and its underlying basket. For most retail investors, the 
transaction costs involved in trading the underlying basket are likely prohibitive. To investigate 
the hypothesis that relative liquidity matters primarily for institutional investors, I investigate 
institutional buying and selling separately, defined as the aggregate number of shares bought 
(sold) by 13-F investors during a quarter scaled by ETF shares outstanding at the beginning of 
the quarter. Our results demonstrate that ETF liquidity is a strong predictor of institutional 
buying, and an even stronger predictor institutuional selling. In contrast to Cella, Ellul and 
Giannetti (2013) who find that institutional investors have an incentive to exit during episodes of 
market turmoil when overall liquidity is already depressed, our results speak to the overall 
importance of liquidity for selling, not just during episodes of turmoil. 
In terms of more direct evidence of a liquidity clientele effect amongst institutional 
investors, I show that liquidity is more important for investors with short-term trading needs. 
First, institutional ownership is significantly higher among ETFs with high vs. low relative 
liquidity (50.81 vs. 33.22 percent institutional ownership). Morevoer, institutional investors 
account for more than 80 percent of the trading in ETFs (Aggarwal and Schofield, 2012), while 
in our sample their total ownership is on average roughly 40 percent, which suggests that 
institutions are more active traders in ETFs. I also look separately at institutional ownership by 
short- and long-term investors and show that relative liquidity is two to six times as important for 
short- than for long-term institutional ownership (significant at the one percent level). 
The incidence of short-term trading in ETFs is also evident from a comparison of holding 
durations of ETFs relative to their underlying securities. To illustrate, using quarterly holdings 
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data from SEC 13F filings, I find that the mean holding period for our sample of ETFs is 2.8 
quarters, which is on average two quarters lower than the dollar-weighted holding duration of its 
underlying basket. I also compare the fraction of short-term ownership in ETFs, using the 
definition of transient investors by Brian Bushee (1998), with the fraction of short-term 
ownership in the underlying securities, and find that ETFs have on average 13.1 percent more 
short-term investors.  
These findings provide direct evidence for a liquidity clientele effect in ETFs. The 
attractiveness of liquidity for short-term investors may, in the words of John Boogle, Founder of 
the Vanguard Group, create a temptation to trade. As illustrated in the second chapter, the high 
liquidity of ETFs attracts noise-traders with correlated demand for investment styles. One 
important implication of our findings is that as the ETF market continues to grow, it will likely 
facilitate a higher volume of short-term trading, thereby having an impact on market efficiency 
and volatility, as well as causing higher correlations in the underlying basket of securities. 
In the third chapter I argue that, due to the ease of investing in investment styles with 
ETFs and because of their high liquidity, ETFs attract a clientele of short-term investors with 
correlated non-fundamental demand for investment styles. In this case, liquidity can sometimes 
be detrimental for pricing efficiency, because the high liquidity of ETFs attracts short-term 
investors with correlated non-fundamental demand for investment styles. My findings indicate 
that there is significant commonality in ETF misvaluation at the investment style level (size, 
valuation and sector): changes in ETF misvaluation (proxied by the ETF-NAV return) comove 
positively across ETFs in similar styles, and negatively with ETFs in distant styles. These 
findings agree with the the style switching prediction by Barberis and Shleifer (2003), whereby 
investors allocate capital at the level of the investment style, and reallocate capital across styles 
as one style outperforms its distant style. Although the negative distant-style comovements are 
much weaker in magnitude relative to the own-style comovements, this is not surprising because 
investors may finance the increase in own-style allocations by selling securities in more than just 
one (opposite) style. This is particularly true for styles with less well-defined opposites (such as 
specific sectors, or mid-cap or blend funds).  
The own-style misvaluation factor, proxied by the average change in misvaluation of ETFs 
in a given style, accounts for roughly half of the variation in ETF-NAV returns (regardless of the 
return horizon used). The economic magnitude, as measured by the impact of a one Std. Dev. 
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shock to the own-style factor relative to the Std. Dev. of raw ETF returns is considerable at 4 
percent at the daily horizon, but declines with the return horizon to 1.27 percent at the monthly 
horizon. This finding suggests that the proportion of common non-fundamental risk in ETF 
returns remains roughly constant regardless of the return horizon used, but the economic 
magnitude (relative to raw returns) declines because arbitrage forces are overall more potent at 
longer horizon and eliminate both idiosyncratic and common misvaluation. 
The evidence of style-based commonality in misvaluation implies excess comovement of 
returns, but of which, the ETF or the NAV? To provide more direct evidence that changes in 
ETF misvaluation are in fact driven by misvaluation in the ETF, rather than the NAV leg, I 
investigate the source of misvaluation. Specifically, if an ETF is hit by a positive non-
fundamental demand shock that pushes its price above the underlying portfolio NAV value 
(resulting in a positive ETF premium), then I should observe a reversal in the future ETF returns 
without any impact on NAV returns. Conversely, if the initial positive demand shock was driven 
by positive fundamental news that is absorbed first into ETF prices, then future NAV returns 
should be positive as the NAV catches up with a lag and the ETF return should remain 
unaffected. The empirical results confirm that ETF premiums have a negative and significant 
impact on future ETF returns over a period of three to four days, consistent with premiums 
reflecting non-fundamental demand shock. More importantly, reversals in ETF returns are 
strongest among small-cap ETFs (the category with the highest liquidity relative to their 
underlying basket), which is consistent with the conjecture that liquidity attract short-term 
investors with a greater exposure to non-fundamental demand shocks. This finding also rejects 
the alternative hypothesis that stale pricing among underlying small-cap stocks is responsible for 
the common factor in misvaluation among small-cap ETFs. Long-term buy-and-hold investors 
can take advantage of the misvaluation by timing their purchases to coincide with a point in time 
where premiums are at or below zero.  
Moreover, current ETF premiums also forecast future NAV returns negatively over a four 
day period (positive on first day, negative on the remaining days), which is opposite to what the 
information diffusion view would predict. Such a negative relationship can, however, arise when 
investors experience non-fundamental demand shocks and trade sequentially. In this case 
liquidity goes first to the most liquid securities (ETFs) and when liquidity dries up, demand goes 
to the next most liquid ETF and so on, until no more ETFs are sufficiently liquid relative to their 
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underlying securities, in which case the demand goes to the underlying securities. Thus, when 
ETF premiums reflect large demand shocks, it is likely that both ETFs and their underlying 
securities are affected, but the impact is on average greater for ETFs due to their high liquidity.  
I also provide additional evidence that commonality in misvaluation is in fact driven by 
demand shocks. First, I find similar style-based comovements in proxies for relative demand 
shocks (relative turnover and relative ETF price impact) with most of the effect originating from 
ETF, rather than the NAV leg. Existing studies argue that commonality in liquidity arises either 
from either from the demand or the supply side. The demand-side view argues that commonality 
in liquidity arises because of correlated trading activity (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 
2000; Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk, 2012), demand by institutional owners (Kamara, Lou and 
Sadka, 2008), by investor sentiment (Huberman and Halka, 2001) or by the price impact of 
correlated liquidity needs (Greenwood and Thesmar, 2011). In this case I can view commonality 
in ETF liquidity as a proxy for correlated demand. The supply-side view argues that liquidity 
commonality is explained by the funding constraints of financial intermediaries. Several 
theoretical models predict that commonality in liquidity, via illiquidity spirals or feedback loops, 
increases during periods when arbitrage capital is limited. My evidence of style-based 
commonality in liquidity has not been documented in prior literature. This result is more 
consistent with commonality in demand shocks rather than commonality in the fund constraints 
of financial intermediaries because the latter is typically characterized as a market-wide (rather 
than a style-based) phenomenon.  
Finally, I find that the magnitude of commonality in misvaluation is significantly stronger 
for ETFs with greater commonality in demand shocks, and for ETFs with more desirable 
liquidity characteristics confirming my conjecture that due to the ease of investing in investment 
styles with ETFs and because of their high liquidity, ETFs attract a clientele of short-term 
investors with correlated non-fundamental demand for investment styles.  
In the fourth chapter I investigate whether the trading by a local (country-specific) 
clientele in Exchange-Traded Funds can induce a country-specific factor in ETF misvaluation. 
Identification is uniquely achieved by looking at pairs of ETFs from different countries with 
identical fundamentals (i.e. passively tracking an identical benchmark index), but different 
clienteles. My findings indicate that twin return differentials (based on local-minus-foreign 
ETFs), contain a strong country-specific common factor which I refer to as the local habitat 
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factor. This common factor accounts for almost half of the variation in twin return differentials. 
The economic significance of the local habitat factors is also strong: a one Std. Dev. increase in 
the local habitat factor (relative to a one Std. Dev. increase in raw ETF returns) is associated with 
an increase of 15.34 percent in return differentials at the daily horizon, and a 3.75 percent 
increase at the monthly horizon. This declining magnitude is consistent with arbitrage activity, 
but due to limits-to-arbitrage the effect remains highly significant even at the monthly horizon. 
An important and interesting alternative explanation is that coutry-specific commonality in 
twin return differentials reflects differences in information diffusion between local and foreign 
securities. Specifically, if local investors are better or faster at processing information about 
abstract local fundamental factors, then it can give rise to commonality in the twin return 
differentials of local ETFs relative to their foreign peers. I provide several tests to rule out such 
an explanation. First, I compare the degree of commonality in misvaluation for two sub-samples: 
a) a sample where the trading location of ETF-pairs is different from to the trading location of 
their underlying securities with b) a sample where the trading locations of the ETF-pairs and 
their underlying securities match. The results do not materially differ between the two samples.  
Third, I compare the degree of commonality in twin return differentials among ETFs with 
identical fundamentals, but different levels of liquidity (and non-trading probability). My 
findings indicate that the degree of commonality in twin return differentials increases from 28.6 
to 40.2 to 62.9 percent (as a proportion of total variation in twin return differentials) when the 
liquidity of the foreign ETF increases from low, to medium to high, holding constant the 
liquidity of the local ETF. This finding is inconsistent with the alternative explanation of 
information diffusion, which predicts stronger results for less liquid ETFs that have a higher 
degree of non-trading (or stale pricing) probability, but the result can be rationalized in the 
context of local-trading induced misvaluation. In the cross-section of securities, demand is likely 
to go first to the most liquid securities, implying that commonality in twin return differentials 
could be stronger for more liquid securities because they attract shorter-term investors. The 
investors who experience local demand shocks are likely to be shorter-term because in the 
preferred habitat model, demand shocks reflect changes in sentiment, risk-aversion or liquidity 
needs, which reflect short-term changes.  
If ETF misvaluation truly reflects local-trading induced misvaluation, it should not be 
confined to the ETF market. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that changes in ETF 
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misvaluation are positively (negatively) correlated with stock market returns in the local 
(foreign) market. This relationship is strongest at the daily horizon, weaker but still significant at 
weekly horizon, and disappears entirely at the monthly horizon. This finding implies that 
misvaluation in local stock market returns, at least on a value-weighted basis, declines rapidly 
with the return horizon. It is certainly possible that specific types of stocks are more exposed to 
local misvaluation. Specifically, smaller stocks and growth stocks are more likely to be held by 
local investors (Kumar and Kornioitis, 2013) and may therefore be more exposed to demand 
shocks by local investors. Although my results reveal a positive a significant relationship 
between twin return differentials and a local variant of the SMB factor, and a negative and 
significant relationship with HML factor at the weekly horizon, this result does not hold at other 
horizons, nor is it economically very important. In order to properly assess whether local stock 
returns are also exposed to the local habitat factor (instead of trying to explain changes in ETF 
misvaluation), I need to formally investigate the asset pricing implications of the local habitat 
factor for stock returns. I leave this for future research. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A3-1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Variables Description / Calculation Source 
IFLt 
Dollar value of daily net share creations over the period t (week, month or quarter) 
scaled by beginning-of-period AUM. 
Bloomberg 
CIFLt-4 ln(1+cumulative dollar inflows up to month t-4 / AUM on 01/2006) Bloomberg 
ETF Ret Monthly ETF return inclusive of dividends CRSP 
AUM Number of shares outstanding multiplied by NAV. Bloomberg 
Age (Current Date-Inception)/365 Morningstar 
PREM Average monthly PREM, where PREMd-1 = ln(ETF mid-price) – ln(NAV) 
CRSP / 
Bloomberg 
Track. Err. Tracking error, i.e. the monthly standard deviation of the daily change in premiums. 
CRSP / 
Bloomberg 
EXP Ratio 
The percentage of fund assets used to pay for operating expenses and management fees, 
including 12b-1 fees, administrative fees, and all other asset-based costs incurred by the 
fund, except brokerage costs. Sales charges are not included. 
Morningstar 
VIX S&P 500 option implied volatility CBOE 
TS 
The difference in yields on a 10 year U.S. government bond yield and a 3 month U.S. 
T-bill 
Datastream 
P&S LIQ Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure of aggregate liquidity WRDS 
Liquidity measures (Note: all variables are signed such that higher values indicate greater liquidity) 
Quoted 
Spread  
𝑄𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ log [
𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑑 − 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑑
(𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑑 + 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑑)/2
]
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
 
where ASK and BID refer to closing ASK and BID prices of the ETF i on day d. Nt refers 
to the number of days in month t. 
CRSP 
Price Impact  
𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐻𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ log [
|𝑅𝑖,𝑑|
𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑
]
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
 
where R is the ETF return (in %) and DVOL is the dollar volume on day d. Daily 
observations beyond the 99.5th percentile are discarded. 
CRSP 
Turnover  
𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑
]  
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
 
where VOL is the share volume of ETF i on day d, SHR is shares outstanding. Daily 
observations beyond the 99.5th percentile are discarded. 
CRSP / 
Bloomberg 
Share 
Creation 
Activity  
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 +
1
𝑁𝑡
∑
|𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑 − 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑−1|
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑑−1
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
] 
where SHR is shares outstanding for ETF i on day d (from Bloomberg) 
Bloomberg 
REL(LIQ)  
Relative liquidity is the ratio of ETF to underlying portfolio liquidity: 
𝑅𝐸𝐿(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡) =
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑑𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑘,𝑑
𝑈𝑁𝐷/𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑑
𝐸𝑇𝐹
𝐾
𝑘=1
]
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
 
where LIQ is one of the three liquidity measures (for Amihud I use the difference as it is 
in logs). Portfolio liquidity of ETF i is measured as the dollar-weighted average of 
individual asset k’s (monthly) liquidity. 
CRSP / 
Bloomberg 
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APPENDIX A4-1: ETF-DATA CLEANING 
In constructing the levels and changes in premiums, I take great care to deal with outliers and 
data errors in the raw data for the ETF and NAV prices from Bloomberg. First, when the ETF 
mid-quote price is missing, I use the closing price instead. Second, I remove all ETFs from the 
sample with more than 20 percent missing (non-trading) observations for both the ETF and NAV 
prices. Also, for ETF-months where more than one third of ETF or NAV prices are missing due 
to non-trading, I discard that fund-month from the sample. Third, the underlying currency for the 
ETF and NAV prices is sometimes misreported in Bloomberg resulting in a sequence of extreme 
positive or extreme negative premiums. In such cases the correct exchange rate is manually 
applied. Fourth, the time-stamp for the official NAV price is sometimes off by one day compared 
with the official NAV observations from Morningstar or the iNAV series from Bloomberg (in 
1.5 % of daily observations). In such cases I prioritize official NAV prices from Morningstar 
(when correct) over iNAV prices from Bloomberg. To determine whether the alternative NAV 
prices have a correct time-stamp, I require that the correlation between the “correct” NAV return 
and the ETF return is more than 0.5 greater than the correlation between the “wrong” NAV 
returns and the ETF return. 
Next, I take a closer look at the premiums. For a handful of observations the premium 
based on mid-point prices is far larger than the premium based on closing prices (10 percentage 
point difference). In such cases I use the premium (and ETF return) based on closing prices 
instead. A handful of premiums are greater than 20 % in absolute magnitude. These are 
considered to be data errors similar to Petajisto (2013), and are discarded from the sample.  
A simple correlation analysis between ETF, NAV and underlying index returns (UND) can 
be used to detect anomalous observations. There are three correlations to consider. First, the 
correlation between the NAV and the UND returns must be close to 1, unless the fund uses 
sample replication (rare in my sample). Second, the correlation between the NAV and ETF 
returns should generally also be highly positive, but it can be lower when the ETF is highly 
mispriced. Third, the correlation between the ETF and the UND return should also be high, but 
generally lower than that between the ETF and the NAV. I take action when NAV returns (based 
on iNAVs) are more highly correlated with both ETF and UND returns (by 0.1 on average) 
relative to official NAV returns, and when the correlation between ETF and UND returns is 
greater than the average correlation between official NAV and ETF returns, and that between 
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official NAV and UND returns. In such cases I replace all variables using official NAV prices 
with those using iNAV prices. Roughly 3 % of observations are affected. Also, when premiums 
based on official NAV prices are missing, I use iNAV prices and returns instead. To ensure 
accuracy of iNAV returns, I require that the correlation between ETF and iNAV returns, and that 
between UND and iNAV returns to be greater than 0.5. 
Finally, to mitigate the impact of any remaining outliers, I winsorize all measures of 
returns and misvaluation at 5 Std. Dev. from the mean fund-by-fund. 
APPENDIX A4-2: STOCK-DATA CLEANING 
The following static screens are applied to stock-level data from Datastream: I keep major 
listings (MAJOR="Y"), stocks located in the domestic market (e.g. GEOGN="GERMANY) and 
firms of the equity type (TYPE="EQ"). I cross-check the security type from Bloomberg to 
ensure that only common equity is retained (SECURITY_TYP=” Common Stock”) and that the 
primary security of a company trades in the domestic market (e.g. 
EQY_PRIM_SECURITY_COMP_EXCH=”GR” for Germany). Financial firms are removed 
from the sample (ICB-sector code = 8000). 
The following dynamic screens are employed: 
1. In order to minimize potential biases arising from low-price and illiquid stocks, I delete 
”penny” stocks from the sample. Specifically, stocks with beginning-of-period prices 
below 0.50 USD. (Schmidt et al., 2014)  
2. Discard all price observations where the price is greater than 1,000,000 of the domestic 
currency. (Schmidt et al., 2014) 
3. I set the daily return to be missing if any daily return above 150% (inclusive) is reversed 
the following day. Specifically, the daily returns for both days t and t-1 are set to missing 
if [1+r(i,t)][1+r(i,t-1)]-1<50 % , where r(i,t), is the simple return for day t, and at least 
one of the two returns is 150% or greater. (Schmidt et al., 2014; Lee, 2011) 
4. If daily returns are greater than 375 percent, I exclude returns from day -1 to +1 around 
the extreme event. (Bartram, Griffin, Lim,  and Ng, 2014) 
5. To handle splits, mergers, and potential data errors, daily returns of the extreme 0.1% 
(inclusive) at the top or bottom of the cross-section of each country are set to missing for 
that month (Amihud, 2002; Hou, Karolyi, and Kho, 2006; Lee, 2011). 
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APPENDIX A4-3: THE MECHANICS OF ARBITRAGE AND CROSS-LISTINGS WITH 
EUROPEAN ETF 
ETFs have an open-ended structure that is available to select institutional investors (known as 
Authorized Participants, APs) via the creation/redemption process. This process is an arbitrage 
mechanism by which Authorized Participants (APs) exchange the underlying basket for ETF 
shares with the ETF manager when there is excess demand for the ETF, or when it is trading at a 
premium relative to Net Asset Value (share creation). APs exchange ETF shares for the 
underlying basket when the opposite occurs (share redemption). 
This arbitrage process is the same for ETFs traded in the U.S. or Europe. The main 
difference is that in the U.S., ETFs are traded across multiple trading venues (e.g. NYSE ARCA, 
NASDAQ, BATS, Direct Edge-X), but trades are settled in one depository system (the 
Depository Trust Company). In contrast, European ETFs are listed on multiple national markets 
– up to five – and secondary market trades are settled in the central securities depository (CSD) 
of the country in which the trade was executed. This structure of multiple cross-listings and 
settlement systems imposes additional costs on arbitrageurs, thereby worsening pricing 
efficiency.  
European ETFs can be listed in one of three ways: 1) the classic-listed model, 2) the 
Depositary Receipt model or 3) the split structure
55
.  
First, the classic-listed model is typically used by ETFs domiciled in Ireland or 
Luxembourg
56
, but listed in France. In this case, the ETF sponsor only uses one central securities 
depository (CSD) to create or redeem ETF shares, referred to as the issuer depository. Other 
depositories wanting to settle ETF trades are called investor depositories. Cross-border 
arbitrageurs wanting to transfer newly created ETF shares from the issuer depository to investor 
depositories (e.g. France) can do so electronically, but this creates additional costs every time 
shares are moved across depositories
57
. This method cannot be used when depositories are not 
linked to each other, or if regulators prohibit it (such as in Germany). In some cases, transfers 
between two markets need to through a third depository (e.g. in order to move an Irish ETF from 
the Dutch to the Italian market, you would need to go through Germany). 
                                                 
55
 http://www.securitiestechnologymonitor.com/blogs/european-etfs-dozens-depositories-dtc-28241-1.html 
56
 As of March 2013, more than 84 % of all European ETFs are domiciled in either Luxembourg, or Ireland (80 % 
for my sample of countries). http://www.pwc.lu/en/fund-distribution/docs/pwc-publ-european-etf.pdf 
57
 Financial Times Alphaville posted by Izabella Kaminska on Tuesday September 20th, 2011 13:19 
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Second, the depository receipt model is similar to the American Depository Receipt (ADR) 
model for cross-listed stocks. This model is often used by ETFs domiciled in Ireland, but listed 
in Germany. In this case the investor depository is not allowed to transfer shares electronically. 
Instead, another party (typically a bank) has to re-issue a number of ETFs into the remote 
depository, lock them away, and issue depository receipts to local investors. This can be costly 
because ETF arbitrage involves frequent share creations / redemptions, unlike for cross-listed 
shares. In addition, the process can be operationally challenging as the re-issued ETF receipts 
may have different identification codes (ISIN’s) making it harder for a broker’s back-office 
system to handle and increasing the risk for settlement failures.  
Third, the split structure is a hybrid of the other two. In this case ETFs are simultaneously 
issued into multiple depositories (e.g. ETFs domiciled in Ireland are listed in both Germany and 
the U.K.). This process is operationally complicated because it requires manual processing. A 
broker-dealer has to send an instruction – often by fax – to each depository to deliver ETFs to a 
transfer agent in one market, and to receive ETFs from a transfer agent in the other market. This 
process can take from one to several days, especially if correct communication protocols are not 
followed, increasing the risk of settlement failure.  
These complications in the transfer and settlement of ETF shares - including the 
requirement to have depository accounts in each country and follow post-trading rules in each 
jurisdictions -  increase operational costs and increase the risk of costly settlement failures, 
particularly for cross-border arbitrageurs
58
. In an effort to avoid settlement failures, market 
makers typically deposit their inventories of ETFs at different CSDs across Europe, which leads 
to a fragmentation of liquidity
59
. This has also been cited as a deterrent for institutional investors 
and for asset growth
60
. Another problem with the multiple listing & settlement is that prime 
brokers and clearinghouses may use a so-called omnibus account at the CSD. This means that 
                                                 
58
 Managing the settlement procedure efficiently is essential for APs, according Mr Butler of Northern Trust. 
Financial Times by Chris Flood on September 19, 2011 12:36 am.: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2cef77ae-d00b-11e0-
81e2-00144feabdc0.html. 
European exchanges have a policy of forcing a buy-in, in which case the exchange buys-in the securities at current 
market value and forcing the defaulting seller to cover the costs. 
(http://www.etf.com/publications/journalofindexes/joi-articles/7260-the-fragmentation-of-the-european-etf-
market.html) 
59
 “ETFs: building liquidity” on 02 Nov 2010: http://www.professionaladviser.com/etfm/feature/1866073/building-
liquidity 
60
 Financial Times by Chris Flood on February 11, 2014 6:35 pm: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e382016a-932e-11e3-
b07c-00144feab7de.html 
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ETFs can be loaned out by the clearinghouse to another investor without the knowledge or 
approval from the owner of the ETF. ETFs that are lent cannot be transferred, and can therefore 
not be used in cross-border arbitrage trades. 
 
 
